January 20, 1916. 
LAND AND WA T E R 
regarded as the field of operations of the Allies ; 
whale all; the shaded portion up to the Suez Canal 
be regarded as the enemy field of operation, the 
Allies possess in mere geographical outline a very 
high example of interior lines. If we appreciate 
that action between the two opponents must 
develop near the sea-coast (where it is emphasised 
by: a thicker line) we see at once the relatively 
short distances through which an Allied con- 
centration must, pass compared' with those 
through which an enemy concentration must 
pass. An enemy going right round by land to 
attempt an attack upon the Suez Canal, for 
instance, or, profiting by the British concen- 
1 ration against such an attack, attempting 
another . surprise movement elsewhere, has the 
immensely long exterior lines through the shaded 
portion alone open to him. , The Allies have the far 
shorter. lines across the. sea from coast to coast. 
(2) If there were no more than , this element 
it would already' be a serious advantage. But 
there is again the. fact that these interior com- 
munications are communications //y6-e«. 
There are indeed modern conditions under which 
a communication by sea, in spite of the great 
tonnage of modern shipping and the certitude of 
arrival within fairly exact limits of delay, is inferior 
in mobility to communications by land. Where 
there is poor wharfage accommodation at few 
ports, and on the land ample railway siding 
accommodation, ample rolling stock and a great 
number of double lines, there land communication 
has superior mobility over sea communication, 
even for great masses of troops. This is un- 
doubtedly the case, for mstance, -vvitli the shores 
of Belgium and Picardy.. From tiie nioutli of the 
Scheldt to the mouth of the Seine armies operating 
by land could concentrate their men and Xheu 
material more rapidly from one point to anothe 
than armies with communications entirely con" 
fined to the sea. But such conditions are rare- 
They are only found, in places where the portions 
of the land near the sea are part of a high civilisa- 
tion. 
The Levant is a very conspicuous instance to 
the contrary. Hardly any good metalled roads, 
only one trunk line of railway, stand upon the one 
side, opposed to the indefinite power of expansion 
of sea communication upon the other. 
From the Straits of Otranto to the Suez Canal 
oy sea is for any individual transport at a moderate 
speed a matter of a hundred hours. Transport by 
rail and road from the same neighbourhood to the 
neighbourhood of the Suez Canal-^even were a 
railway built from Palestine to the confines o( 
Egypt — would be a matter not of a hundred hours, 
but of anything you Hke : double or treble 01 
tenfold that time. 
And as against a single railway line supple- 
mented by no proper trunk roads, you have ar 
indefinite amount of shipping at your disposal for 
the sea routes. 
A force concentrating on the southern shores 
of Asia Minor, say near Adana, with the object 
of striking at the one railway the enemy possesses 
for his exterior communications round the Eastern 
Mediterranean, is, in time, only 40 hours by trans- 
port at moderate speed from the shores of Egypt 
The force to be marched in opposition to it drawr 
round by land is four, five or six times that number 
of hours distant. 
The same is true of an attack at any other 
\ita] point, such a? the concentration of forces 
against the Gulf of Alexandretta. where the rail- 
way line approaches the sea. It is perhaps 50 
hours from Egypt, perhaps 15c from the Adriatic, 
