LAND AND WA J E li 
Movember 13, 1915. 
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striking character about it. The State consists, in 
the main, of barren and exceedingly difficult 
highlands in the centre, south and west, merging into 
easier hill country in the north. The nucleus 
of the highlands may be defined roughly by the 
shaded portion in the accompanying map, and it 
is remarkable that roads, passable to vehicles in 
any useful degree, come up only a few miles from 
the valleys that bear the railways into the foothills 
and then stop at the borders of the highland 
country. For instance, down the valley of the 
western Morava, running from Ujitze to Kruche- 
vatz, there is a road, and most of the way a 
railway as well. And southward from this valley 
up to the edge of the highlands, there are roads 
along which a vehicle, but hardly ever motor 
traffic, could travel, and the heads of these roads 
are at mountain villages as Ivanytza and Ushche, 
while a similar road runs from Nish up to Proku- 
pulje. But beyond these roadheads there are 
nothing but tracks, leading through the wildest 
conceivable tangle of barren mountain land. The 
whole district is of this character, right away to the 
Adriatic, and whether it be called, poHtically, 
Serbia, Montenegro, or Albania, matters httle to 
the strategics of the campaign. The Serbian army, 
having retired upon those highlands, ij it is 
supplied, has a new advantage against an enemy 
whose sole superiority lay in artillery, and whose 
infantry effectives are manifestly beginning to 
deteriorate. 
That modifj'ing phrase, however, " if it is 
supplied," is all-important. For the same con- 
ditions of ground which make it easier to resist 
in such hills make it correspondingly difficult to 
bring forward munitions. Supply from +he Adriatic 
would pass, even if it went to the north, so as to 
avoid the hostile Albanian tribes, across nothing 
but mule tracks in the hills, and would come 
from very poor sea bases at Antivari or St. Giovanni. 
Everything depends upon this question of supply, 
and it is a matter upon which we have no in- 
formation. 
THE STRATEGICAL VALUE OF USKUB 
AND THEREFORE OF THE ALLIED 
ADVANCE ON VELES. 
Meanwhile, there is this further point of con- 
siderable interest at the present moment. The 
mass of highland country, possessing in all its extent 
no plain save that of Ipek, is pierced by one fairly 
easy avenue of communication. It is the road 
going up from Uskub over the low and easy 
Katchanik pass to Metrovitza — followed so far 
by the railway, and thence continued to Novibazar. 
The Bulgarians have pushed up this road to the 
Katchanik pass. The Austro-Germans are pres- 
sing no further than the roadheads on the north 
upon advance posts , corresponding to the broken line 
in Sketch II. At the extreme end of this, by 
Visegrad,they have suffered a sharp reverse at the 
hands of the Montenegrins, and in general, they 
are held at the edge of the wilder country. But 
the Bulgarians pushing up from Uskiib, past 
Katchanik towards Metrovitza, are obviously a 
very serious threat indeed. 
It is clear from the elements on Sketch II. 
that this or.e and only avenue of advance into the 
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