LAND AND WATER. 
November 27, 1915. 
situation as might mako the ultimate Allied 
victon- look less immediate than it looks now. 
And iif surh a sweeping success were too much to 
iiopo for. there might, at an\' rate, be political 
results incalculal^h- valuable for two reasons, it 
nuist put fresh heart into the GeiTnans. It might 
disturb the self-confidence of the Allies by taking 
it as its weakest point. 
(^ur enemies having, not only the armies but 
tlie whole machinery of Government of two 
empires under a single control — and that not a 
ci\il but a military control— is able to ensure that 
its diplomatic and its military polic>- go hand in 
hand. Against this unit>- of idea and synchronism 
of action, \ve have to oppose a tripartite direction, 
principallv, if not entirely civilian. Three diplo- 
matic organisations differing entirely in tradition 
and method, three armies, of which two are cut 
off entireh- from co-operation with the third, and 
the co-operation of these two beset by the 
obstacles of difference of language, of tradition, 
of annament and so forth. But there is a third 
diflk-ultv on the Allied side, the full force of which 
I think" hds hardlv been appreciated. It is that, 
if (iermany's Eastern stroke is to be countered, 
there is no means open save by the co-operation of 
military and naval forces. The intricacy of the 
problem of amphibious warfare is proverbial. 
Never has it been more completely or perhaps 
more tragically illustrated than in the account of 
the Dardanelles Expedition which Mr. Churchill, 
the principal actor in the matter, gave to the 
country a week ago. How much more involved 
must the problem be when instead of combining 
the land and sea forces of a single country, >ou 
have to combine two kinds of army with two 
kinds of navv. The merit of the German stroke 
at Serbia, is "that to counter it, the Allies must be 
involved in the most difficult of all political, 
diplomatic and military problems. They have to 
use their command of the sea for a purpose which 
tests their capacity for unity of action to the 
utmost. 
CRUCES OF AMPHIBIOUS WAR. 
This then is not a situation in which we can 
neglect any weapon or any use of it. People 
forget that in amphibious war there is only one 
advantage to be got by those that make it. It 
is the advantage of throwing superior numbers 
on a point u^iere the enemy does not expect 
them. If circumstances deprive you of the elements 
of surprise, your campaign may be all the weaker 
for being amphibious. This weakness does not 
only exist when there is uncertainty as to com- 
munications being secure — though obviously lack 
of such security is a very terrible weakness. The 
real weakness Hes in the restriction of numbers 
involved in putting an army first into ships, then 
off the ships on to the land. In moving troops by 
land, the speed of movement depends upon the 
number and condition of the roads. In moving 
troops at sea, it depends upon the number and 
speed of the ships available and the facilities for 
embarking and disembarking. You are in a bad 
case if the enemy can concentra.te quicker than 
you can. 
The final and perhaps the crowning weakness 
of amphibious war is the difficulty of holding open 
a line of retreat. Armies on land can be made to 
•retreat either by defeat in the field, or an effective 
threat at their communications. It is presumed 
that no country would embark upon amphibious 
war unless it had control of the sea ; the second 
danger, therefore, need not be contemp ated. 
But the first danger remains. If a^ sea-borne 
•irmv has to retreat once more to the Sea the 
problem of further retreat is a problem of re- 
embarkation. Writing in Land Axn ^^ATER six 
weeks ago I touched on this subject in connection 
both with' the first landings at Salonika and with 
the problem of withdrawing our troops from the 
Dardanelles. It is this problem which we may be 
sure is the true explanation of the pressure now 
being brought to bear on Greece by the beginnings 
of a mercantile blockade. For it would be suicide 
to go further in the matter unless the safe pos- 
session of Salonika were certain. 
URGENCY OF THE MATTER. 
As to the blockade itself it is impossible not 
to regret that that this measure was not adopted 
some time ago. The patent facts that it was in 
our power to bring sea power to bear on Greece, 
that Greece was peculiarly susceptible to such 
pressure, and that the enemy was using military 
threats to keep Greece from fulfilling her obliga- 
tions to Serbia, all made it clear enough in the 
first weeks of October that we should have to use 
force to save the situation, and that only one form 
of force was available. Writing in these columns 
on this subject on the i6th October, I limited 
myself to the guarded phrase : " If it were legiti- 
mate for us to learn from the enemy, our diplo- 
matists might remember that Greece alone of the 
Balkan States already has great maritime interests 
and had always envisaged a still greater future on 
the sea." 
Possibly the six weeks' delay in taking action 
is to be explained by the obUgation we considered 
ourselves under to carry France and Russia with 
us in every step we took. If so the delay is a 
tribute to the enemy's judgment. It is, at any 
rate, quite incredible to suppose, as has been 
hinted, that we waited to hang up Greek shipping 
until the Christmas dried fruit imports were safely 
in our warehouses ! 
ENEMY SUBMARINE SUPPLIES. 
The Blockade of Greece, if there is craft 
enough at the AlUes' disposal in the Mediter- 
ranean to make the blockade truly effective, 
may quite possibly affect the fortunes of the 
war in an unexpected direction. We know 
from several sources that there is a considerable 
number of German and possibly Austrian sub- 
marines in the Mediterranean, and it is clear that 
they are not being supplied either from Con- 
stantinople or from Pola. That they can get all 
they need, either from the African coast — as 
Nelson used to do — or at rendezvous arranged with 
Spanish ships somewhere off the coast of that 
countr\-, is really not half so probable as that a 
certain number of Greek ship masters should have 
been brought into this business. As we have 
recently been reminded, the Greek mercantile 
marine includes a very large number of small 
trading steamers, which are either owned by their 
Captains or at any rate by small syndicates of 
traders and adventurers. These men are in busi- 
ness for profit, and are extremely unlikely to be in- 
fluenced in their action by any sentimental sym- 
pathy with the Allies. Greece abounds with 
small ports, and it would be well within the 
limits of German capacity to engage a number 
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