Januarj- 13. 19 16, 
LAND AND WATER 
avowed enemy of human libeity and rights, and 
that to remain at peace with so diabohcal a thing 
was altogether inconsistent witli the hberal and 
noble traditions of a self-governing people, if, 
while Christian Europe was fighting to save public 
faith, it seemed intolerable that America should 
not resent the murders of which her own people 
have been victims, but stand idly by exchanging 
smug courtesies with the assassins — why, then, the 
course of the war might be altered decisively 
indeed. It is already a mere matter of time 
before right is vindicated and Germany beaten 
to her knees. Were the United States to join 
in that vindication the time might be made very 
short. But we do not ask, nor need, America's 
active alliance. 
If America will not help the Allies, will she 
help the enemy ? Many and specious efforts will 
be made to get this help. There are three forms 
of action which can give it most effectually. If 
Congress forbids merchant ships from arming 
in self-defence, the power of submarines will be 
enormously enhanced. It is to be presumed 
that no settlement will be made that does not 
stop submarines from sinking at sight. But if 
many merchant ships are armed, submarines will 
not dare to approach any on the surface. If, 
then, they are cut off from sinking at sight, their 
occupation will be largely gone. Next, Congress 
mav forbid the export of munitions. But in this 
matter the Allies have the commercial interests 
of the ordnance makers as a strong bulwark 
against a pro-German policy. Finally, America, 
having refused to condemn the lawless actions 
of Germany in Europe or to help Christendom 
in its new Crusade, may be urged to show its 
impartiality by trying to relieve Germany of the 
burden of our sea siege ! Already we have received 
Notes from the Secretary's Department couched 
in language far more brusque than any addressed 
to Germany. Doubtless if the letter of the law 
is more important than its spirit, the new con- 
ditions of modern sea hostilities leave much 
of our action unprovided for by international 
precedent. Should America hrmk down our siege, 
she will be doing as much, and more, for Germany 
than if she forbade the export of rifles, guns and 
shells. She would be assisting her in point of 
fact to escape from a form of military pressure 
from which her own mihtary and naval forces are 
inadequate to relieve her. 
ORDER IN COUNCIL OR BLOCKADE? 
We must, I fear, be prepared for new efforts 
of this kind from Washington. It would be as 
well if, before these efforts are made, our siege 
were put upon a better regulated basis. It has for 
long seemed an error in policy to base these pro- 
.ceedings on the Order in Council of last March. 
Until the German submarine blockade had shown 
its true character, there was some sense in relying 
upon this Order. But since we borrowed a leaf 
from the German book and sent our submarines to 
the Baltic, our embargo on shipping has been 
more effective than any blockade recorded in 
history. A very small understanding of the 
American character should make it clear that if 
President Wilson's Government intervenes to 
relieve Germany from our sea pressure, it does so 
not from sympathy with Germany, but in a sort of 
blind obedience to the counsels of lawyers. If 
we can regulate our legal position, we shall be 
safe from American interference. Now Americans 
have no very great respect for British Orders in 
Council. They savour a little too much of events 
that led to the Colonies throwing off their allegiance 
to the British Crown. But Blockade is a different 
matter altogether. It arouses no memories but 
those of her own exploits in the Civil War. It 
would seem then that our controversial case would 
be made far stronger if the Allies proclaimed a 
joint blockade of Germany, and our proceedings 
at sea no longer appealed for justification to a 
British Order in Council. The Arnerican doctrine 
of a blockade, joined with the equally American 
doctrine of continuous voyage, could, I should 
think, be made to justify legally all the proceed- 
ings necessary to making our siege of Germany 
effective. 
SUCCESSFUL END OF A FAILURE. 
The first paper I wrote for Land and Water 
dealt with the early and fragmentary accounts of 
how the men had been put ashore at Cape Hellas. 
" It will probably be found," I said, " when the 
full details of the great landing at the Gallipoli 
peninsula are published, that the most remarkable 
combined naval and military operation in face of 
strong opposition has been accomplished." All 
we have learned since confirms tlie truth of these 
words. I little expected that within six months 
I should be commenting on operations still more 
singular and extraordinary, namely the with- 
drawal of two armies landed in circumstances of 
such furious opposition having been withdrawn 
without any opposition at all ! It was marvellous 
enough that Anzac and Suvla Bay should have 
been evacuated without the enemy being aware 
that the e\'acuation was going forward. That the 
thing should have been repeated at Cape Hellas 
is almost a miracle. We have learned something 
of the ruses that enabled the first withdrawal to 
be made. For the second, an entirely new system 
of deceiving the enemy must have been adopted. 
In each case the service of mere transportation, 
that is the purely naval service, must have been a 
marvel of efficient organisation and of perfectly 
incredible work. 
The thing, indeed, could not have been a 
more complete success if the enemy, instead of 
being deceived, had been a party to the proceed- 
ings. It is right that the Admirals and other 
officers concerned should be honoured for so un- 
precedented a feat. 
The lay reader of military and naval history 
dwells for preference on the purple patches of 
victory. But it is a mere comfnonplace to say that 
the deeper student reserves his soberer enthusiasm 
for the retreats, the withdrawals, the leading of 
lost causes, for, by a curious fatality, it is often 
enough in these that the highest genius is shown. 
Until the full history of this extraordinary adven- 
ture is told it will be impossible to guess what the 
final verdict of history on it will be.. But it seems 
certain that, but for the strange idea that the 
battleships could for themselves force a passage 
through the Dardanelles, there would have been no 
mihtary force sent to Gallipoli at all. The ex- 
pedition seems to have been an afterthought, not 
because it was thought that the battleships could 
fail, but because it was hoped that the soldiers 
would make their success more rapid and more 
complete. It seems to have been entirely over- 
looked that the unsuccessful early efforts of the 
ships ensured the soldiers' task being made im- 
possii^le. As the battleships' task was impossible 
