xsovcmber 27, 1915.1 
LAND AND WATER 
western edge of the highlands, the game may be 
kept going until other forces appear in the field. 
Now the suppl^'ing and munitioning even with 
small arms ammunition alone, or even food for such 
a force in such a ccuntry is not an easy problem 
to solve. If we take the whole stretch of country 
from the ^Montenegrin frontier down to what is 
called to-day, rather artificially, the Albanian 
frontier, we shall find in it only one possible avenue 
of supply, and that avenue is indifferent, or rather, 
exceedingly bad. 
Observe the conditions as they are expressed 
upon the accompan3-ing Sketch. The Serbians 
have lost Novi Bazar, they are about to lose 
Mitrovitza. They are, so far as concerns the main 
body of the army, in the mountains in the district 
A.A., with their Government at Prizrend. They 
are falling back on the Montenegrin plain of Ipek. 
We mav altogether neglect, for the purposes 
of this calculation, poUtical frontiers, and cjnsider 
rnlv the nature of the ground and the sympathy 
of the populations. 
The nature of the ground is a wild tangle of 
mountains, with two open spaces, the plain of 
Ipek (on the edge of which also stands, to the 
scuth, Djakova) and, sixty miles awav towards the 
Adriatic, the open country round Scutari, which 
has a very bad shallow port at San Giovanni, with 
a few other bad Uttle ports and roadsteads imme- 
diately to the north. Everything west of the line 
B.B.B. is held by the Au^trians, and everything 
East of the line C.C.C.is in the hands of the Austrc- 
Germans or of the Bulgarians. It we are to muni- 
tion the Serbian army, where it retreats into the 
plain of Ipek or into Montenegro, there is only one 
track by which it can be done. It is the track 
which leads across the hills from the plain of 
Scutari to Djakova, crossing three passes at F, G and 
H, not very high, but none of them, if I am rightly 
informed, practicable for modern traffic : That line 
of about sixty miles in all its detours, or, say. four to 
five days' going for any considerable train of sumpter 
animals or primitive wheeled vehicles, is the only 
opportunity : to the south, unless the Bulgarian 
advance is checked, the avenues of supplv, poor 
as they are, are blocked. Northern tracks lead 
only into Montenegro, itself closely blocked on 
every side, save upon the patch of sea-coast .at 
and immediately to the north of San Gio\anni. 
Meanwhile to the south of this mountain track, 
in great numbers, and actually upon its course, if 
we take the political frontier of what is called 
.\lbania, arc the mountain tribes, Catholic and 
Mohammedan, opjjosed to the Slav cause, and 
Orthodox mountaineers, who will also be hostile. 
It is said that the enemy is already providing 
these with arms and munitions. It is clear that 
such an avenue, abominable in itself as a way, 
rendered more difficult by the ground through 
which it passes, and, worst of all, interrupted by a 
hostile population, can only be cleared by deter- 
mined effort on the part of the Allies, and if this 
be made in time it may yet be possible to save the 
Serbian army. 
FRENCH ATTEMPT NEAR VELES. 
The particular steps by which the enemy 
achie\'ed his end, and established himself between 
the main Serbian force and those of the Allies can 
now be followed in great detail, thanks to a long 
communication which appeared in the Press of 
last Tuesday, the 23rd. 
I will repeat in passing, by the way, what was 
said in these columns last week with regard to 
another subject, that it would be of the greatest 
value if the Government or the military authorities 
would help as far as possible the continual publica- 
tion of such statements. It is quite impossible 
to see the war as it is without such detailed state- 
ments from time to time 
Basing oneself then, upon this information, 
what we find is this. 
The French Commander-in-Chief arrived at 
Salonica exactly a week after the first Austro^ 
German crossing of the Danube. 
It was clear that an attempt to eftect a junction 
with the Serbian forces or to relieve the pressure 
upon them, must consist in an advance up the rail- 
way which follows the Vardar valley. It is, of 
course, a single-line railway and presumably not 
over well supplied with rolling stock. At about 
the 140th kilometre from the > Icn'ca terminus 
there begins a very narrow gorge cmied the Demir 
Kapu (Iron Gate) ravine. The more open valley 
south of this gorge has for its chief siding Strum- 
nitza station. 
The chief siding of the more open valley north 
of the gorge is Krivolak station. 
The first thing to be done was to prevent the 
Bulgarian division, or perhaps two divisions, that 
were already operating in this neighbourhood, 
from seizing this gorge. It is very vulnerable, 
because through the greater part of it the railway 
runs along no moi-e than a ledge between the rapid 
unfordable Vardar river and precipitous rocks, 
while at its northern end the line can only be 
carried on by going through a rock tunnel. Further, 
just north of Strumnitza station was another 
vulnerable point, the bridge which carries the line 
across the Vardar. The French commander at 
once made it his fiist business to push up to 
Strumnitza station and occupy it, and imme- 
diately after to seize the Demir Kapu gorge before 
the Bulgarians had time to arrive and occupy 
Krivolak station and siding to the north of it. 
The French advance guard were in occupation 
of Krivolak a week after the arrival of their 
Commander, that is, a fortnight after the first 
Austro-German attack on the Serbians in the 
north. It was only a weak detachment, but it was 
followed by reinforcements, ar.d lour days later, 
on October 23rd, a few troops wjre ferried across 
the Vardar, which was rolling in spate from the 
heavy rains, and these troops prepared and held a 
position upon the further, or eastern, bank. Four 
days later again, on October 27th,. the General 
in ccmimand arrix'ed at the head of the ad\'anee at 
Krivolak station and determined to occupy the 
13 
