November 27, 1915 
L;A N D AND WATER 
enemy's press to accustom opinion to the loss of 
Gorizia, the immediate answer is that the last 
Italian offensive nearly, but not quite, succeeded 
in its violent assault upon the Podgora ridge and 
the ridge of St. Michael, and the Austro- Hungarian 
Government in its own organs and through neu- 
trals who watched the battle, prepared opinion for 
immediate defeat. That defeat the Austro-Hun- 
garian forces did not for the moment suffer. They 
lost ground, but the last climax which would ha\-e 
decided the matter was denied to the Italians. 
But if the question be put in another fashion, 
and if we ask why Gorizia has been allowed to fall 
into such peril at all, the answer is undoubtedly 
the difficulty of supplying men. The losses along 
this front have been very heavy, for it is here only 
that the Austro-Hungarian forces .come under 
the fire of an organised and numerous heavy 
artillery. 
We must always remember that the organ- 
ised, concentrated fire of heavy guns nowhere meets 
the enemy in the East. It is on the French and 
Italian fronts alone that he meets his equals, or his 
superiors, in this arm. 
Now the losses corresponding to the proper 
use of such an arm (the Italians have had many 
months in which to accumulate munitions, while 
their heavy artillery is of known and proved excel- 
lence) have been undoubtedly very heavy, and the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy has for many weeks 
past been in some difficulty for men. It has 
recruited its units with elements of more and more 
doubtful efficiency, and it is probable that the 
Serbian effort has cost more men than was ex- 
pected. Meanwhile it is clear that orders have 
been received to prevent the Russian movement 
across the Styr in Volhynia from taking too great 
an extension, and four army corps are permanently 
immobilised watching the Roumanian frontier. 
IMPORTANCE OF ROUMANIA. 
It may be noted in this connection that this 
same Roumanian frontier is of capital importance 
at this moment, not only to the enemy, but to the 
Allies. 
Should Roumania elect to join our enemies (at 
whatever future risk to her as a State) she not only 
brings in perhaps thirty divisions of new material 
admirably organised, tut she releases fresh Austro- 
Hungarian forces just at a moment when the 
rest of that army is in most crying need of recruit- 
ment. The. entry of Roumania might prolong 
for another half-year the resistance of the Austro- 
Hungarians on the Italian front. 
Conversely, if Roumania should ultimately 
throw in her lot with the Allies, it is, from the point 
of view of numbers, a revolution for the enemy. 
For even if the Austro-Hungarian reserves are not 
yet at the point of exhaustion, they are at the least 
under a very heavy strain. The appearance of 
considerable forces in the Eastern theatre of war 
would not merely call upon Austro-Hungary for 
renewed or exceptional efforts, it would probably 
put those efforts beyond her reach. Of such im- 
portance is the political question of the Balkans 
and, in particular, this problem of Roumanian 
neutrality to-day. 
One thing has appeared, the most lamentable, 
from the experience of the last few weeks. It is 
this. The Allies, when they were lirst startled into 
this by by the crass pride of the German pedants, 
designed sincerely and openly a national policy 
for Europe. 
They went into the field to restore, belatedly 
and after long toleration of Prussian contempt for 
light, the freedom of national wills. They pro- 
l)osed to light for an affirmation of those rights. 
Prussia herself held in subjection certain 
populations, notably the Poles, whom she could 
not govern, and only hoped to destroy. Austro- 
Hungary meant nothing but a jumble of varying 
jealous peoples each at issue with the rest. So 
unnatural a unity was kept together only by the 
illusion of the Hapsburg authority. The war, for 
the ancient civilised peoples of the West, meant 
then, the redemption of Belgium and of Alsace 
Lorraine and the acquirement for Italy of the 
Italian provinces still unredeemed, the freeing of 
the Slavs, the establishment of a stable equali- 
brium at last in Europe on the basis of that free- 
dom they themselves enjoyed. 
The action, proviicial and isolated, of the 
petty Balkan States has strained and warped this 
ideal. One of the smaller Balkan States — or rather 
its King — has already refused to accept it, and has 
preferred treason to the common cause. Greece, 
at the moment of this writing, hesitates. Rou- 
mania also hesitates. If that hesitation be deter- 
mined against the cause of nationalism, then the 
upshot of this campaign can but be the ruin of 
these great hopes of national justice, and the 
survival of the smaller nations as mere dependents 
of the victors. 
I say again it is lamentable, but unless this 
immediate crisis be successfully passed it is in- 
evitable. 
Civihsation will certainly not tolerate its 
general peril at the hands of little new nations 
which it fostered and almost created in better times. 
If they prove incapable of national honour they 
must sacrifice their titles to national independence, 
and when Europe can breathe freely again, and 
when the Prussian cancer is cut out, the little 
nations will fall under tutelage — not wholly for 
their good. 
THE POSITION IN SERBIA. 
It is now unfortunately clear that the enemy 
has in his hands the whole of the Balkan situation. 
This misfortune is due to three causes. The 
too prolonged interval between the first German 
offensive on October 6th, and the advance of the 
Allies. Second, the fact that the Serbian autho- 
rities elected to make their principal stand in the 
North of the State. 
Thirdly. The lack of supply. 
The two first causes now belong to the past and 
a discussion of them would be useless in a survey 
of military operations. But the third is a present 
matter, is still capable of remedy and needs the 
examination of those who would intelligently follow 
this phase of the great war. 
In the first place, let us establish the truth 
of the main statement. The occupation of Serbia 
by the enemy is in the main due to the lack of 
supply from which Serbian forces suffered. How 
do we know this ? 
We know it from the course which the Serbian 
retreat has taken. 
In the first days of the operations, when the 
line of the Danube and its immediate vicinity was 
being defended, the Serbian army was directly 
exposed to the fire of a heavy artillery which it 
could not match. There were trained against it 
pieces up to 12 in. in calibre, and perhaps even' 
larger pieces. To meet tiiese it mav have had a 
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