LAND AND WATER. 
January 20, 1916. 
concerned, practically every man oLexperiencp in 
production was willing to serve in this department 
regardless of his personal interest, and from those 
willing a selection of men of ability has given 
most amazing results. Has this recognition of 
entirely new conditions inflicted any humiliation 
on J.ord Kitchener of Khartoum on the Army 
Council, or upon the very able and devoted public 
servants who have jjut in years of excellent ser\ice 
at the W ar Office ? What was in point of fact 
an activity in which only civilians could possibly 
excel seemed to be imposed by necessity on the 
War OfBce which had no training and no aptitude 
for it. The anomaly was frankly recognised, 
and simply remedied. The matter was taken 
from soldiers' and officials' hands and put into 
professional and commercial hands. 
SIEGE BY SEA. 
It is the reverse process that we want with 
regard to the siege to-da}'. The siege is in the 
hands of diplomatists and lawyers — probably the 
best diplomatists and the best lawyers in the 
world. But diplomatists and lawyers are not men 
of war and the siege is a work of war. Their share 
in the siege is real but incidental. It is vitally 
important, but it is subordinate. The poHcy of 
the siege should be settled by the Cabinet, and 
its conduct decided by the Navy. Of course 
the Navy will need the help of the diplomatists 
and the lawyers in the framing of their measures, 
and in the conduct of negotiations. 
Throughout this difiicult business — and it 
would be the blackest ingratitude to the Foreign 
(3fiice not to recognise the enormous extent to 
which the skill of its diplomacy has reduced the 
difficulties, narrowed the field of controversy and 
introduced an enormously higher efftciency into.the 
siege — it certainly looks as if the main strength of 
the Allied position had hardly been used to the full. 
This main strength, of course, is that vis a vis both 
to America and the other neutrals, the moral posi- 
tion of the Allies is unassailable, and the moral posi- 
tion of Germany indefensible.' Germany's crimes 
against America call to Heaven, if not to Washing- 
ton, for vengeance. To murder American citizens 
upon the high seas was bad enough. To do it in face 
first of American protest, then of American prayers, 
and finally of American threats, was to add the most 
humiliating kind of insults to the most monstrous 
kind of injury. To intrigue against the sover- 
reignty of the American Government by stirring 
up disorder, organising the slaughter of peaceful 
citizens by explosions, and wrecking bridges and 
waterworks — surely these would have been bad 
enough if they had been conducted by secret 
agents of Berlin, whose crimes at any rate could 
have been decently disowned. But to do these 
things by the representatives accredited by the 
Emperor to the President of the United States, 
was surely to show a cynicism of contempt un- 
paralleled since Gondomar terrified James I. into 
cutting off Sir Walter Raleigh's head ! For 
reasons which .seemed good to the American 
Government, it has submitted— not without a 
murmur but without a blow to this treatment. 
What apparently our Government fail to realise 
is that this submission makes it quite impossible 
for America actively to resent it, if we take the 
punishment of Germany into our own hands. Such 
indirect injury as we have done to American trade 
by a logical enforcement of the siege is relati\ely 
trivial. It is not as if American trade in bulk bad 
diminished. It has grown vastly. And remem- 
ber that this trade has been protected the world 
over, not by the American, but by the British Fleet. 
There is but one weakness in our position. 
This is, that the siege of Germany is carried out, 
not by the Allies as a bod^^ but by Great Britain 
alone, and not under a blockade, but under an 
Order in Council, the legal validity of which can 
manifestly be questioned. Surely it should not 
need much resolution to take the requisite steps 
for putting the whole thing on to an impregnable 
basis. Let me tabulate once more what these 
steps seem to be. 
(i) The siege of Germany must be by block- 
ade and not under an Order in Council. 
(2) It must be a blockade proclaimed jointly 
by all the Allies. 
(3) The main conduct of the siege should be 
in the hands of the British Admiralty, as agent 
of the Allies. 
(4) The Board must be strengthened by the 
addition of war-trained officers from the fleet, so 
that the best naval brains may be available for 
this work. 
(5) So far as the, siege involves the necessary 
negotiations or communication with neutrals, the 
Foreign Office and diplomatists should conduct these 
negotiations, but acting on Admiralty instructions. 
(6) The import of ALL goods beyond the 
average consumption of the neutral countries 
in previous years, or. not intended for our AlUes, 
should be prohibited absolutely. 
MOUNT LOVTCHEN. 
The Italians, and particularly the Italian., 
seamen, have been somewhat severely criticised. 1 
for allowing Mount Lovtchen to fall, initq!.' 
the hands of Austria. The unconditional sur-; 
render of Montenegro is the dramatic, sequel 
to this victory. It is clear that the strategic, 
importance of the stronghold in question 
was not exaggerated. But with great, respect, ; 
the defence of Mount Lovtchen does not seem 
to me to be primarily a naval question at all. 
We do not know the details of the operation by 
which it was captured, but I should think it exceed- 
ingly doubtful that the Austrian Dreadnoughts 
were of material assistance., At any rate it was 
quite certain that, as far as this capture was due 
to artillery, the heavy Austrian howitzers could 
have done the work' just as well as the naval guns. 
Even if the artillery of the Viribus Unitis, of the 
Prince Eugen, or the Tegethof helped materially, it 
was doubtful if such help was in any case necessary. 
If .we assume that it >vas necessary, and there- 
fore it was a matter vital to the safety of Monte- 
negro that the Austrian Dreadnoughts should have 
been prevented .from taking part in this operation, 
there were clearly but two ways open. One was 
to prevent this squadron entering the Bocche 
di Cattaro, the other tp destroy them when they 
were inside. But the whple Dalmatian coast 
from Pola almost to Cattaro is veiled by a strung- 
out archipelago of islands, so that of the three 
hundred mile journey there is nowhere more than 
fifty miles- at the outside three hours' steaming 
that need be done in open water. To have 
prevented the Austrian Dreadnoughts from reach- 
ing Cattaro then, the Italian Navy would have 
been compelled eitjher to hold the whole series 
of passages between these. islands in force, or to 
have maintained a close blockade of the mouth 
