LAND A N D V\ A T E K . 
November ij, 1915. 
a force adduig ''ery nearly double as much. 
If all the Balkan neutrals joined the enemy, his 
forces in the East would increase 40 per cent. 
There was another political effect. To strike 
at tlie Balkans was to provoke inevitable in- 
decision for the moment among the Allies. 
The over-running of Serbia \\as a thing \ery 
dangerous to Russian prestige, an anxious matter 
to England, least important to France. Finally, 
the moral effect of German troops in Constanti- 
nople (what is but a handful in such a war as 
this, say but one division, would make a prodigious 
show in the eyes of the populace) directly affects 
that great Mohammedan world, the relations 
between which and the Governments of France 
and Britain are so exceedingly complex and d(>li- 
cate. 
The mere moral effect of the Serbian tragedy, 
the cry of " Saving Serbia " may — as a militar\- 
motive — be neglected. But to save the Serbia 11 
Army from destruction, and to " Stop a rot " 
in the Balkans is another and far more defensible 
policy. 
Under such circumstances it was to those who 
were alone fulh* possessed of the facts, and who 
could alone weigh all the elements of the situation, 
political and strategic, one against the other, tp 
decide whether a Balkan expedition were advisable 
in spite of its strategical insigniticance and on 
account of its political value. 
Not without hesitation and not without grave 
divisions of opinion the die has been cast in favour 
of an e./^^edition limited to a certain number. 
which number we are not at liberty to discuss. 
This expedition, political in inception, will 
have for its now strategical object the following 
clear motive : To tttrn the enemy's adventure, 
ij possible, into a blunder ; to take ad\antage of 
e\ery weakness the situation presents to him, 
although that situation has been created by his 
own initiative. 
THE THREE LINES OF ADVANCE. 
It is abundantly clear, not only from the 
simplest examination of the map, but from th<^ 
historv of every camjjaign between the Danube 
and the .T.gean, from Roman times to our own, 
that two great lines of movement alone exist in 
this region and that ever\thing will depend upon 
the combination of these two great lines of move- 
ment. 
The lirst consists in the valley of the Serbian 
Morava continued by that of its tributary the 
Nisluua, and then, after a low saddle continued 
eastward down the valley of the Maritza to 
Adrianople ; then the road leads over open and 
rolling country to Constantinople, a fortnight's 
march away. The other runs from the Gulf of 
Salonica up the valley of the Vardar to Uskub, 
north of which, after a low saddle at Kumanovo, 
it follows the upper valley of the Morava, to 
the junction of that river with its tributary 
the Nishava, at Nish. North of Nish the two 
great avenues run together to the Danube. 
These two unique routes are followed to-day by 
o 10 
I 
JSf'Mies 
Adrionopie 
10 
