October 30, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER 
haustible strength of the eneraj^ that certain 
papers have aheady rendered us familiar with in 
this country. It refers in particular to Land and 
lWater, and in so many words " Warns its readers 
against the calculations of H. Belloc." It does so 
eight or nine times, and in doing so is compelled to 
state definitely what the Germans want us to 
believe. 
I will take the points in this article one by 
one, noting only those which are of an objective 
and precise type. In other words, noting only 
those which can be met and answered. 
I find in the opening of the article the phrase 
that " the extreme numbers which the German 
Empire alone can put in the field "— " was pre- 
pared to put in the field " is a more accurate trans- 
lation of the phrase — " are twelve million men." 
We are all familiar with that sort of non- 
sense in this country. They might just as well say 
a hundred million while they were about it. 
The French General Staff have calculated as 
a maximum for the Germans somewhat over 
eight millions. This calculation is based upon the 
knowledge of not only what they themselves could 
do in a population at least as healthy as that of 
Germany and with a far larger proportion of men 
trained to arms, but also upon the analogy of all 
mobilisation whatsoever, past and present. If 
the German Empire can mobilise twelve millions 
of men before the summer of 1916 then France 
could upon the same estimate mobilise between 
seven and eight millions, which is nonsense. 
One never knows in the presence of an ab- 
surdity quite what sort of prose to use, and this 
talk of twelve million armed Germans is an ab- 
surdity quite out of the common. If one gives 
statements of this kind the adjective they deserve 
one loses emphasis by violence. If one merely 
contradicts them the reader, unused to the parti- 
cular material discussed, may not grasp the 
enormity of the falsehood. 
The basis upon which all reasonable calcu- 
lations are made, not only by the French or 
the English commanders, but by every soldier and 
civilian who h?.s studied this war, and, of course, 
by the enemy's General Staff also, are by this 
time familiar to the readers of Land and Water. 
Briefly, one normally expects the mobilisa- 
tion of about a tenth of the population, but when 
tiie effort is extended to a second year and when 
a supreme effort is made, and perhaps already a 
few elements not quite desirable introduced, you 
may just reach twelve per cent. Twelve million 
for Germany means over seventeen per cent., and 
includes children, elderly men, invalids, lunatics, 
cripples, blind, deaf, and paralytics. 
The next statement prepared for the public 
of this neutral country is to the effect that the 
reserves that Germany has at this moment actu- 
ally in arms and equipped are not less than three 
and a half millions. Later, as we shall see. this 
becomes four millions. 
Tliis is again exactly on the lines of the sort 
of stuff we are used to in the panic Press in this 
country. It clashes with the opening absurdity 
of twelve millions as the number of German effec- 
tives, but, counting their known present losses 
and their known numbers in the field and on aom- 
munications it docs bring the total up to at least 
eleven millions. Even that is very nearly all the 
men of military age admitted in the German 
census figures and without regard to men neces- 
sary for civilian occupation, or to the inefFicients. 
In other words, it is as much nonsense as the rest. 
By this time, though the article has [)ro- 
ceeded but a few lines, the writer is obviously 
aware that an obvious criticism would occur to 
the mind of any one reading it who can use his 
judgment at all, and that criticism is, " If you 
have this gigantic number of reserves, why on 
earth do you leave your lines in Russia so thin 
that at places you are getting sharp local defeats ? 
Why do you leave your line in France so thin 
that if an offensive stroke is undertaken against it 
you are thrown into confusion and have to rush 
up a hotchpot of local reserves, and are in terror of 
its breaking even then? (As is shown by your 
haste in moving those local reserves.) And why 
are you acting in the Balkans with an insufficient 
number of troops ? " 
The writer of the article, having such an 
obvious criticism occurring to him, remarks that 
the General Staff " works like a good chess player, 
and only uses at the right time and place just such 
amount of force as he neeas." 
But the answer to that is that the enemy does 
not use, nor does any sane man use in war " just as 
many men as he needs." He uses all the men he 
can. That he still keeps reserves in order to feed 
his units and to replace wastage, and that his re- 
serves will last some weeks longer no one doubts, 
but that the amount of reserves of the German 
Empire alone is three and a half millions is not 
believed by anyone competent to discuss this ques- 
tion. Statements of that kind are only made in 
the hope that neutral civilian populations — and 
even civilian belligerent populations that are 
cursed with a Press which aids the enemy — may 
by some chance be made to believe them. 
The plain broad statements given over and 
over again in these columns are obvious truths. 
(1) By all the rules of arithmetic the enemy's 
efficient effectives decline in a few weeks. (2) He 
can keep up their mere numbers by admitting 
boys, elderly men, and other inefficients hitherto 
rejected by the doctors. (3) If he does that (as he 
probably will — for most commanders in similar 
circumstances in the past have yielded to such a 
temptation) he will be weaker than if he had stuck 
to efficients alone. 
The next statement made is that the Austro- 
Hungarian losses are no guide to the (German, 
because they are immensely heavier and this, we 
are further told, is due to the squandering of 
human lives " in the hands of such commanders 
as Dankl and Aufferberg " — also to the " relatively 
high number of prisoners in Russia." 
The last point is sound. The number of 
Austro-Hungarian prisoners in Russia is very 
much larger than the total of German prisoners in 
the hands of the French, English, and Russians. 
But the remark about Austrian " expenditure of 
life " and the mention of the two Austrian 
Generals quoted immediately reveals the source 
from which this kind of thing comes. It is Berlin 
sneering at Vienna. Also it is nonfense. The 
service which, rightly or wrongly, has developed 
tactics most costly in human life is the Prussian. It 
is a thing that they can boast of or that can be re- 
proached against them, according to the i>:ood of 
the writer. It is not an ignoble thing, or one 
which any military staff need be ashamed of, to 
say " though we did spend our lives lavishly yet we 
attained our results." 
