January 2"], iqtG. 
LAND AND W A T It R 
BLOCKADE AND RUMOURS. 
By ARTHUR POLLEN. 
WITHOUT doubt the most urgent question 
of the day for us is to lind out if the 
siege of Germany can be made effective 
and to make it so if it can be. The past 
week has revealed gratifying advances in public 
opinion, not only in this country, but in America, 
on this question. There is now a practical unani- 
mity that the siege should be proclaimed to be, 
and in fact become, the common work of all the 
Allies, whether the lion's sh -.re in actually en- 
forcing it continues to fall to (ireat Britain or not. 
There is next an increasing opinion in favour of 
proceeding by a regular blockade instead of 
pleading the sanction of an Order in Council, 
whose legality seems dubious to American jurists, 
and there is a marked advance towards agree- 
nient that we shall be more likely to find — and 
certainly more' prompt in adopting — means to 
make the siege a reality, if its conduct is more 
under naval than diplomatic authority. So far 
there is legitimate ground for a very genuine 
satisfaction on the part of those \vho, for the 
last six months, have been urging these three 
points on public attention. 
Finally, there have been published in New 
"V'ork the returns of the quantities and destina- • 
tions of American exports during part of the ye^x 
1915. These have been largely reprinted in the 
London Press, and though accurate and well- 
informed analysis will greatly alter their apparent 
meaning, there can be little doubt that those 
who during the previous half-year have main- 
tained that our methods of carrying out Mr. 
Asquith's threat to prevent " all commodities from 
entering or leaving Germany," have been so far 
fruitless as to rob our siege of its war value, are 
substantially right. For to subject a civil popula- 
tion of a country to inconvenience is only irritating, 
while to subject it to real privation and famine 
is to reduce its army to impotence. 
But the past week has also brought us evidence 
of another result of this campai^^n of education 
by no means as satisfactory. There has 
appeared in the Daily Telegraph an article, signed 
by Mr. Archibald Hurd, which emphasised the 
incalculable degree to which the fortune of the 
Allies is bound up with the right use of the British 
Navy. Mr. Hurd draws two lessons from the 
Napoleonic War. The parallels of 1805 and 
1812 are, he tells us, an illumination and a warning 
as to what we should do now and why we should 
do it. We need at the helm the firm and ex- 
perienced hand of such a master of sea war as 
was Lord Barham ; if the Navy is to do its work 
the " Nelson touch " must be restored to the 
Admiralty; if trouble with America is to be 
avoided we shall need statesmanship at Whitehall 
as well as consummate professional ability ; if 
public confidence is to be maintained, we need a head 
of the navy whose authority is unquestioned and 
unquestionable. The application of these lessons 
is obvious. Lord Fisher, he urges, is the man and 
must replace Mr. Balfour at the Admiralty. 
It is then a sort of summary of the position to 
say that there is absolute unanimity as to the 
importance of making the siege a reality ; a 
general unanimity that this must be an Allied and 
not a British operation ; a growing inclination 
towards procedure by blockade ; a growing dis- 
satisfaction with the authorities so far responsible 
for the siege — a dissatisfaction that has resulted 
in thinking that it would be better run if it were 
in naval hands. But it is also recognised that this 
cannot be done without changes at the Admiralty ; 
and the fact that such changes may be desirable 
re-opens the (juestion " How is the capacity of 
Whitehall to run the naval war to be increased ? " 
Is it best to look to the Fleet itself, for new blood, 
and choose new advisers from those who have 
had eighteen months' experience of the real 
thing ? Or is it better once more to place our 
confidence in so old and distinguished a public 
servant as Lord Fisher ? As it is folly not to 
recognise that all these questions are inter- 
dependent, and, as the successful termination of 
the wa:r depends upon the right course being taken 
in each particular, let us briefly look at the 
various questions in detail. 
SHOULD THE SIEGE BE ALLIED 
OR BRITISH ? 
There are two reasons why it should be 
allied. First, Grea Britain is taking great 
responsibilities vis-a-vis with America and other 
neutral Powers, by acting solely in this matter. 
It is not fair that this should fall solely upon us. 
Secondly, the fundamental difficulty of the sea 
position is to reconcile neutrals to the course which 
the Allies require to be adopted. The most 
important of the neutrals in America, and for a 
hundred reasons the public of the United States — 
to whom Mr. Wilson professedly looks for guid- 
ance as to his conduct towards ihe belhgerents — 
would regard controversy with the Allied Powers 
as something different altogether from a con- 
troversy with (ireat Britain alone. But as on 
this point there is virtual unanimity no more on it 
need now be said. 
(2) ORDER IN COUNCIL VERSUS 
BLOCKADE. 
The argument in favour of proceeding by 
blockade is twofold. The neutrals question the 
validity of the Order in Council. The legality 
of a blockade seems easier of estabhshment. 
If the validity of the blockade can be legally 
maintained, the blockading powers have the right 
to confiscate not contraband goods onl}', but both 
goods and the ships car ying them when they 
attempt to break throxigh the blockade. It is 
then a more efficient process. If the supplies 
entering Germany have to be carried by ships 
that must insure against the risks the blockade 
runner has to face, two results would follow. 
Only a very small proportion of ship owners would 
face the risk, and supplies would not only auto- 
matically become less in bulk, but enormously 
more costly. It might be thought, if the United 
States has protested so vigorously against our 
proceedings in the matter of contraband, that they 
would protest still more vigorously if we adopted 
