October 30, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER 
of a French liner, and finally of the Royal Eduuird 
were proof enough that even isolated under-sea 
boats could very greatly modify the co-operation 
of land and sea forces. The stories which have 
reached us of the doings of our own submarines 
in the Sea of Marmara carry the argument further, 
as tending to show, were the conditions such that 
their numbers could be increased, the whole 
Turkish water transport from the mainland to 
the peninsula would undoubtedly be stopped alto- 
gether. 
The position of British submarines in the 
Baltic and in the Sea of Marmara is in many re- 
spects curiously like, and in many respects curi- 
ously unlike that of the German submarines round 
Gallipoli and in the North Sea and Western 
Atlantic. It is like, because in the Baltic and the 
Sea of Marmax-a our submarines are operating in 
waters nominally commanded by the enemy; un- 
like, because they cannot enter those waters 
except through channels at once narrow and ex- 
tremely well defended, so that to get to their field 
of operation at all is an achievement, not only of 
the greatest possible danger, but one wiiich calls 
for even more skill than courage. The German 
submarine issuing from Zeebrugge or from the 
defences behind Heligoland can reach its hunt- 
ing-ground without serious peril, but, as the fate 
of more than one British submarine shows, to get 
either through the Sound or up and down the 
Dardanelles is a totally different thing. The 
German submarine risks begin when they get into 
the waters we command, but the dangers of entry 
once passed, the British submarines seem to main- 
tain themselves, both in German and in Turkish 
waters, as if the dangers were negligible. These 
things show" a new light upon the efficiency of the 
submarine. 
Writing to a naval friend when the Scott 
controversy was at its height, just before the war, 
I urged that the development of a submarine 
offensive was to us a matter of far less import- 
ance than the development of means for counter- 
acting its attack. My ground was that the sub- 
marine was necessarily the weapon of the weak, 
whereas, in a sea war, we should always be in the 
position of the strong. With an overwhelming 
fleet of battleships and a vast preponderance in 
cruiser strength, the normal condition in the 
waters round these islands — whether the enemy 
came out to fight a sea battle or not — would 
necessarily be that our control would be absolute, 
except for such offensive as submarines and air- 
craft could effect. Our primary duty, then, 
seemed to lie along the line of neutralising that 
menace as far as possible. In saying this, I was 
only repeating what many younger officers in the 
Navy had been urging for years without result. 
It is worth, for instance, remembering that 
Captain Murray Sueter's plea for the study of 
this subject was published so long ago as 1907. 
The fact that our transports were carrying 
Sir John French's Army across the Channel 
within a week or ten days of war breaking out, 
and that that incredible traffic has been undis- 
turbed from that day to this, is proof enough that 
the Navy was quite prepared to defend a limited 
line of communication against under-w sr 
attack. Still, the fact remained that the general 
principles of submarine war, both as regards 
defensive and offensive, had not been thought out. 
iThe loss of six cruisers and a battleship taught 
lessons that any rational analysis of the problem 
should have made unnecessary. The counter-offen- 
sive against the submarine attack on trade is a 
different case altogether. There was some excut';e 
for neglecting to prepare for an onslaught in the 
main completely out of the tradition of civilised 
warfare. 
Fifteen months of naval warfare and eight 
months of trade war have given us an exact 
measure of the capacity of the submarine in 
waters which we control. Why is it that where 
we are in the German position, that is, in the 
Baltic and Marmara Seas, our ratio of sub- 
marine loss and our capacity for submarine 
success are, the first so much below, and the 
second so much above, the German experience? 
The answer undoubtedly is that the German and 
Turkish control of these waters is far less 
efficient than our control of our own. I 
do not know how many submarines we 
have in the Baltic. Whatever the numbers, 
nearly a score of ships, seven transports, 
a destroyer, and now a 9,000-ton cruiser, have 
fallen to their prowess. In the whole month of 
October the German submarines had an almost 
incalculably larger number of targets to go for, 
and have not hit more than ten British ships in 
home waters in the whole month. The first ex- 
planation then is that once in the enemy's waters, 
our submarines have fewer and less skilful 
enemies than the German submarines must face 
round these islands. There is a second explana- 
tion not less true, and in many respects much 
more important. Only vague rumours have so far 
reached us of the doings of Commander Nasmith, 
V.C, and his brother submarine commanders in 
the Sea of Marmara. There may be excellent 
reasons, and probably are, why we should not 
know the full and astounding story of their- per- 
formances. Though we do not know details, 
we know enough to make it reasonably cer- 
tain that the skill, resource, enterprise, and 
courage of our submarine officers completely 
eclipse those of the enemy's men. And it 
is a fact so obvious as to afford the last convincing 
weight to what seems to me to be the final deduc- 
tion to be drawn from submarine experiences of 
the present day. 
I have already noted that the arrival of the 
German submarines very greatly modified the 
extent and the methods of sea and land co-opera- 
tion in the Gallipoli Peninsula. The larger ques- 
tion is : Had these boats arrived before the trans- 
ports, could the landing have been attempted at 
all? The character of that operation has 
been made perfectly apparent both by official 
and unofficial descriptions. I have sug- 
gested above that, offensively, we must look upon 
the submarine as the primary because the sole 
weapon of the weak at sea. But defensively it 
would appear from the Dardanelles experience 
that it most certainly is the weapon of the strong. 
By this I mean that if two German submarines 
operating in waters nominally controlled by the 
invading British could modify the operations off 
Gal] Dli to that extent, will a dozen or a score 
of British submarines operating in waters where 
the preponderance of destroyers would be British 
affect the possibility of an enemy's raiding force 
landing on these shores ? 
Mr. Pollen will lecture on behalf of naval and military charities at 
Kssex Hall, W.C, Oct. 28, at 6.30 p.m. ; Victoria Hall, Halifax, Oct. 31. 
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