LAND A.ND WATER 
iNOveniuei ^u, lyi^- 
at the time that £"13 had not been engaged upon a 
soHtary jouhk \ and if German complaints in the 
Swedish papers are any index to the truth, it would 
seem that our enemies are under the impression 
that British submarines have been fairly streaming 
into the Baltic ever since. At any rate the attack 
on the Moltke and the stranding of £13 seem to 
ha\e couNinced the (icrmans that Ix'fore attempting 
anything more ambitious against the Russian fleet 
in the hope of gaining the use of Riga, it would 
be just as well to find (nit how far the communica- 
tions with W'indau and Libau, which they already 
lield, could be made safe. The fate of these com- 
munications is bj' this time familiar to my readers. 
H.xactly how many transports have been sunk we 
do not know, but the number is considerable, and 
they are far from being the only naval victims. 
The Prinz Adelbert and Undine are acknowledged 
lost, the Frauenlob is reported from Sweden to 
have followed them. We can, therefore, assume 
that these captured ports have since mid-October 
been reduced to comparative inactivity. And we 
know that the submarine campaign is very far 
from being limited to transports onl}-. Lloyd's and 
the daily papers have reported no less than 30 ore 
ships sunk between Sweden and the Prussian 
ports, and a Stockholm correspondent has been 
careful to explain that these are only the ships 
whose ctews have been brought to Swedish ports. 
Of the ships sunk outside the German ports or 
nearer the German than the Swedish coast, we 
have so far heard nothing and shall hear nothing 
until the stories of the submarines are told us by 
the Russian Admiralty. Certain correspondents 
in Petrograd speak of a campaign in terms that 
are hardly credible. One, for instance, sa}s that 
the sinking of transports is an almost daily occur- 
rence. But limiting ourselves only to the ships 
as to which we seem to have reliable evidence, 
40 seem to have been attacked successfully between 
October loth and November 12th. Will Germany 
be able to organise any counter campaign to equal 
the efficiency of our North Sea, Channel and 
Atlantic patrols ? If they cannot, it is obvious 
that von Hindenberg's efforts before Riga and 
Dvinsk must be greatly handicapped, and until 
the raiding is seriously diminished, we must expect 
liim to continue to give ground as he has done 
during the last few weeks. 
This attack on communications by sub- 
marines, brilliantly effective both in the Baltic 
and the Sea of Marmara, is one of the unexpected 
developments of sea power during this war. It is 
a weapon that our enemies have sought to use 
against us in the Channel, practically without 
success of any kind, and with only very moderate 
success in the Eastern Mediterranean. If only 
the enemy had a sufficiency of bases in the Medi- 
terranean, one would expect the attack to be 
exceedingly effective, but Pola is nearly 1,200 
miles from Salonika, and Constantinople is for 
practical purposes the only other base available. 
Except for these, the enemy sulmirines have 
to rely on some arrangement with supply ships 
from Spain, the only neutral Mediterranean sea- 
board, and to make rendezvous with these is too 
1 isky an affair for a permanency. Nor would such 
rendezvous be possible except at a distance from 
the field of operations, that would greatly diminish 
the \aluc of Spanish assistance. 
The reason why u sufficiency of bases is all 
that is lacking to make the enemy submarines 
formidable in the Mediterranean, is that the 
submarine's immumtv from attack is of course 
entirely a question of 'the size of the area in which 
it operates. It will be remembered, for instance, 
that in the first davs of the submarine attack on 
British commerce,' the field of their greatest 
successes was in the Channel between Dover and 
Portsmouth. Neariv twenty ships were, if I 
remember righth-, sunk within a few miles of 
Dungene. s in almost as many days. But by the 
time deftnsi^•e measures could be undertaken, the 
Channel \\as altogether cleared and remained 
apparenth- quite free from the presence of sub- 
marines for several months. But where the waters 
were wide and open, as in the waters North, West 
and South of Land's End, and in the North Sea, 
the attacks showed a crescendo of efficiency from 
month to month. 
The most amazing thing in the success of our 
submarines in the Sea of Marmara is that the area 
to be patrolled is itself so small, and the entrance 
to it so exceedingly long and narrow. That we 
have lost £20 there is deplorable, but it was fully 
to be expected. It is, indeed, almost a miracle 
that so many boats have made so many and such 
successful cruises, and so few been lost. It is the 
largeness of the area to be patrolled that consti- 
tuted the chief German difficulty in the Baltic. 
\Miether the closing in of winter will affect our 
campaign there adversely, I am not seaman 
enough to say. That it will add very largely to 
the hardsips of submarine life is obvious, but 
will it make these hardships prohibitive ? Wliat- 
ever the effect of the approaching winter, the sub- 
marines are clearly doing much to relieve the 
pressure on General Russky, and we can hardly 
doubt that he will make the best of the opportunity 
while it lasts. 
MR. CHURCHILL'S EXIT. 
Mr. Churchill's retirement from the Cabinet is 
fortunately not a naval event at all, but its recep- 
tion by a part of the Press points to an effort 
to use it to influence naval administration. Lord 
Milner's cry that the Cabinet is shedding not its 
weaker but its stronger men, has been echoed. 
Mr. Churchill's vigour, resource, enterprise and 
courage have been acclaimed, as if the Government, 
and especially the Admiralty, could ill bear the 
loss of them. 
The real though bloodless victory of our fleet, m 
beitig what it icas, and where it was, when the war 
broke out — a victory that started Germany power- 
less at sea from the very beginning! is set out as 
a purely personal achievement of the late First 
Lord's. Now it is all right to speak pleasantly of 
a Minister when he retires, more especially if it 
can be said that at any rate h'e failed gallantly. 
But here praise has outrun all reason, and seems 
to have been bestowed for ulterior objects. If 
comment on our naval administration is to be 
intelligent and discriminating, it is important 
that this situation should be examined. There 
is another danger also in the situation. Some 
writers see in his exit at any rate this good, that 
at least Lord Fisher is free to return to Whitehall. 
To those who believe that the right administra- 
tion of the British Navy could have determined the 
war before this, and is essential to any determination 
of the M-ar in our fa\our, tli(- 'situation thus 
created is not free from serious danger. It is 
therefore in the highest degree important that it 
should be dealt with franklw 
14 
