]. A X D AND AV A T E R 
Octobci- 23. 
more threaten Sofia and the cciitr?.! plain of tlie 
Bulgarian State. The Bulgarians coukl no longer 
act indepeuiJenlly upon the Serbian frontier, and 
the diversion would change the whole situation, 
for any threatening of Sofia would also threaten 
that avenue of communications with Constanti- 
nople which the Germans are fighting to obtain. 
Everything, however, depends upon the 
numbers which the Allies can here bring into 
play. That is a point upon which, in the nature 
of things, no information can l)e given. Any 
judgment passed, therefore, upon the situation 
as a whole, and dependent upon a calculation of 
the strength of the Allies here, the numbers they 
intend to send, and the rate at which they can hi 
sent and munitioned, is valueless, because the 
chief elements in the calculation are wanting. 
Sundry journalists in this country have discussed 
the matter as though these elements were in their 
possession. TIic} are not. It is foolish to cal- 
culate, and it is twenty times more foolish to 
advise the soldiers who alone possess the elements 
upon which a judgment can be formed in this 
matter. All that is clear is that the disembark- 
ing and munitioning of a force sufficient to 
counterbalance the Austro-German-Bulgarian 
combination must be a matter of gi'eater time 
than the completion of tlie Bulgarian and Austro- 
German campaign in the north-eastern corner of 
the State. 
It remains to be pointed out that an Allied 
force would have a military role of great import- 
ance, even if it were not in time to prevent the 
first objective of the enemy from being reached. 
For, suppo.se the enemy in possession of the 
Danube, between Salon ica and Bulgaria, and 
also in possession of the railways from 
Semcndria and Belgrade to Xish and tlience 
from Nish to Sofia, a large and increasing force 
to the south and to the west of that line upon its 
flank will be a very formidable menace. The 
line could not be securely held until this Allied 
force, combined with the retreating Serbian 
Army, has been defeated, or held upon a line 
stretching securely across the State as far as 
the Rhodope Mountains, at least, and to hold 
such a line the enemy, even with his Bulgarian 
Allies, has not sufficient numbers. 
THE FAILURE BEFORE DVINSK. 
The enemy's efforts on the extreme north, or 
lett, ot his eastern line are very well worth watch- 
ing, because they are typical of the whole situa- 
tion of the war. His business is to take the town 
ot JJvmsk, also the town of Riga, and to hold the 
whole of the Dvina line. Upon that attempt he 
has now been occupied off and on for two months 
the last month of which has been concentrated in 
a special effort to take Dvinsk itself The 
enemy s perpetually repeated offensive— which is 
as perpetually repelled, with very heavy sacrifices 
in men— consists essentially in two sectors cover- 
ing about 150 miles. Tliere is first of all what I 
have called on Sketch IV. Sector 1, the fight 
on the ower Dvina for the town of Riga, for 
behind '/r^i''''''^^ '""' P''^^^"^^ to the kver 
behind it. There is next, in Sector 2, the fight in 
m ttt'tl?""^'^ ^°^' ^'''''^- I<^ ^^^^ ^^ Sector 
Btrenoih ^LTf^ '"V ''""'"" ^"^"^^'ard all his 
stiength just before the fall of Vilna. He took 
ne.:lrichstadt, a bridgehead south of the lower 
mer. he came near to Jakobstadt. His^ only 
'^''^ /^ /' 
W 20 iO 10 fO 
Aides 
difticulties here were the absence of roatls. He 
had fairly hard ground save in front of Riga 
itself (wliere there is a big marsh), but he 
failed to effect a crossing. In the second 
sector in front of Dvina there has been pro- 
duced a most interesting situation. It has not 
only been produced, but it has been prolonged by 
the Russians until it would seem as though the 
Germans over here could not possibly succeed 
unless all their efforts in other fields be abandoned, 
for here also it is the gradual exhaustion of effec- 
tives that is being felt, or, at any rate, a local 
exhaustion due to his drawing of men off for the 
ncAv adventure. 
The country to the west and south of Dvinsk 
is a mass of lakes, large and small, often inter- 
spersed with extensive woodlands and joined 
sometimes by great districts of marsh. One of 
the largest of the latter, which I have marked M 
on Sketch Map V. appended, is the obstacle which 
SchL»<ibfl-<.i 
Miles 
