October 30, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
REPLY TO GERMAN CRITICISM. 
By HILAIRE BELLOC. 
MOTE Tills article liaa been subniittetl t» l!ie Press Bureau, which does not object to the publication as censoreJ, and takes no 
responsibility for the correctness ot the statements. 
In accordance with the requirements ot the Press nureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustratint; this Article must on^y be 
regarded as approximate, and no deQnile strength at any point is indicated. 
THE Serbian situation is one geographic- 
ally simple enough, and to be seized as a 
whole with comparatively few points 
upon the map. 
The military objective in the campaign is 
not the destruction of the Serbian Army (as it 
would be in a war of wliieh this was the 
main theatre), but the occupation of the 
north-eastern corner of the Serbian State. If 
the enemy can surround and destroy the Ser- 
bian fighting forces so much the better for him. 
But if he does no more than clear the north- 
eastern corner of Serbia and thus seize the rail- 
way, road, and river communication with 
Bulgaria, and therefore with Turkey in Europe 
and Constantinople, he has achieved his purpose, 
because that purpose is mainly political. 
In such a sketch as this Skt'tch A the enemy 
in areas A and B is separated by Serbian territory 
and neutral territory (N). It is his business to 
clear the extreme corner so as to join hands by 
the waterway of the Danube (D. D. D.). and later 
by the railwav (R. R. R.). His progress so far is 
marked by the white belt round the dwindling 
shaded portion, and he thus cuts the oi^ly avenue 
of Serbian supply. 
The enemy cannot hope for a decision in this 
field. He is fighting in it witii little more than five 
per cent, of Jiis effectives in the field, and he ex- 
pects from the occupation of the railway and the 
river, and from the possession of a complete 
avenue of communications right through to the 
Bosphorus, to pi'oduce upon this count ly, especi- 
ally, so strong an effect that either there will be 
at least confusion in the directing powers of 
Great Britain, better still disaffection between 
the Government and the governed, and best of all 
(for him), if it be possible, the growth of varying 
objectives and corresponding disagreements 
between the Allies. 
He further hopes for this military result from 
his action — the diversion of forces for the Bal- 
kans which may relieve the growing pressure 
upon him in the West. This latter point may 
easily be exaggerated. Ten per cent, or less of the 
forces available against him in the West would 
be sufficient to render the enemy's jjosition in the 
Balkans permanently unstable. It is perfectly 
obvious to the most superficial student of military, 
affairs that the railway route, at least, would never 
be secure so long as a considerable undefeated 
array lay upon its flank. 
With the little Serbian forces his immense 
numerical superiority (more than two to one) 
would enable him to deal. And he could keep 
them permanently off the line of communi- 
cations to Constantinople. But a growing num- 
ber of men upon his flank ultimately doubling the 
Serbian forces, and, perhaps, more than doubling 
them, would negative the effect of his earlier 
success. 
What he is gambling on is the necessary 
tardiness with wnich such reinforcements can 
arrive. Before they shall have developed any 
strength he reckons on having the mastery over 
the Near East, on having brought up perhaps a 
certain number of newly-equipped Turkish forces 
(they cannot be very large), and on the possible 
intervention upon his side of the Balkan States 
still neutral. 
Now, the measure of his success hitherto ob- 
tained in this task is already considerable. The 
invasion began upon October 6, it has proceeded 
three weeks, and has more than half accomplished 
its main object of clearing the north-eastern 
corner of the State, and the rate of its advance 
may be judged from the accompanying Sketch I. 
It has been slow (and the conclusions we are to', 
draw from that will be dealt Avith in a moment), 
but it has been uninterrupted. 
In the first fortnight the invasion from 
across the Danube had reached no more than the 
line of dashes upon the next Sketch, I., over page, 
through Pojarevatz, and so south of Belgrade to^ 
near Shavatz. Meanwhile the Bulgarians in! 
the East (witli whose concentration, ended' 
upon October 6, the Auetro-German move ; 
across the Danube exactly corresponded) had only 
just reached, without having crossed, the line 
Kniajevatz-Zicchtar. which is the valley of the, 
Timok River, and wliich carries the railway that- 
reaches the Danube and communicates with Rou- 
manian territory. But in the third Aveek. v.hicli 
has just ended, the situation changed. There waa 
[Copyrigh! in Amerka by "The Nciv York American." 
