October 23, 1915. 
LAND AND .WATER. 
first prevented the enemy from turning the Rus- 
sian line 1)y its left or eastern end. Meanwhile 
the present Russian positions run from Schloss- 
berg in front of Illukst, through C'hikovo, north 
of Lake Sventen, thence across the Novo Alexan- 
drovsko road to a point somewhere near the X 
(the line just here is not clear) upon the railway 
to Mlna, cover Lake Dryswiaty, and pass through 
and hold the village Usotje on the west bank of 
Lake Bokinskoje. 
It is clear that so long as that line is main- 
tained the enemy is being held before Dvinsk, 
just as he was held before Warsaw. The enemy's 
efforts nowhere reach nearer than six or seven 
miles from the town and, what is most important, 
his two main avenues whereby he could turn the 
Russian positions, the railway to Vilna and the 
main road running south of Dvinsk to Widsy, are 
held by bodies thrust much farther forward from 
the town thp.n those upon the west. The main 
German effort will presumably be concentrated 
upon the 15 mile front between Illukst and the 
Novo Alexandrovsko road. Their last violent 
attacks were at the two points just mentioned, 
Schlossberg and Chikovo. They both broke down. 
Later news shows that the Russians have dis- 
lodged them from just south of Dryswiaty Lake 
and they are also beaten back across the River 
Dryswiaty, where it runs oddly parallel and out- 
side Lake Obole just west of Usotje village. 
Now, the position deducible from such a state 
of affairs seems to be roughly this. The enemy 
must here have an objective. He is not merely 
•wasting men in violent counter-offensive move- 
ments on a front of something like 150 miles 
mei'ely in order to preserve a certain line which 
has no strategic meaning at all. He is reallv trv- 
ing trying to get the line of the Dvina, Riga, and 
Dvinsk. He may yet succeed. _He is building 
roads. But he has failed for two months. The first 
cause of this state of affairs would seem to be the 
new munitionment of the Russians; and the 
second a certain balance already established be- 
tween the enemy's own power of munitionment 
and recruitment in this field and that of our Ally. 
THE ENEMY'S EFFECTIVES. 
To this question of numbers, which more 
than ever dominates the whole campaign, and is 
the basis of any reasonable judgment of the 
future, I will turn at the close of this article, but 
for the moment it is sufficient to point out that it 
is being felt in every part of the field. Not only 
have you the Austro-German force against Serbia 
barely sufficient in numbers for its task, and prob- 
ably composed of material already inferior, but 
you have in the abortive attempts to take Dvinsk 
the same halting of strength apparent. 
The Balkan adventure has withdrawn from 
the Russian front a certain number of men; not a 
very large number, perhaps, but, say, five or six 
divisions. The Russian centre has been drawn 
upon for reinforcing this northern part of the line 
of the Dvina until it has become wholly inactive. 
iThe enemy is still strong enough to maintain him- 
self upon the lines he reached upon the borders 
of Russia proper in Lithuania, but he is no longer 
strong enough to advance. And when one says 
" strong enough " one means not only that his 
recruitment in men, but that his rate oi munition- 
ment are now balanced against the forces opposed 
U> him even u^Jon this side. Upon the Western 
side, as we know, the balance has been heavilj;; 
against him for some time and is increasing. 
It is true to say, and must be repeated, that 
with every week that passes the enemy's effort will 
be more and more political and less and less stra- 
tegic. It must be so in the nature of things. For 
whenever a man's reserves are near their limit, in 
fui)/ struggle, wdiether in some financial contest or 
in strength, as in a wrestling match, or in num- 
bers, as in this case of the enemy in the present 
great war, he has only two policies open to him. 
Either he must throw the last of his energies 
into one supreme effort which will almost invari- 
ably include diversion to another field of the more 
direct methods hitherto attempted, or he must try 
and husband his strength and use it sparingly 
in order to spin it out. If there is any conclusion 
from the present position to be drawn more 
clearly than another it is that those who now 
govern the whole of our allied enemies unchecked 
and uncriticised from one united command have 
put their money upon the former of these two 
policies. It is a point which has already been 
emphasised in these columns and which must be 
repeated, for upon our judgment of it will very 
largely depend, not only our appreciation of 
the present phase of the war, but of its possible 
duration and of its probable political con- 
clusion. 
But there are in this calculation certain 
elements which, though they have been repeated 
over and over again under the best authority and 
with elaborate arguments and citation of evidence 
of facts to prove them, have not yet sunk into 
the public mind and do not yet mould public 
opinion. 
Peoi^le still talk as though the calculation of 
enemy numbers and of remaining enemy re- 
sources were a piece of private amusement in- 
dulged in at random and leading to am^ 
number of various conclusions. I, therefore, once 
more this week, at the expense of some consider- 
able repetition, because I believe it to be the chief 
interest of this moment, return to that general 
statement of the enemy's resources as compared 
with those of the Allies, which is at the basis of 
all judgment of the war, and further allude to the 
objects the enemy had in view in beginning this 
Balkan adventure, and show why those objects 
may be regarded as political and strategical in 
so far as the two can be distinguished. 
THE RELATIVE NUMERICAL POSI- 
TION OF THE ENEMY. 
To begin at the beginning. A nation puts 
into the field for the prosecution of the war cer- 
tain forces divided into units, that is, corps, 
divisions, brigades, batteries, squadrons, batta- 
lions. It is compelled by the very nature of 
military organisation to arrange its strength in 
this fashion. It doesn't say, " I have a million 
men available. I will train and equip them and 
put them into the field." What it says is, " I will 
put only so many units into the field as 
I can maintain ' there at full strength 
throughout the probable course of the war 
in spite of the probable rate of ivastage." 
For as the men in the various units are put' 
out of action by death, capture, wounds, and ill- 
ness of every kind developed on active service, 
their places must be taken by fresh men who have 
been trained and equipped beiiind the armies, and 
