I. A -N I) A A U 
\\ A 1 11 K . 
*\u\fnuK'i :io, I()I5. 
against the common enemy. That is one source of 
our diffirulti'- which it is meet that wo should 
bear in mind, when tempted to cnticise the 
Ciovernments. 
All the Allied peoples arc represented b\' 
Parliaments to whieh the respective cabinets look 
for approval even in the prosecution of the 
campaign. Many regard this as a precious safe- 
guard — the French prize it as a sheet anchor of 
ci\il liberty. J^ut it may also become a clog on 
the only kind of action that can be successful in 
a ruthless struggle like the present. In normal 
times the nation identifies itself with the legisla- 
ture ; in war time with the arm}-. Inter anna 
silent leges. To-da}' there is, there ought to be, 
but one thought, one stri\ing — to carry the 
campaign to a successful issue. And this can 
be done only by placing competent men at the 
head of the enterprise and enabling them to 
translate their plans into acts without advoidable 
loss of time or fear of obstacles. If — to take an 
extreme and improbable case — the Government of 
a belligerent country were being reconstituted 
and the minister of one of the national defences 
who had worked out far-reaching plans, instead 
of being allowed to execute them were to be 
set on one side because of petty party intrigues, 
with what feelings could we then look into the 
future ? 
GERMANY'S METHODS. 
No such vagaries can mar military prospects 
in Germany. There the War lords conceive 
grandiose projects knowing that they will be free 
to develop them in every detail without inter- 
ference from Parliament or Parliamentary repre- 
sentatives. Had it been otherwise, the history of 
the campaign would have been different. If the 
(ierman Reichstag wielded the power say of the 
Belgian Chamber, there is little doubt that some 
of the seemingly wild war plans that astonished 
the Entente world would have been vetoed as 
extravagant. The secret of German success is 
open to all mankind ; the subordination of ever^-- 
thing and everyone to the necessities of the war ; 
the appointment of the most competent leaders 
to carry it on ; the suppression of every let and 
hindrance to the free action of these. For nearly 
a year and a half we have witnessed, nay ex- 
perienced, the marvellous results achieved by this 
simple recipe. Yet we are to-day, if anything, a 
little further from applying it — where it" is legiti- 
mately appliable— than we were at the outset. 
The reason for this seeming remissness is highly 
creditable to the Allies — the possession of sym"- 
pathies too wide for any mere military cause, of 
hallowed traditions and "of a lofty political faith — 
all well worthy of being preserved. 
Germany stoops to conquer. And she can 
stoop low. Yet we are told that she is on her last 
legs. Our press is filled with records of her tribula- 
tions. None the less, and although fighting against 
the vastest and mightiest empires of the world, 
she imposed upon them from the start lier own 
choice of the place and the time of each decisive 
encounter. Her press exults in the thought that 
not once has it fallen to the lot of the Allies suddenly 
and effectively to break fresh ground, to create a 
new front, to -organise a comprehensive scheme of 
attack. 
It should be obvious b}- now that the task 
before the Allies calls for "their entire strength 
and for the full exercise of the faculty of self- 
abnegation where the common interest requires it. 
For it is hardly possible to persist in the methods 
and with the maciiinery heretofore employed 
without endangering or impairing the issue. Those 
methods and that machinery have been tested by 
results, which are what might reasonably have 
been anticipated. The Allies are determined -to 
light on ; and they are possessed of adequate 
resources which only need to be handled v^itlt skill 
to make sure of victory. E. J. Dii.i.OK. 
NEED FOR MORE UNITY. 
T,'-e following letter on the need for greater unity of 
action among the Allies has reached us from one 
of our readers in Paris : 
Est-il permis de dire aiijourd'hui tout hant cc que 
les hommcs clairvoyants disent tout bas dcpnis longtemps 
doja — c'ost que nos adversaircs out sur nous unavantaKc 
onorme qui consiste dans I'unite de plan et d'artion 
resultant de I'ctat de vassalite dans loquel les AUeniands 
ticnnent leurs allies ? C'est probablement, ;\ I'hcure 
actuellc la seule superiorite qu'ils aient sur nous. 
Les facteurs majeurs de la guerre — Amiee, Marine et 
Diplomatic — des quatre nations ennemies se trouvent 
reunis en un seul faisccau tenu par une seulc main. II 
est banal de dire que 1 'unite de direction est necrssairc 
a tout's Ics entrcprises humaines. Comment en scrait-il 
autrcment dans une guerre comme cellc-ci ? Cctte 
vcrite parait bicn demontree aujourd'hui. 
Nous ne dcvons pas perdre une heure dc notre temps, 
une parcelle de notre cnergic, en vaincs recriminations : 
nous dcvons tout conservcr pour I'action utile. Ouelle 
est aujourd'hui cette action ? Dcvons-nous acceptor la 
constatation desolante que I'Entente rcstera une formulc 
ind?cise, sans cohesion, devant une Alliance reellc et 
effective? Ou bien devons-nous chercher s'il ne serait 
pas ]iossible de creer un orp;anisme qui represehto pour 
I'Entenie ce que le Kaiser represente pour I'AUiancc 
cnnomic ? Est-il impossible de concevoir un Grand 
Conseil de Guerre rcunissant les quatre grandes nations 
de I'Entente, charge exclusivcment de" 1 'etude dc la 
strategic generale et de tons les problcmes que comporte 
Taction commune en vue d'une pensee unique : vaincre. 
II siegerait en permanence dans une \-ille a choisir. Nos 
.'Allies et nous-memes y serious representes par trois 
delegues pour chaque nation appartenant respectivement 
a I'Armee, a la Marine et a la Diplomatic. Ces delegues 
scraient degages de toute autre fonction et choisis sans 
aucune preocupation de parti ni de consideration politique 
parmi les honimes dont Ic caracterc, le passe et I 'ex- 
perience offriraient le plus de garanties. 
La formule la plus effective doit ctre cherchce— 
celle que nous venous d'indiquer n'a qu'un but : c'est 
d'ouvnr la discussion. Xeanmoins, des a present, nous 
v voyons un avantage trcs net— les decisions <pu 
reuniraient I'unanimite pourraient devenir immediate- 
ment executoires, puisque les delegues seraient en contact 
constant avec leur Gouvcrnemcnt. 
Dans un interview recent. M. le President du Conseil 
a pris som de nous dire ce qu'il cntendait par " La 
Victoire," et nous sommes parfaitement d'accord Mais 
nous ne I'obtiendrons qu'a la condition de posseder un 
organ-.sme qui soit en mesure de maintenir constamment 
d accx)rd les pomts de vue et les possibilites des quatre 
grandes nations de I'Entente, et d'en deduire le plan des 
operations generales. 
Tlie fifth edition of the Cambridge l^niver'^itv \\'ar I i<t 
IS now published and is a fonnidal:.lc quarto volume containiii- 
over 11,000 names. Trinity College has 2,500 ; Pembroke 
1^052 Gonvillc and Caius 952, Clare 750, Emmanuel 648, Trinitv 
Hall 603, Jesus 559, King's 556, Christ's 540, and St. John's 
513- . It IS a record of which the Universitv mav well be proud 
showng, as it does, Cambridge Universitv's fine spirit. There 
are O14 killed, nearly 900 wounded, arid 123 prisoners and 
missing. The distinctions comprise: Mentioned in Des- 
patches, 241 ..VC., 3; D.S.C., i; D.S.O.. 36: Militarv 
:klcdaille Mihtaire. 4 ; Croix de Chevalier, 10 : Ooix dc Guerre 
4 : Kussian Orders, 5 ; Serbian Order, i. 
18 
