i\u\ ciuuei zu, iyj-o- 
Xv i^ i'^ J-^ 
in the T.ondon Press of last Monday. It was from 
the pen of that occasional and very valuable 
Hungarian correspondent — or rather authority 
writing from Hungary, who from time to. time gets 
letters through to the Morning Post. 
In the midst of a gi-eat deal of most interesting 
general information we have a batch of statistics 
to which I would draw particular attention. 
These statistics lay down the total Austro- 
Himgarian wastage at about 37,000 a day, of which 
halt is provided by " returns," the other half by 
new — and now obviously inefficient — material. 
This is much higher than the number esti- 
mated^ — deliberately scaled down it is true — in 
these columns. On the analogy of the British 
the Austro-Hungarians need fresh men at the 
rate of a total real wastage of more than a quarter 
of a miUion, but less than 300,000 men a month, 
and this again is much higher than the figures 
one would expect from the publications of the 
French Intelligence Department. But Austria- 
Hungary is probably losing more men in proportion 
than the German Empire at the present moment, 
both because the material upon which she is 
calling is worse, and because the comparatively 
narrow front upon which the enormous masses of 
the exceedingly effective Italian heavy artillery 
are doing their work must be very costly in life. 
In the same set of statistics we have con- 
firmed the figure of about four Austrian Corps as 
immobilised upon the Roumanian frontier. It 
is not a very large item, but it is interesting to see 
a deduction which was little more than guess work 
confirmed by a witness. 
SITUATION IN MACEDONIA. 
Public opinion in this country will be the 
steadier in the immediate future if it recognises in 
their general outline the elements of the position 
in the Balkans, the grave situation of the Allied 
forces there, and their yet small numbers — and 
the small numbers of their opponents — compared 
with the other theatres of war. 
The first point is the question of scale, and 
that is something which the Press as a whole 
unfortunate!}' leaves out, to the great confusion of 
its readers' judgment. The Germans and Austro- 
Hungarians crossed the Danube with forces 
amounting to round about 4 per cent, only of their 
total units in the field. In mere size the Balkan 
diversion is a small affair. They found in aid of 
their adventure, which could not even have been 
attempted by them single-handed, Bulgarian 
forces more than half as much again, but not 
double their own. 
Against this there is a Serbian Army of about 
the same size as, or rather smaller, than the Austro- 
German force from the north, and a Franco-British 
force reaching by this time on the actual front 
more than a third but not yet half the total 
numbers of the Serbians. 
The next thing to appreciate, therefore, is 
that while the actual forces engaged are small, 
as the scale of this great war goes, the Serbians 
and the French and English are very gravely out- 
numhered in this field, and n'ill remain gravely out- 
numbered for a long time to come, and perhaps 
during the whole development of the Balkan adven- 
ture. Matters will, of course, at once change 
in character if, or when, a Russian force were to 
appear on Bulgarian soil or an Italian force from 
the Adriatic or, still more, if Roumania were to move. 
It must never be forgotten that the Allies went 
to the Balkans on the invitation of the Greek 
Government, which had further mobilised its own 
army, and ostensibly arranged upon our side 
forces nearly the equivalent of the whole Bul- 
garian body. The defection of these has changed 
the military problem from top to bottom, and we 
have in effect an enemy force ^\•hich may be repre- 
sented by 5 against a Serbian force (the supply 
of which is unknown to us and any defect in the 
supply of which will be fatal), to be presented l>y 
the figure 2, while the Allies actually in line in the 
critical period we are just entering are represented 
rather by the figure 1 . 
The effect of this superiority in the enemy's 
numbers is already apparent in the strategics of 
the big fight for Veles. 
The readers of Land and Water are familiar 
with the thesis put forward in these columns that 
Veles, also called Kuprulu,is the point we must 
watch. If it is occupied and the Allies advance 
beyond it northwards, Uskub, as we have con- 
tinually repeated, is no longer tenable, and with the 
loss of Uskub by the enemy he also loses his one 
great avenue of approach into the heart of the 
Serbian Highlands by the railway and road over 
the Katchanik Pass to Metrovitza. Further, if the 
enemy had to evacuate Uskub, a junction could 
immediately be effected between the Allies at 
(B) (C), and the main Serbian Army in (A). 
In a word, Uskub is the key of everything 
and Veles is the key of Uskub ; that is, Veles 
occupied by a reall}- large force capable of pressing 
forward. 
KVvmanovo 
n 
■BadoaodPdss^ ■■jm (3 Krivolak 
'ere 
Monastic 
The enemy, who had at first no more than a 
division at Veles, has taken full measure of the 
situation and is using his great superiority in men 
to check the advance on Veles, and at the same 
time to cut off the Allied forces in the south from 
the main Serbian arm\- in the North : he has 
poured down on to the front before Veles a second, 
a- third, a fourth, a fifth, and witliin the last few 
days a sixth division. He can both hold and out- 
II 
