January 13. iQiG. L A N D \ X D W A T E R . 
THE APPROACHES TO EGYPT. 
6y HILAIRE BELLOC. 
NOTE.— This Article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, which d02S not object to ihe publication as censored, and takes 00 
responsibility for the correctness of the statements. 
',In aoc9rdanc2 with the requirements of the Press Bureiu, the pasitions of troops on Plans Illustrating this Article must only be 
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated. 
THE activity upon the Southern Russian 
front continues, and our ally claims an 
advance in the districts of the centre 
and the left, that is, upon the middle 
Strypa and in the Bukowina, of about two miles 
a day. On the extreme right, south of the Pripet 
marshes, where the railway crosses the Styr at 
Tchartoriisk, the line fluctuates with very little 
variation west or cast. But the passage of the 
river and the ruined village itself, which forms a 
bridgehead for the Russians, remains at the 
moment of writing in Russian hands. 
The meaning of these three developments 
put together, the uncertain lighting in the north 
with the taking and retaking of Tchartoriisk, 
the clearing of the eastern bank of the middle 
Strypa and the occupation of the heights five miles 
east of Czernowitz, is what was pointed out last 
week in these columns. Our allies are putting all 
the strength of their new attack into the centre and 
the left — that is, on the Strypa and in front of 
Czernowitz. The Austro-Germans are countering 
by a corresponding pressure in the north at 
Tchartoriisk, where the Kovel railway crosses 
the Styr. 
Neither party has achieved any appreciable 
advance as yet. It is not probable that either 
party will achieve such an advance just now, and 
the reasons for that judgment are as follows : 
The Hne between the Pripet marshes and the 
frontier of Roumania, though not a continuous 
line of trenches like that upon the western front, 
is, in direct distance, not much over two hundred 
miles and, with all the sinuosities of the front, 
certainly less than 300. The enemy can con- 
centrate upon that front, counting all local 
reserves at least 3,000 men a mile : the Russians 
say 5,000 men a mile. He has behind him, 
in the southern part of it especially, good roads. 
There are continual gaps across which no good 
defensive organisation can be made, but also 
across which no offensive is possible on account 
of the nature of the ground at this season ; there- 
fore the real line to be held is shorter than that 
on the map. It is therefore, though not a con- 
tinuously entrenched line, yet for the purposes of 
this winter fighting a line which can only be 
broken or shifted by a success against the specially 
entrenched sections. 
Now we know from all the experience 01 tnis 
war that such a success is only achieved by the use 
of heavy artillery. We further know that the 
successful use of heavy artillery depends upon 
motor traction, and we know, again, that the 
condition of the ground in Volhynia and the Buko- 
wina at this season hampers such traction in the 
highest possible degree. It is hardly conceivable, 
therefore, that a really successful offensive on a 
large scale should develop against the Austro- 
German trenches between the Pripet marshes and 
the Roumanian frontier at this moment. 
{Copyright in America by " The New York American."] Egypt. 
What tlie new Russian ettort has done is in 
the first place to concentrate great numbers of 
the enemy's effectives upon this line. 
Secondly, a political result, to affect ttie 
impression on neutrals in the East and to weaken 
the legend which Germany in particular had 
industriously spread, that no Russian offensive, 
even a local one, could be undertaken for many 
months — if then. 
Thirdly, the new Russian offensive must have 
some effect upon domestic opinion in Germany 
and Austro-Hungary, which was no more than 
three months ago persuaded that the power of the 
Russian armies to undertake a new offensive was 
finally broken. 
that the hurried concentration of the enemy's 
men north of the Roumanian frontier has had some 
effect on the Balkan situation cannot be denied. 
But it would be foolish to exaggerate that effect. 
The delay of the enemy before Salonika, apart 
from political considerations which do not concern 
these articles, is mainly due to the necessity of 
repairing the railway' thoroughly before any 
advance can be undertaken. The munitionment 
of the heavy pieces, with which alone an attack 
can be undertaken, depends entirely upon un- 
interrupted railway commincation to the ad- 
vanced rail-heads whence the big shell are distri- 
buted to the batteries. Now in the case of the 
attack on Salonika there is but one such rail-head 
—that of the Vardar railwa\\ The fine was 
wrecked by the Serbians and French ; and even 
in peace there is at the best only one single line, 
and a single line which, lunning as it docs often 
through gorges and upon ledges of rock, could 
only be doubled at a very great expense of time. 
The bridge over the Save in front of Belgrade 
has been repaired. (The roUing stock, I believe, 
already crosses it.) But the line along the Upper 
Maritza and down the Upper Vardar has not been 
completely repaired as yet, and even when it 
furnishes 'a through communication it will take 
some time before a large accumulation of heavy 
shell at the advance base of the enemy in front of 
Salonika, will be possible, 
CONDITIONS OF AN ADVANCE 
ON EGYPT. 
The value of Salonika as a base for Allied 
offensive action is the academic question of greatesi 
interest in anv discussion of the strategics of tht 
Near East. But it remains an academic question 
only until we have seen what effort the enemy car 
make against that fortified base, for until he has 
failed in his attempt to reduce the port of entry 
upon his flank there can be no use made by the 
.\llies of Salonika for a forward movement. And 
for that attempt we are still waiting. 
Meanwhile the position of Salonika and of 
the control by the Allies of the Eastern :\Iediter- 
ranean, is bound up with the enemy's menace to 
