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danger. The Battle Meets accordingl\- began to 
centre in hum< waters. From 1905 to 1913, there 
had never been the shghtest doubt of the necessity 
of prejjaring for a sea war with German)'. Years 
before Mr. Churchill went to the Admiralty, the 
plans were laid for a North Sea concentration, if 
ever relations with German}- became critical. 
The lessons of periodical North Sea manoeuvres 
doubtless resulted in a progressive modification 
of those plans. But it is idle to pretend that the 
plans of 1914 were the personal inventions of Mr. 
Churchill. They represented, so far as the very 
imperfect organisation of the Admiralty permitted, 
the mature judgment of the naval service. Had 
war broken out in 1910, igii, 1912, or 1913. plans 
slightly different, but, according to the standard 
of that time, adequate to the situation would 
equally have been found ready. 
Finally, there is the point that at the strategic 
moment, the Fleet, at any rate, was at its appointed 
station. But again, we must remember, that the 
]:)lans to which I have alluded, were not limited 
to the selection of a war station. The essential 
matter was not the exact location of each squadron 
of the Fleet, but, that at the first breath of danger, 
the Fleet should be there. To occupy the station 
was more essential to the plan than the station 
itself. The plan involved then its automatic 
e.xecution. The discussion as to whether Prince 
Louis or Mr. Churchill gave the actual orders has 
alw avs seemed to me a controversy about nothing. 
The "right wav to look at it is that not to have 
carried out these plans would have been an un- 
thinkable dereliction of duty. To give the order 
was at once elementary and obligatory. 
THE MORAL. 
Mr. Churchill has remarkable qualities, and 
has tried sincerelv to serve his CGu:itry. He may in 
another field serve with success proportioned to his 
courage and energv. But at Whitehall he was a 
serious danger. One good thing may result from it . 
If the Navy is allowed to organise its technical 
knowledge Vnd sea experience, so that grave 
questions are settled— not by this or that retired 
officer whose fame was earned in days when naval 
conditions were utterly unlike those of to-day, but 
—by the impersonal judgment of the younger men 
who know the weapons and methods of to-day, 
then Mr. Churchill will not have failed for nothing. 
TWO WAYS OF WAGING WAR. 
By Dr. E. J. DILLON. 
AMID the crash of well built political air- 
castles and the deepening shadows of 
ministerial, parliamentary, and other 
crises there is at least one source of com- 
fort which the AlUes would fain claim for their 
own. The grounded conviction that one and all 
we are pursuing the same aim in various efficacious 
ways, with good hope of achieving it. Amid burnt- 
out enthusiasms and dissipated illusions we cling 
firmly to that rock of safety where hope and 
inspiration have their source. And evidences of its 
reality abound at every hand's turn. We cannot 
take up a journal without coming upon an inter- 
change of cordial telegrams between the French 
and British Premiers, the Russian and Itahan 
army commanders, the Speakers of the French 
Chamber and the Russian Duma, the various new 
Foreign Secretaries, all proclaiming in thrilling 
language the close solidarity of their respective 
peoples, their stern resolve to fight to the finish, 
their absolute certitude of ultimate victory. 
HARMONY OF THE ALLIES. 
Those cheering utterances warrant the belief 
that there never was such harmony among nations 
whose interests are so disparate, whose duties 
lie so far apart, whose friendship is of such recent 
date. The prompt, ungrudging acquiescence thus 
displayed by entire States in the painful surrender 
of national feelings and instincts for the behoof 
of the cause of collective civilisation is in truth 
a glorious portent. Two years ago it would have 
been scouted as an impossibility. To-da}' every- 
body appears to take it as a matter of course. 
Surely it is a pledge of final victory ? It is uni- 
versally proclaimed as such. The most pessi- 
mistic critic has never \et called that dogma in 
question. Patriotism prompts us to accept it 
implicitly. We may charge individual statesmen, 
even Cabinets, with disastrous blunders and call 
for such amends as Ministerial changes can furnish. 
but we may not raise doubts about the bed-rock of 
our salvation. 
Yet to me it seems that the time has come 
not indeed for recriminations but for clear thinking, 
plain speaking and resolute acting. Mistakes 
have undoubtedly been made, some of them fraught 
with appalling consequences, and in certain cases 
it was impossible to commit them without first 
doing violence to common sense. And violence 
was done unfalteringly. Then we witnessed the 
odd spectacle of the nation's leaders expressing 
astonishment at events in the Balkans which they 
themselves had rendered inevitable. But cursing 
the weather will not better the ruined crops. And 
to-day it might be more useful to cast a glance 
at the essential conditions in which the struggle 
is being waged and ask ourselves in what sense 
these conditions can or must affect the outcome. 
The first significant fact that presses for 
recognition is that the harmony of thought, 
sentiment and aim which prevails among the 
Allies is no new factor in the situation. It w'as 
from the beginning, is to-day and will be unto the 
end. Consequently it confers on the AUies no 
immunity from — let us say the necessity of long 
consultations, heated discussions and decorous 
delays. It does not banish nor even temporarily 
suspend national aims, traditional policies, political 
and military reserves. On the contrary, it pre- 
supposes the full satisfaction of all these before it 
can exercise any beneficial action of its own. That 
explains how it came to pass that several months 
ago when Roumania was literally itching to draw 
the sword against Austria but first wanted to 
drive a lucrative national bargain with the Allies, 
the transaction was not concluded. For one of 
these refused to barter away to Roumania the strips 
of territory she demanded, and based the refusal 
on grounds which commended themselves to the 
others. And in this perfectly legitimate way the 
allied nations came to lose Roumania's co-opera- 
x'o 
