November 6, 1915- 
LAND AND WATER 
death, disease, capture, wounds, and occasional 
minor sources of loss, such as desertion, men 
returned for civihan work, etc. 
(3) The strength of these units we call the 
effectives of an army. Were wastage to proceed 
uncorrected these effectives would diminish regu- 
larly, even in peace time. In war they fall at a 
very rapid rate indeed (very roughly speaking, 
at a rate which, in intense action, averages at least 
100 per cent, a year) 
(4) But this icasfage of the effectives does not 
proceed uncorrected. It is perpetually made good 
by what are called drajts, that is, men sent forward 
from reserves at home to make good losses at the 
front. These reserves are gathered at various 
points called depots. They are formed from 
(«) Wounded and sick men completely cured 
who are thus at varying intervals of time able 
to undertake once more their original duties.i 
[b] Men who have not yet been in action, 
but are levied, trained, equipped, and then sent 
out to repair wastage. 
(5) The true wastage of an army at any 
moment, that is, the number of men by which at 
that moment it is deficient in numbers from its 
theoretical complement, or establishment, consists 
in the permanent losses plus the temporary losses 
not yet restored to the army. 
For instance : — I have a battalion a thousand 
strong (its full establishment) on the ist of August. 
If I lose during August from all causes xvhatsoever 
200 men, then to have my strength restored to full 
establishment, I need a draft -of 200 men. 
The 200 that I have lost may consist in a first 
hundred permanent losses (killed, prisoners, and 
either maimed for life or unable to take up their old 
duties in full). While the second hundred may 
consist in temporary losses, light cases of sickness 
and slight wounds, who will later return to service. 
But though this last category is temporary 
and not permanent, there is ahr.ys a floating 
margin or balance of temporary losses off the 
strength ; for though the cured are always coming 
back from hospital new cases are always going 
in. This margin or balance is often known by the 
confusing term of " Permanent temporary " losses. 
In an active campaign it tends rather to grow 
than diminish. 
The elements of the problem before us, then, 
when we speak of the enemy's effectives and of his 
reserve of efficient man-power are perfectly simple. 
They consist in three estimates : (i) The estabhsh- 
ment of his armies ; (2) Their real rate of wastage ; 
(3) The real amount of his total original man- 
power available for actual service. 
When we have approximately arrived at these 
by comparing all forms of evidence we do not reach 
exact figures. But we can estimate the total 
possible amount of error. We can be certain that up 
to a given earlier date at least, his effectives will 
remain at full strength. We can be certain that 
after another given later date at least his effectives 
of efficients must decline. These earlier and later 
dates have long been known The most favour- 
able to us is some time in this month, the least 
favourable the end of January or beginning of' 
February. 
Now it is in the quaUfying words " of efficients" 
that ambiguity lies ; because all commanders, on 
seeing their effectives in danger of declining in 
number, tend to make that number good out of 
inelficients. The temptation is almost irresistible ; 
and throughout military history it is a temptation 
that has been yielded io over ^nd ovw again. 
It is irresistible chiefly because the various classe? 
of inefficients merge so gradualh^ one with the 
other, from those who almost passed the doctor 
or who, though but boys, are almost mature, or 
though elderly are still almost good enough material, 
down to the deaf, dumb, blind and paralytic. 
You cannot get yourself to refuse the best 
of the inefficients ; you are led on to use the 
next best — and so on. 
Often as this point has been repeated in 
these columns, I mu5t beg my readers, leave to 
return to it on account of its importance and 
liability to misunderstanding. 
I have 100 men fighting for me in a certain 
unit. I have behind them at home 100 other 
men thus divided : 50 are perfectly sound. Ten 
more or less sound, and suffering only from im- 
maturity or the beginning of age. Ten more are 
worse ; doubtful on account of some physical 
defect, such as varicose veins, weak heart, 
etc. Ten more are men who have been wounded 
or have been on the sick list in former fighting ; 
they are recovered enough for most plain duties, 
but might break down under a severe strain. 
Ten more are really bad material suffering from 
permanent grave defects, former severe illness only 
partly cured, etc. I could put them in uniforms 
and put weapons into their hands, but the result 
would be deplorable. The remaining ten are 
absolutely useless. They consist of blind, par- 
alytic, cripples and imbeciles. 
Now as my 100 at the front waste away I 
replace them first of all out of my 50 sound men. 
But there comes a time when I have used up all 
those sound men. The man commanding my 
unit sends word : " We are, after the last action, 
reduced to 90 ; send me a draft of ten." It seems 
absurd to leave my unit in the field below its 
strength simply on some pedantic doctor's plea 
that the first batch of ten on the list is not quite fit. 
My mind is full of the importance of keeping my 
unit at full strength, so I send up that first batch 
to the front, although it is material I should not 
have used if I still had sound stuff to draw upon. 
Time passes and another batch of ten is asked 
for. My next batch is a good deal worse than the 
first, but the line of demarcation is not strictly 
marked and I am led on to sending this also. 
So the process continues until I come at 
last to the perfectly impossible people who are 
blind or paralytic or in some other may out of 
the question. I have been gradually tempted 
step by step to replace my efficients hySnefficients ; 
each new batch so supplied is only a little lower 
in efficiency than the last, the downward grade is 
almost imperceptible, and I follow it jjntil I reach 
disaster. 
That is what is meant by "\Coming to an 
end of one's reserves in efficients and^ beginning to 
depend upon inefficients " and, I repeat, all com- 
manders of armies in this dilemma are tempted 
to the course. Very nearly all have yielded to the 
temptation, and it has always bee 11^^ disastrous. 
Now why should it be disastrous ? 
For this reason ; that, after, adding a very 
small proportion of men who a.rc''almost (but not 
quite) efficient, every mere increment of numbers 
actually weakens you instead of strengthening 
you. » 
To repeat the example^lgiven before m these 
columns : A battalion a thousand strong, of which 
250 were elderly men or children unable to stand 
