October 16, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
have been sent from tlie Italian front. Some few- 
have come from the Russian. We know that at 
most four corps were in this region before the 
attack began. That he has been able to concen- 
trate and will be able to maintain ten field corps 
upon this new front is not credible for exactl}' the 
same reason that the enemy has been unable to 
reinforce, as he must have wished to reinforce, the 
striking sectors in Lithuania (especially in the 
north of Lithuania) during the last three weeks 
of fighting, and for the same reason that he has 
been unable to reinforce as he would his Western 
front. 
It is perfectly clear that the enemy for many 
weeks past has been holding the Western front 
with a calculated minimum of men, reinforce- 
ments for Avhich have been doled out sparingly. 
It is perfectly clear that on the Italian frontier 
he has equally been on the defensive, and he would 
not have wasted upon that defensive more than 
another minimum. It is further clear that his 
action in Lithuania was, even so late as three 
weeks ago, composed of a very determined offen- 
sive, and if that offensive has not made good it 
is because it could not make good. 
It may be argued .justly that this insufficiency 
of men on the East and on the West was due to 
the fact that he was gradually massing on the new 
front. But that he would have massed upon the 
new front so very large a body as ten corps is, I 
repeat, impossible. He has half that number : 
forces equivalent to the Serbian Army itself or 
not much greater. 
The enemy could undoubtedly, if a decision 
upon this new front meant the end of the war, 
risk everything; badly weaken his other lines and 
produce upon the Danube much more than 500,000 
men. He could do in this grand strategy what 
has been done over and over again in tactical 
experiment, to wit, risk weakness everywhere 
except at the decisive point and gamble on his 
power to decide all by one stroke at that point 
before his starving of strength elsewhere had time 
to turn against him. 
But the enemy's position is not of this 
sort. 
He is fighting, not a battle, but a series of 
campaigns. To risk grave weakness anywhere 
would be to risk the whole war. And even though 
it were excusable to play for such enormous 
stakes with a decision clearly before him on the 
new Balkan front, it would be inexcusable, or 
childish, to do so under the actual conditions. 
For there is no decision possible upon this 
new front. 
The matter is so plain, it is so clearly a thing 
of the map and of simple calculation, that a 
neglect of it is inexcusable. 
It is capable of positive proof. 
For, let us suppose an extreme case. Let us 
suppose that before December the enemy were to 
destroy the Serbian Army. Let us suppose that 
he were to hold within that time securely the line 
to Constantinople, and let us suppose that he 
were, shortly after the expiration of that time, to 
be able to munition the existing Turkish forces 
and to equip existing trained and large Turkish 
reserves of men. Wliat then? Would he have 
won the war ? 
He would not be within a thousand miles of 
winning it. 
He would have produced a very great poli- 
tical effect, and I shall try in conclusion to show 
that political effect is here his chief object. He 
would have put Allied pressure upon the Balkans 
out of the question and the Allied objective of 
opening the Black Sea equally out of the question. 
He would have made it theoretically possible, in 
the course of many more months, to lay the foun- 
dations for a tardy, or ultimately a momentous, 
campaign, through the North-east parts of Asia. 
He might ultimately (in theory) threaten Egypt. 
But, meanwhile, what will be happening else- 
where ? 
Can any sane calculation regard the remain- 
ing enemy forces as free to achieve a laborious and 
tardy success over the mule paths of Asia Minor, 
the Syrian tracks, and the Desert of Sinai, while 
their effectives on the two European fronts 
decline at the rate of 100,000 a week, while the 
persistent hammering and persistent cracking of 
the all-important defensive line in France and 
Flanders (even as I write comes news of a whole 
corps out of action on the Lens — La Bassee front 
alone — 8,000 dead) is continuing, and while the 
Russian reserves, though requiring months for 
the task, are being armed for an offensive which 
only time delays and which is mathematically, 
certain to appear in its turn — a balance is al- 
ready achieved. 
The conception is an impossible one. It is not 
a military conception at all. Such bold strokes 
have been attempted by military nations at the in- 
ception or in the midst of their effort, with full 
reserves of men behind them. They would have 
no meaning in a situation like that now imposed 
upon the enemy. 
The enemy is, then, coming upon this new 
front in grossly insufficient strength. But he is 
doing it because, allied with Bulgaria, hia 
strength is far superior to that of the Serbians. 
It is sufficiently superior to ensure victory. If he 
is equivalent in number to the Serbians the Bul- 
garians as a whole much more than double his 
effectives. They bring to much more than 2 to 1 
the forces Serbia has to meet, and, as we have 
seen, from the lie of the map they at any rate com- 
mand north-eastern Serbia and its railway. 
Bulgaria must, indeed, spend some of her 
forces in watching other regions. But the bulk 
of them are available against Serbia alone, if 
Serbia alone be in the field. 
The least number that will turn the scale is 
200,000 men. This figure would not command a 
superiority, but it would prolong the defence, and 
it would have effects exceedingly important at 
this particular crisis. It would give Bulgaria 
pause. 
But in stating this number 200,000, one must 
remember the two remaining questions, the third 
question, the question of time, and the fourth, the 
question of supplies. 
TIME AND SUPPLIES. 
In order to appreciate the factor of time the 
reader may cast his eye upon the following 
Sketch 111., where S is Salonika, N Nish, B Bel-" 
grade, the dotted line the Bulgarian frontier the 
broad black line passing through B the Danube- 
Save frontier, and the line B.N.Sf. the railway 
Belgrade— Nish— Sofia, a hold upon which is aU 
that the enemy desires. 
