LAND AM) WATER. 
November 6, 1915. 
food ?) can reach the Serbian Army from tli^ 
Soiith, that is from the sea. 
The lirst of these great ways, marked (i) (1) 
on sketch I is followed by the main rail\va\ line 
from Salonika to the Danube. It is the trench of 
the V'ardar Ri\er continued in the. trench of the 
I'pper Mora\a River ; for it so happens that 
between these two main valleys there is no very 
hif^'h or difficult land, but only a low saddle near 
Kumanovo. 
The other main road north marked (2) (2) 
on the same sketch I, branching from I'skub, is 
more difficult, but is also followed by a railwaw 
It goes over the Pass of Katchanik and follows 
after that watershed the Valley of the Sitnitza 
Ri\er northward as far as Mitrovitza, after which 
])oint the road continues to Novi Bazar. 
It is clear from the map that even if there 
were a good road leading northward from Monastir 
to Prizrend whereby supply could reach Northern 
Serbia through the Salonika-Monastir railway this 
road would be in peril of attack from the East if a 
considerable hostile force held Uskub. But I 
cannot find evidence that such a road has been yet 
constructed. Motor traffic could (when the big 
m"»p which the French Staff is using was completed) 
reach Djenavitza from Monastir. But thence 
down the Upper waters of the Vardar through the 
Plain of Tetovo to the railhead of Kalkandele, 
motor traffic has, upon this map at least, no road 
to serve it. While from Kalkandele to Prizrend 
there is apparently no more than a track across 
the mountains. After Prizrend a good road leads 
again to the Mitrovitza line striking the railway 
at a point not yet, at the moment of writ'ng, 
occupied by the enemy. 
Many of the sarhe features of communicat on 
arc observable on the map issued by the English 
War Office. Only those on the spot and acquainted 
with the actual and present opportunities for 
traffic between Monastir and Prizrend can judge 
the feasibility of supply by such a route. I have 
been told that opportunities for it do exist, but I 
can find no support of this view either on the map 
or from those who have seen the country fairly 
recently. Even if such a road be actually in 
existence and engineered all the way from Monastir 
to Prizrend, it is, as has been said above, threatened 
by any considerable hostile force at Uskub. For 
that town lies only twenty miles away from the 
Prizrend-Monastir road, or track, and those 
twenty miles go through an easy open plain 
between the mountains, which is further served 
by a railway as far as Kalkandele. 
But while this holding on to Uskub is the 
capital point for the enemy and the capital point 
against us strategically in the south, it so happens 
that to a sufficient force attacking up the valley 
from the Salonika railway Uskub is particularly 
vulnerable ; and the reason for this will be apparent 
if we look at this next sketch map II, and see how 
the nodal point of Uskub Hes relatively to Kuma- 
novo and Veles. 
Uskub stands at the apex of a triangle upon 
which converge the main roads from north and 
south and the t\i^o branches of the main railway 
line as well. This triangle is not occupied by any 
mass of mountain country round which it will be 
necessary for an army to travel. Uskub does not 
lie thus at the apex of a triangle because that 
triangle is taken up with impassable country. On 
the contrary', all that district is the fairly open 
Plain of Kumanovo, continued in the Plain of 
Ovitch on the south. , If, therefore, a force suffir 
cient to carry the point of VeUs began to exercise 
pressure up northwards (the Allies are alread\- at 
Krivolak) it would, long before it had reached hall- 
way to Kumanovo, render the position of an enemy 
at "Uskub impossible. Were a sufficient body of 
the Allied forces to b? advancing northward from 
Veles by but one day's march, it would be necessary 
for the "enemy occupying Uskub to fall back upon 
Kumanovo or risk destruction. 
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That the Bulgarians do not yet find us in 
sufficient force to the South nor yet fear the pres- 
sure that can be exercised thence is clear from the 
way in which they are behaving. The Serbians 
and their AUies may have had Veles and may have 
lost it again. The accounts are not official and 
they conflict. But there could be nothing doing 
as late as Sunday in any great strength beyond 
Veles at Krivolak, for the Bulgarians at Uskub 
are following up the second railway to Katchanik 
in complete security. 
The fact that the Bulgarians are up to (but 
apparently, on last Sunday at least, not over) 
the Pass "of Katchanik and arc pushing up the 
r.iilway northward immediately suggests to any 
student of the map the envelopment of the Serbian 
Army. From the Pass of Katchanik to the rail 
head at Mitrovitza is only 50 miles. From 
Mitrovitza to the point of Kraguievatz which the 
enemy reached on Sunday, is less than 80 miles, 
while the Austrians who have appeared beyond 
the Drina in the north-west, between Visegrad 
and the Serbian frontier, are less than 100 miles 
from Mitrovitza. 
In other words, there are three distinct enemy 
forces pressing in from three points of a triangle, 
A, B, and C, which triangle includes that mass of 
central mountains upon which the Serbians, re- 
tiring before the invaders from the North and the 
Bulgarians pressing in main force upon the East, 
would retreat. 
But though this danger is very apparent upon 
the map, it is modified to some extent by con- 
ditions of ground, and by a consideration of the 
enemy's rate of progress" It is now more than 
ten days, for instance, since three Austrian 
