LAND AND WATER. 
November 6. 1915. 
MUDDLE OF THE BALKANS. 
By Dr. E. 
THERE is something touchingly naive in t!ie 
dealings of Entente diplomacy with the wily 
Coburger and his Bulgarian confederates. Naive 
but honest and tnithful. The Bulgars and 
their ruler first leagued themselves secretly and 
solemnly with the Kaiser against the AlUes and then 
publicly averred that they were free to light against 
Turkey and Germany. They added that they were not 
only free but eager to march against the Turks and the 
Teutons. And, although all the signs such as the Austro- 
Hungarian loan, the dismissal of the War Minister 
Fitchei^, and the close relations with the Porte belied 
this declaration, the trustful Allies gave it implicit credit 
and urged the Bulgars to enter the field without further 
delay. But Ferdinand's men needed time to concert 
military action with Germany against the Entente, and 
they were puzzled how to rid themsehes in the mean- 
while of the irksome importunity of the .Mlies 
Suddenly a diabolic idea struck the men of Sofia : 
They would set the statesmen of the Entente to reconcile 
inveterate enemies by sacrificing staunch friends, to 
harass ill-starred Serbia and fill her cup of bitterness to 
the brim. She was to be coaxed or cowed by her best 
friends into giving up the Macedonian territory that she 
most prized to her unscrupulous enemy Bulgaria. And 
for months the eminent Statesmen of the Entente con- 
scientiously argued, wrangled and almost quarrelled on 
the subject with the Serbs who, knowing the Bulgars' 
nature, were driven to despair. Many were sorely 
tempted in that hour of depression. . . And Entente 
diplomacy persevered to the end compassing its aim and 
putting faith in the words of King Ferdinand's Ministers 
who still continued to say : "If you obtain for Bulgaria 
the territory to which she justly lays claim, we will 
draw a sponge over bygones and the Balkan League will 
live and thrive again. We are impatient to march against 
Turkey." And the knavish politicians who by their own 
confessions were capable of this infamy against Austria, 
Germany and Turkey who had been helping Bulgaria, were 
deemed mc apable of deceiving the statesmen of the Entente 
Faith in Bulgaria. 
Russia's faith in Bulgaria was wonder-working. 
Government and Opposition were at one. M. Sazonoff 
promised her a plenary pardon for all future as well as 
for past sins. The Opposition journal Retch, whose 
Edftop, M. Milykoff, was once Professor at the Uni- 
versity of Sofia, pleaded the cause of the Bulgars with 
soul as well as mind. In Great Britain, too, people were 
so strongly impressed with the sense of Bulgaria's mis- 
fortunes that their sympathy left no room for suspicion 
of her villainies. And so they all went on trusting her 
and building fearlessly on their trust. 
A few there were who were acquainted with the 
character of the Bulgars, and there was at least one ' 
Englishman who had had conclusive proof of the treacher- 
ous game they were playing. These watchmen from 
their conning towers sought to apprize the nation of 
what they saw and knew or guessed. But they were 
silenced in the interests of the Allied cause, and they 
cheerfully resigned themsehes to the sacrifice so that 
the Cabinets, which had all the data for a judgment in 
their possession should also have perfect freedom. And 
the Governments e.xercised that freedom to the fullest. 
Great Britain accepted Russia's assurance that Bulgaria 
would be won over in time, and that in no case would 
her soldiers turn their arms against their liberators. 
In France a different illusion was hugged : that in a 
fateful conjuncture like the present the Hellenic nation 
would never s^ike out a line of policy diametrically 
opposed to th^ of its friend and protectress France. 
I'or Greece was almost as much the spoiled child of FYancc 
as was Bulgaria of Russia. M. Venizelos, too, was a 
living pledge that these expectations would be fulfilled. 
