LAND AND VV A T E R . 
November b, 1915, 
a strain would, ui say a week's rapid retirement 
liiroiigli bad weather, nm a far greater chance of 
disaster than a battahon only 730 strong, but all 
of them sound and of true military age. If Von 
Klnck, pelting back with the ist German Army 
across the Marne fourteen months ago had had 25 
per cent, of his effectives drawn from men who 
had not passed the doctor or who were immature 
or elderly, that 25 per cent, would not simply have 
fallen to the allies as stragglers and prisoners, 
they would have clogged the whole machinery of 
the retreat. They would have been present every- 
where in ever}' unit. Every company and battery 
and squadron w( aid have been poisoned with 
them ; and the whole body would have been 
incapable of the very fine feat which Von Kluck 
performed when he fell back upon the Aisne lines 
in those famous days which saw the ruin 
of the Prussian plan. 
All this is surely clear enough. Let me next 
repeat our evidence for the German situation in 
this matter of an efificient reserve. 
We have as a base for our calculations, obtain- 
able from many countries in great detail and with 
perfect precision, the proportion of efficients to 
ineiTc'ents in any conscript population. Every 
conscript service gives us within extraordinarily 
small margins of difference the same proportion. 
Of four men, young, but of age, presenting them- 
selves to the doctor, one must be rejected. Of the 
100 men 25. That rule works in populations most 
widely different in character and occupation. It 
has been seen at work here in the voluntary 
enlistment in Britain during the last twelve 
months. 
We see the same rule at work under the more 
compHcated system of the Germans. The Ger- 
mans, as we have seen in previous articles, divide 
their conscripts (with the exception of a tiny group 
of criminals who are not eligible for the army — 
only about one per 1,000) — not into two categories 
like the French, of fit and unfit, but into four ; the 
first the perfect!}^ fit ; a second a smaller category 
of doubtfuls ; then the frankly unfit, and lastly "a 
very small category (only 6 per cent.) of impos- 
sibles — e.g., dwarfs, madmen, cripples, tue 
maimed, etc. 
Now it is remarkable that if we exclude the 
last little category we get for the German Empire, 
as elsewhere, the regular proportion ; with this 
difference, however, that the German Empire has 
a rather larger number of men called unfit because 
so much of it? population is town-bred and because 
there are such strong social influences at work to 
prevent the full conscription of all classes in the 
State. The actual German figures in the last 
statistical tables published just before the war, 
were just over one-half (53 .4 per cent.) for the perfect- 
ly fit. Less than a sixth (15.01 per cent.) for the 
rather less fit and a quarter (25.1 per cent.) for the 
unfit, the balance (6.3 per cent.) being the im- 
possibles. 
It is worthy of notice that in those parts of 
Gennany where the government has not got to 
consider social influences or the degradation caused 
by town fife, yofi get almost exactly the French 
proportion. East Prussia, for instance, a district 
where, upon the whole, you are dealing with a 
healthy peasantry, you had for 191 1 just over 75 
per cent. (75.4) for your perfectly fit and rather 
less fit, and only 24.6 for your unfit and impossibles ; 
which figures are, within a ver>- small fraction! 
precisely those of the French population also. 
Now with this point perfectly clear, that only 
about three-<iuarters of your man pow-er are your 
eflicients (even in the best years of the early twenties) 
we can set down the elements of our problem. We 
cannot give exact figures, but we can gi\'e extremes 
below and above which those figures cannot stand 
and within which " margin of error " those figures 
must stand. 
The total number of men available, including 
the two younger classes of '16 — '17, but excluding 
the later classes of elderly men who are onl\' 
technically liable and are certainly not efficients, 
is twelve million. You caii, if you like, make it 
thirteen million b\' counting some boys below 
seventeen, and a number of men in the middle 
forties, who are not really lit for service at all. 
But twelve million is the round figure for the incn 
of military age, including the lads of the two younj^f 
classes mentioned above. Of those twelve million , 
nine million are efficients. To get a margin ot 
error, let us put it between nine and nine and a half 
millions. 
Of that figure more than three millions, but 
(probably) less than three and a half million are 
off the strength for good. If you took the analogv 
of the Enghsh figures in lull, counting sickness 
and permanent temporaries, you would get 
3,800,000. On a German officer was found the 
other day a document pvitting permanent casual- 
ties down at 3,200,000. Other calculations along 
other fines give just over three millions, three and a 
third, one of them three and a half. W^e are 
safe if we put the permanent loss at more than 
three and less than three and a half millions, even 
though the higher figure proves to be less, when the 
truth is told, than the real total. The Units at 
full establishment kept in the field and on com- 
munications are in the neighbourhood of four 
milHons. We may put a minimum of three and 
three quarters, allowing for the starving of con-.- 
munications and for certain units noted on both 
fronts being below their full establishment, or we 
may allow up to four and a half nlillions for all 
effectives whatsoever, though that is probably 
too high (in the German dccument just alluded to, 
however, five millions were allowed for the sum 
total of all active service, communication bureaux, 
medical, etc., etc.). 
The rate of wastage is not less than 225,000 
a month on the average, may be as high as 
260,000, may be higher. The truth is at any rate 
over the lower figure, seeing what the total wastage 
has been in fourteen months of active war, with 
the army at its full strength only within the last 
twelve months of these fourteen. 
Lastly, there is an unknow^n number of effi- 
cients (many of whom the Germans dress up in 
uniform and whom neutrals see about the streets 
m their towns) but who are not of use as effectives 
because they have to be kept back for the civihan 
auxifiary work of trains and shipping work and 
mmes and clothing, and all the rest of it. That 
number may be a^ low as one and a half million ; 
It IS almost certainly over two millions. We are 
safe if we take two as a maximum and one and a 
half as a minimum. 
Now put all these figures together and vou 
arrive at the following position :— 
Weighting everything against ourselves and 
in favour of Germany, aUowing a full nine and a half 
milhons of original efficients over two years, 
counting the lads, taking onlv one and a hall 
millions aw.ay for auxil:a-y work, pu'tin- the 
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