Novembci 20, 191: 
L A X D A N D W: A T E R 
tion and all that that would ha\e involved. Thereat 
the Germans rejoiced exceedingly and cried out 
that the Entente Powers were at sixes and sevens 
among themselves. In this allegation there was 
of course no truth. Almost perfect accord reigns 
among them all. For when differences have to 
be they are agreed to differ. 
In a similar way we negotiated with Greece. 
She, too, asked for terms and received the promise 
of all that was accounted fair just then. It is 
alleged that one condition which would have 
sufficed to turn the scale in our favour — a territorial 
guarantee — was denied her. If so, doubtless we 
are expected to assume that it was denied on 
excellent grounds. The result unfortunately has 
been what we know and may yet be supplemented by 
what we sometimes forebode. But there was no 
divergence of views among the Allies. They were 
perfectly unanimous. 
DEFECTION OF BULGARIA. 
The defection of Bulgaria and the tergiversa- 
tion of Greece and the German inroad into Serbia 
connoted the abandonment of the first line of our 
defences of Eg^'pt and the Suez Canal. It now 
became urgent to strengthen the second Hne, to 
rescue the Serbs from utter defeat and to impress 
Greece and Roumania. For these purposes a 
powerful military expedition was needed without 
delay. At first, however, our leaders were not 
sure that that was the best plan, and they employed 
so much time in thinking it over that there was 
little left for fitting out the expedition. Neither 
was it easy to obtain in adequate numbers men 
adapted for military service in a mountainous 
country like Serbia and to provide them with 
everything requisite for a campaign. France could 
not readily spare the troops. Great Britain could 
not muster them at such brief notice. Russia 
was equally unprepared and much too distant. 
What was to be done ? 
Of. one accord people's thoughts turned to 
Italy who it was understood possesses large num- 
bers of troops not actually employed at the front, 
and of troops too which are specially fitted for 
service in the highlands. \Miy not appeal to her 
in the name of the harmony that attunes the Allies 
to painful sacrifices. After all, Italy has interests, 
vital interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, in 
Albania, in the countries inhabited by the Otto- 
mans. To take an active part in the war there 
would be to pursue her own national interests 
in a country where they are most seriously threa- 
tened and might be most readily furthered. That 
was the first impulse of the French, British, 
Rusians, Serbs. 
But it soon yielded to Italy's lucid and con- 
vincing explanations. Italy, it was pointed out, 
was and is heart and soul with the Allies. She 
entirely agrees with them about the necessity of 
the expedition to Serbia. She is convinced that 
to be effectual it should be prompt and formidable. 
She is persuaded that it is to the interest of each of 
the Powers without exception to contribute to its 
success. And she herself will set the example by 
fighting with even greater energy than before 
against Austria in the unredeemed territor}'. 
There she can be most useful to her friends. 
She would gladly lend a hand in the Balkans too, 
even at the risk of provoking actual warfare with 
Germany. But the question being purely military 
the Cabinet has to adjust its policy to the decision 
of the General Staff, and that decision is unfavour- 
able to participation in the war on any new front. 
Moreover, Italy has co-operated in other ways with 
the Triple Entente in their Serbian expedition — 
in ways comparable to those in which Germany is 
helping Austria against Italy. Besides Britain's 
interest in the success of Serbia's resistance is 
greatly superior to that of the other members of 
the Entente. If Italy's stake were greater it 
would be reasonable to expect more from her than 
can at present be looked for. And lastly one may 
conjecture that the Italian General Staff, or say 
rather General Cadorna, who is prudence incarnate, 
has exercised his hberty of judgment in estimating 
the Allies' chances of success and may, with great 
respect for their opinion, have formed a divergent 
one of his own. 
GO-ORDINATION OF FORGES. 
Thus everything is being done rationally 
and with due regard for that measure of unanimity 
and co-ordination of forces which has been ac- 
counted necessary and sufficient. There is nothing, 
therefore, to complain of. Everything is being 
done by system. The Allies, although engaged in 
a life and death struggle, are not fighting for victory 
pure and simple. That would be an easy task, 
considering their vast resources of men and money. 
What they are contending for is victory to be 
achieved under a set of complicated and highly- 
creditable conditions. Before each outbreak of 
hostilities the potential enemy is to be treated as 
a friend, his assurances are to be accepted as 
against every other evidence of his intentions. No 
military preparations for the eventuality of his 
turning against us are to be made. To the 
organised newspaper campaign wlvch is destroying 
his faith in the Allies military power, no response 
in kind is to be made. For to descend to any of 
those expedients would be derogatory to our 
dignity. In satisfying his territorial demands or 
meeting his attack, no sacrifices which any Entente 
Power considers too painful need be made. Hence 
Italy need not send men to Serbia, just as Russia 
did not abate her claims to the territory coveted 
by Roumania, nor Britain adopt conscription. The 
Entente cultivates freedom, dignity and national- 
ism while waging war. 
And this is natural. For the members of the 
league it is explained arc all peoples mindful of 
their traditions, proud of their past glories, jealous 
of their present possessions, solicitous for their 
future growth and each one unwilling to hold its 
national individuality in abeyance. Moreover, 
the Allies have not broken with the past. On the 
contrary, after the war everything is to go on as 
usual in their respective countries and meanwhile 
all the threads are to be kept intact. They have 
merely opened a parenthesis in their smoothly 
flowing life and are bent on closing it again as soon 
as possible. Meanwhile they have parliaments to 
consider party interests to further the future of 
the various regimes to consult, the interplay of 
social forces to watch and the just balance between 
civil and military authority to uphold. In other 
words, it behoves the Entente States to compel 
the grandiose struggle they are waging, its issues, 
its schemes, its preparation and its strategy into 
close connection with the changing, perhaps in- 
coherent, dictates of that loosely ordered political 
life. And the duty of seeing all those internal 
interests felicitously counterbalanced must ever 
precede that of harmonizing the strivings of all the 
.Allies, co-ordinating their forces and hurling these 
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