He and M. Delcasse understood each other thoroughly 
and trusted eacli other out and out. Furthermore, 
Greece's interests in the great European tangle were 
bound up with those of France and Britain almost in- 
dis^olubl}'. Of the military syndicate of our enemies, 
J. Dillon. 
(ireece's inveterate foes, Bulgaria and Turkey were 
fiUl fledged members, fa\-ourites of the nnpenal Manager 
who had promised them oddments of spoils to be taken 
from Greece. How, it was argued, could any patriotic, 
any self-respecting Hellenic statesman league his country 
with his country's dcspoiler ? Lastly, there was ^he 
good old guarantee for which all the Allied Governments 
still cherish profound respect— the scrap of paper. Greece 
was pledged by treaty to come to Serbia's succour against 
invasion b\- Bulgaria, and she would, of course, redeem 
her pledge. 
France and Greece. 
That was the picture which France drew of the 
politico ethnical phvsiognomy of Greece, and it, too, 
was accepted by British diplomacy as correct m the main. 
It was in accordance with this belief that the policy of the 
Allies was shaped. Despite rumours to the contrary, 
perfect imanimitv reigned among them all. The Italians, 
it Ls true, were niistrustful of Greece and doubtful of Bul- 
garia and Roumania, for they had also received tidings 
from thoss countries which warranted grave doubts. 
XMiatever else of good or evil may be alleged of the 
Allies it will not be gainsaid that their considerate, nay 
chivalrous, behaviour towards cheats and mummers 
was worthy of the best traditions of an epoch of civilisa- 
tion which is departed. 
Owing to those causes which reflect great credit on 
the good feeling and the trustfulness of the Allies towards 
the Balkan peoples, no measures of protection were taken 
nor, indeed, contemplated during all those precious 
months. For precautions would have implied misgivings. 
It might have seemed desirable, for instance, several 
months ago to land a quarter of a million well-trained men 
at Salonica so as to move them into Serbia before the 
Germans could get there. The writer of these lines 
advocated some such bold move. For already Germany's 
resolve to rig out a military expedition and hack a way 
across Serbia into Turkey had been bruited abroad. Enver 
Pasha had boasted of it. Others had re-echoed it. Italian 
politicians had had wind of it, and also of Germany's 
military preparations for the venture. But no heed was 
paid to those fitful warnings by the Allies, who generously 
refused to belie\'c tliat any of the Balkan States would 
become a party to Germany's vile game. 
To-day the moral features of the Balkan States have 
become more widely and better known than ever before ; 
so too are the strength and weakness of Entente diplomacy. 
Germany's expedition has taken shape and made itself 
felt, and Bulgaria's help to our enemies is not unworthy 
of the violent wrencli which Ferdinand had to give to 
truth and honour before he was able to render it. 
Germany's Hopes. 
The isolation of Russia, the crushing defeat of Serbia 
and the opening up of permanent communications between 
Hamburg and Constantinople are not the only results 
which Germany hopes to secure by the success of her 
Balkan enterprise. She desires to over-awe Greece and 
Roumania into utter quiescence. 
If Greece had fulfilled M. Delcasse's expectations and 
given us 200,000 men, these together with the Serbs might 
have contrived to stay the German advance. But King 
Constantine, ha\ing pledged his royal word to his Imperial 
brother-in-law, honour obUges him to redeem it — even at 
the cost of his own and his country's publicly plighted 
word to Serbia. The Kaiser had counted on finding this 
curious conception of honour in his spell-bound brother-in- 
law, and had reckoned on the political and military conse- 
quences it would engender. He had also built on 
Ferdinand of Coburg's relative fidelity, while optimistic 
French politicians were assuring their countrymen that 
Ferdinand, being the son of a French Princess, could never 
be false to his motlier or to France. Lastly the Kaiser 
postulated steadfast optimism, a high sense of honour and 
a superiative degree of unconcern among the Allied 
Governments. And none of those assumptions has been 
•--"--l. But the greatest of them all, the cohiplete 
ss of the Expedition, is still in the future. 
belied 
success 
16 
