LAND AND WATER 
November 6, 1915. 
Ihe weekly average of ships torpedoed and 
Mined since the attacks on merchantmen com. 
MENCED in the last week of JANUARY, 1915. THE 
MEAN IS TAKEN OF EACH GROUP OF FOUR WEEKS IP 
TO AND INCLUDING OCTOBER 10th. THE LAST IS THE 
vIEAN OF THREE WEEKS. 
A good deal, of course, turns on why it has 
fallen to this level. I\Ir. Balfour, writing on 
September 5th, explained the extreme alacrity 
with which Count Bernstorff had begged America's 
pardon for the Arabic murders, not by any tardy 
recognition of the danger of driving America into 
war, nor by an}' sudden repentance ot bloodginlti- 
ness, but merely by the prosaic realisation that 
this particular form of criminality did not pay. 
The stake they were plaj'ing for, the damaging of 
our merchant marine and the terrorising of peaceful 
seafaring folk, was clearly not worth the candle, 
in the shape of scores of German under sea boats 
and crews sent relentlessly to the bottom. Now 
h;he curious thing about this letter of Mr. Balfour's 
is that it was written in the fourth week of the 
group marked 8 in the rate of destruction graph, 
and this group gives the highest rate of any since 
the campaign commenced ! During the last three 
weeks of August and the first week of- September, 
ships of all sorts were being sunk at the rate of no 
less than' i6 per week. It struck me at the time 
that Mr. Balfour's statement was clearly incom- 
])atible with what was known to the public. 
•We now see the exact meaning of what he said. 
There were facts known to the Germans in the 
form of submarines unaccounted for, that put a 
ver\' different complexion on the state of aif^airs, 
and there must have been further facts known to 
Mn. Balfour which the Germans would learn 
lat^, which would modifj' the picture still more 
di..a9trousl^^ In point of fact, then, Mr. Balfour's 
statement was more of a prophecy than an inter- 
pretation. But it was the prophecy of one who 
knew. He could say what the Germans were 
going to, do, because he knew what they were 
going to learn. 
Looking at the graph we shall see that there 
is a steady growth from the average of three for 
the first group of four weeks to an average of 
13 for the fifth. Jn the 6th group, it falls to ten, 
and in the seventh, rises to eleven and in the 
eighth to 16. The mean of the 5th, 6th and 7th 
is eleven and a third, so that if the graph is 
smoothed out for the whole of the first eight, it is a 
steady rise from the beginning of February to the 
beginning of September. And it was when the 
graph was atdts highest that Mr.Balfour announced 
its fall. No Speculation as to the actual number 
of (ierman submarines lost could be half so signifi- 
cant as the light this f^raph throws on Mr. Balfour's 
words. 
\\'hen the campaign began, it was pointed out 
that, in spite of von Tirpitz's warning in December, 
ur defensive — which, of course, meant an (inti- 
luhmarinc offensive — would have to be ex- 
t;.unporised, and that its efficiency therefore would 
increase from month to month. But it was also 
pointed out that, if the Germans were supj)osed 
to have made all preparations possible for the 
rapid and extensive production of submarines 
when the war commenced, as indeed seemed pro- 
bable, the number of U boats available for the 
campaign would multiply with increasing rapidity 
in the months of April, May, June and July. The 
question then was, would the counter offensive 
over-balance the growth in submarines ? Measured 
by submarine successes it would seem, looking at 
the bare figures, as it the blockade had more than 
kept pace with our counter offensive. But "Mr. 
Balfour's letter of the 5th, and the subsequent 
stor\' of the figures, shows that this was very 
far from being the case. Still, although tnis graph 
speaks for itself, it would I think be utterly mis- 
leading to assume that the drop in submarine 
successes} is proportional to the difference in the 
number of submarines available. It simply means 
that the losses have been formidable, and that the 
survivors and the new crews— and their masters 
and employers no less — hilly realise the over- 
whelming })erils of the game. We have heard this 
week from Holland that von Tirpitz is in disgrace. 
It seems in\-idious that one unsuccessful criminal 
more than another should be selected for this 
distinction in Germany. But the story is not 
improbable, and is at least consistent with present 
conditions, which is that the von Tirpitz policy is 
apparently in a process of deliquescence. For no 
doubt excellent reasons the Admiralty has for 
some time forbidden the publication of the locale 
of submarine attacks, and without knowing where 
the ships were sunk, it is impossible to say whether 
'the scattered attacks during the last fortnight of 
' October were delivered near our shores or not. If 
they. were distant attacks — and it is worth noting 
that the last two victims are Norwegians^t would 
lead to the supposition that the campaign was not 
altogether abandoned, but that it was not to be 
pushed in dangerous neighbourhoods, and indeed 
this is what one would expect. 
Whether or not it is entirely to our advantage 
that the German submarines should no longer 
face the perils of our counter offensive is another 
matter altogether. The Royal Navy is no doubt 
quite prepared to have their attentions directed 
to itself, though it seems a pity from our point of 
view that the merchant shipping bait should no 
longer prove attractive. But one aspect of the 
past campaign and its results must not be over- 
looked. If the under-water boats now assume their 
legitimate military role, it is all to the good that 
the most experienced and bravest of the under- 
water captains and crews are already at the bottom 
ot the seas. The survivors will not," many of them, 
have the skill of their predecessors, and their moral 
will hardly be improved by the memory of their 
predecessors' fate. One other thing should be 
remembered also. Mr. Hurd has recently been 
allowed to publish an account of the mine-laying 
submarines employed by the enemy. These have 
been active now for some m.onths. "^It is not a new 
experiment and undoubtedly they create a grave 
and very perplexing problem. If mines can be 
laid unseen in waters that are fully patrolled, a 
danger that is no light one faces all ships, naval 
or mercantile. A. H. POLIJiN. 
"Mr. I'ulleii will l.vdir,' o:, H,..-: Navv on Iv.'liilf ..f mvil jn 1 
military tliantios at Konsinatnn Tcwn lliill. I'lUlav. ^Ih .Xoviinl.cr, 
« p.m. ; His Majcslys Tlieativ, Suiulav, NovcmlxT ytli, altcriiooii. 
3 p.m. ; Oundlc Schuul, Thursday, nth November. 
14 
