L AND AND NN' A T 1- R 
JaniKin- 13, Jf)iC). 
Wady-el-Arish to Xakhl and so westward, for 
that "would simplv mean the extending of the 
mileage with at "least double the difficulty in 
obtaining water supply. It would come out, it 
■ is true, at a point where the belt of drift sand 
which strategically protects the canal is narrowest, 
but not at that central point where a blow would 
have the greatest effect. 
Again, whate\Tr road the enemy chooses for 
his main advance will be largely governed by the 
existing wells ; and t4ie best line of these, short 
of the seacoast, is that of the second road. 
He will not be so led by the fact that he will 
use the existing wells— they are far too insuflicient 
for his purposes — but they guide him to points 
where, with modern' methods and deep boring 
he can hope to obtain a fuller supply, and they 
give him a trajectory which, thoiigh not surveyed, 
is already familiar to enemy informants and would 
save thegreat expense of time and energy required 
in plotting out a new trace. It has also been 
rumoured that he proposes a pipe line to be laid 
along the railway, but in connection with that 
lumcu' several things must be remembered : 
First, that there is a very small supply of 
water even at the habitable base from which he 
starts, Beersheba ; secondly, that a line at euch 
different levels would Require extensive pumping 
arrangements to maintain a pipe line ; and 
thirdly, that the distance of something over 200 
miles is a v-ery serious consideration, to which 
may be added the fact that complete dependence 
upon a single line of this sort would spell immediate 
disaster if it were tampered with or broke down 
accidentally. Such a line may be laid as an 
auxiliary, but the main advance would surely 
depend upon large stores of water locally collected 
and presumably upon new wells. 
Now upon the hypothesis that the line is laid 
and that a large force with heavy guns and ample 
munitionment for the same can be produced a.ufi. 
maintained on the edge of that belt of drift sand 
which protects the Canal from the east, what 
would be the eneiTiy's most obvious way of 
achieving his object ? 
Remember, that object is mainly the interrup- 
tion of the use of the Canal and that the invasion 
df Egypt itself is lubsidiary or posterior to that 
main object. 
It is clear that the attainment of this object 
depends upon the successful or superior u^e of 
heavy pieces. 
What are the conditions of such a use of 
heavy artillery ? 
There is one fundamental necessity for this 
arm, and that is, ample comm^anication behind it 
for the supply of its heavy munitionment. That 
means a railway. 
Now the problem of the railway is fourfold. 
First, the capacity of any r ailway for supply. 
Secondly, the continuity of its line. 
Thirdly^ the vulnerability of points upon the 
line to hostile attack (for a line once interrupted 
anywhere by an enemy force as useless) and 
Fourthly, the opportunities for extension. 
To take these points in th eir order. 
Given a railway to exist continuously from 
the arsenals, depots and base;'> of the enemy to 
the front against the Suez Canal— at but a few 
thousand yards from that water «-way — its capacity 
for delivery depends mainly rrpon rolling stock. 
Wliat the rolling stock availal )le may be we do 
aot know. It can be supplem<mted rapidly now 
that there is a clear road for the enemy to the 
Bosphorus and beyond. 
As to the ■second point, the continuity of the 
railwa\\ 
We have seen that there are two interrup- 
tions at the mountain ranges in the south-east of 
Asia Minor. But they are interruptions covered 
by newly engineered good roads invohnng in 
transhipment and unloading and re-loading of 
munitions and supply a delay of less than a week 
for both gaps combined. There is a break of gauge 
in the railway through Syria, I believe at Aleppo. 
This, again, is a thing remediable with time. 
But more important is the amount of rolling- 
stock available on the narrower gauge ; for 
though the main line down as far as a point 
North of Adana can be supplied with new rolling- 
stock from Europe, the Syrian line can hardly 
be so supplied. There will presumably be another 
break of gauge, for the extension which will be 
attempted across the Sinai peninsula desert west- 
ward of El Audja can hardly be other than a 
light railway. 
it would be impossible to build a full double- 
track railway across that desert within the time 
during which alone an attack on the canal will be 
of service. For we must always remember that 
the enemy is as keenly alive' to his rate of wastage 
as are our own higher commands, and is calcu- 
lating time far more closely than the general opinion 
of the West as yet comprehends. 
There will be, then, three gauges, three sets 
of rails, between the Bosphorus and the objective 
of the expedition, and with regard to the first, 
two breaks in the continuity of the rail. 
In the matter of rolling-stork we know 
nothing. 
As to the vulnerabihty ot the line. All 
observers have been struck by the proximity of its 
trajectory to the sea in the neighbourhood of the 
Gulf of Alexandrctta or Aleppo. But iMs vulner- 
able section is a fairly short one. There has been 
ample time to protect it from an offensive based 
on the sea. Moreover, the whole of that question 
of where the line may most easily be cut by an 
allied offensive is unfit for public discussion. It 
may well prove that the most vulnerable sector 
may not be the mountainous stretch in the south- 
east corner of Turkey-in-A?ia, but at any rate 
it is clear that the line lies open to seme strong 
offensive from the sea during nearly its whole 
course, as well north of Adana as in the neigh- 
bourhood of Aleppo, and probably again in its 
trajectory through Palestine. 
" )The last point — the power of continuing the 
line is worthy of especial observation. As we have 
seen, the line is already completed with a double 
track as far as Beersheba, at which point we may 
conceive that large stores of munitions are already 
beginning to accumulate. 
From Beersheba to the frontier at El Audja. 
as we have also seen, the line is surveyed and the 
road-bed made, but the rails not laid down, nor, 
presumably, water supply yet arranged for. 
Now what arc the opportunities for continuing 
the supply of railway acioss the desert of the 
])eninsula towards the Suez Canal ? The mere 
trace is not too difficult. There arc no very abrupt 
slopes along the middle of the three lines (2, 2, 2 
upon Sketch II), which we have presumed to be 
the probable trajectory of the light railway. 
The Wady-el-Arish is a shallow depression, the 
descent into it and the' rise from it easy. At 
