November 27, 
1915- 
LAND AND WATER. 
South stand?, the French force holding its 
advanced post on the Kara Hodjali hill on the 
east, protecting the valley. They are faced by 
forces now at least three times their own. They 
rely for munitionment and supply upon a single 
line of railway running to their base at Salonika 
over a hundred miles away, and passing in one 
})lace through a narrow, highly vulnerable 
gorge. To their left, but not in tcuch with 
them, the remains of what was, even originally, 
a very small Serbian force have been forced 
back upon Monastir, the Bulgarian occupation 
of which was, and perhaps is still, delayed for 
political reasons. (At the moment of writing, 
Tuesday evening, there is no news of the occupa- 
tion of Monastir.) On their right certain English 
forces lie in the region of Lake Dorian, and these 
are in touch with the French position at Kavadar ; 
the extreme right of the line still extends, it 
would seem, into Bulgarian territory. 
But the whole of these positions in the extreme 
south of Serbia are manifestly a defensive held by 
forces far inferior to those in front of them, and as 
yet unable to affect the general situation. The 
note of this general situation is the retreat of 
the Serbian army westwards towards the Adriatic, 
and the occupation of nearly the whole State 
securely by the enemy's forces, including, of course, 
a complete grasp of the main railway which was 
his objective and the reparation of which will give 
him open communication with Constantinople. 
Whether that army can be of effective use again 
depends wholly on supply. 
GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN 
AMERICA. 
It is always worth noting the German 
propaganda in the United States. Not because 
this propaganda is likely to have any military 
consequences, but because it gives us the measure 
of the enemy's mind. 
There is an attitude with regard to Germany 
too common in this country, which is roughly as 
follows : That the modem German (the North 
German, that is, the Prussianised German who is 
directing this war, and who is the master of all 
the rest), is better fitted for war than the Allies 
whom he attacked. 
It is not the moment to discuss that theory. 
I should myself have thought it self-evident 
that a military nation invading with an advantage 
of about two to one, getting badly beaten at the end 
of ten days, finding its whole plan ruined, deserved 
no extravagant praise. But, at any rate, the 
opinion is there If that opinion be traced one 
step further back you will find it reposing upon 
another opinion : that this opposed military 
superiority is due to something called "efficiency." 
The word has no meaning, of course, save in con- 
nection with some particular object. Thus if a 
man draws a steam-engine he can be efficient 
as an instrument for drawing it beautifully, or 
as an instrument for drawing it with mechanical 
accuracy. He cannot be efficient both ways. 
Anj'how, this vague idea of " efficiency " as a 
label for the North German state of mind was 
rubbed too hard into academic England during 
three whole generations to be eradicated by any- 
thing save the visible and final defeat of the enemy 
— by his accepting terms. Those who are per- 
suaded of this virtue in their enemy conceive of it, 
I imagine, as a sort of exact co-ordination of the 
whole country to the end of the war, coupled with 
the presence of all the elements that make for 
success in war. 
In the first point they arc right. Modorn 
Germany is exactl\- co-ordinated for war. But in 
the second they are wrong. Though all the social 
elements present are co-ordinated for war, not 
enough are present. Germany has organised 
thoroughly all the elements she possessed, but she 
has not been able to command the full quota of 
elements necessary to success. She is like a man 
who should bring to the organisation of a picture 
gallery a full knowledge of prices and an eye for 
line, but who was colour-blind. The most con- 
spicuous example of a gap in their methods 
is the giving of military initiative to certain of her 
officers, on the ground of their social rank as 
civilians. It will appear very clearly, when we 
can get the full history of the Battle of the Marne, 
how grossly unmilitary superstition contributed 
to the turning of the war in that particular action. 
Remember that the gap opened between Wurtem- 
berg and the guard. 
Now, among those elements which are lacking 
to the enemy is judgment in the affecting of neutral 
opinion, particularly in the United States. 
If " efficiency " means taking a great deal 
of trouble, there is no doubt that the Germans are 
efficient in their American propaganda. But if 
it means taking trouble in the right way (which is 
surely its proper meaning) then that propaganda 
is inefficient. 
I am writing this after reading dozens of 
articles either suggested or dictated, or paid for, 
or merely contributed, by German influences in 
the United States, and I discover the German 
work here to suffer from two very grave weak- 
nesses. The first is inability to keep the team 
together, " to keep the traces taut." One agent 
is saying one thing, another another, and there is 
the most ridiculous confusion and contradiction. 
The second weakness is much more serious. 
It is the complete neglect of, and contempt for, 
what I may call " the informed minority." 
As to the first point, anyone who carefully 
consults German propaganda work, not only in 
America, but in that part of our own Press which 
is playing the German game, or in the Scandi- 
navian countries, or in Holland, is immediately 
struck by this lack of co-ordination. 
Let me give an example : An American 
journalist, the other day, one of those tiresome 
" neutrals " whom they use for our edification, 
was told that the enemy losses on the Western 
front were only one-third of the Alllied losses on the 
same front. 
The folly of the statement needs no comment. 
But my point is not that. My point is that in the 
same week there appeared in another similar 
pronouncement in another country, the statement, 
also German, and also false (though just less 
ridiculous) that the Allied losses were " at least 
fifty per cent " more than the enemy losses on this 
same front ! 
Another example of the same lack of co-ordina- 
tion is the carefully prepared statements in one 
set of papers emphasising the lack of food and raw 
material in the enemy's country, and equally 
prepared statements ridiculing our estimates of 
that lack. The Germans at the head of the Bureau 
which arranges these things would probably tell 
you that one set of statements was made for one 
market and the other for another. But that is 
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