Octc-ber 23, 1915, 
LAND AND WATER. 
THE POSITION IN SERBIA. 
By HILAIRE BELLOC. 
NOTE Thij article has been submitted to tlie Press Bureau, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes no 
responsibility {or the correctness ol the statements. 
In accordance Tvith the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating! this Article must only be 
regarded as approximate, and no deQni te strength at any point is indicated. 
THE nature of the enemy's campaign in 
Serbia is now clear enough. It has 
been going on, at the moment these 
words are written, exactly a fortnight, 
and both its general strategy and its particular 
local results are apparent. 
The unknow^n element is the measure to which 
the Allies can come to the relief of Serbia : the 
measure in time and the measure in numbers. 
The numerical problem has already been 
put before the readers of this journal. Roughly 
speaking, wh?,t Serbia has left of effectives are 
being attacked by an equal or slightly smaller 
number of effectives from Austro-Gerniany 
across the Save and Danube front. There 
are certain diversions made by the enemy across 
t!ie Drina, the western boundary of the State, 
but the main effort is obviously across the Save 
and the Danube, and nearly all of it across the 
Danube alone. 
The enemy could not hope to achieve a de- 
cision even against the Serbians alone in this 
quarter in his present condition of exhaustion in 
eft'ectives. His approaching exhaustion is, in- 
deed, the capital and dominating factor in the 
whole war. But some months ago, probably when 
his success was most striking, and when even 
sober calculation of the future was disturbed 
by the immediate results of the Polish campaign, 
he obtained a promise of aid from the King of 
Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian forces available 
outnumber those of Serbia. Even with the aid 
of Bulgaria he is unlikely to obtain so much as a 
local decision — so much as the destruction of the 
Serbian Army — but lie is likely to obtain with 
that aid a certain immediate strategic objective, 
which is the possession of the international rail- 
way which runs from the enemy's own territory 
across the Save to Belgrade, thence through Nish, 
the old capital of the Serbians, across the frontier 
of Bulgaria to Sofia, and so to Constantinople. 
The enemy also desires to obtain possession of 
that little north-eastern corner of Serbia (A) which 
still cuts him off from direct communication with 
Bulgaria and Turkey by the River Danube, an 
avenue of supply second in value only to the 
railway. 
How excellent the enemy's chances are of 
reaching these immediate objectives will be ap- 
parent by the elementary sketch I here append. 
In order to get hold of the Danube route all 
[Copyright in America by "The New York American."} 
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