Febi'uar 
y 3. 
1916. 
LAND AND WATER. 
COMMONSENSE ABOUT MONTENEGRO 
By Alfred Stead. 
FAR too much has been made of the Austrian occu- 
pation of Montenegro. Now that the Monte- 
negrin episode is finished and the country in the 
hands of the enemy, it is possible to deal more 
comprehensively with the participation of the country of 
King Nicolas in the war. For many months Montenegro 
had ceased to be an active ally, it is doubtful whether 
there was ever a moment during the war when her rulers 
were not actuated solely by a desire that any participation 
in hostilities should be directly beneficial to themselves, 
they gave no thought to the common good, and in some 
instances worked deliberately against it. 
Much has been written and spoken of this, the srriallest 
of the nations banded together to combat the German 
menace, and sentiment has magnified the doings of the 
Montenegrins in inverse proportion to the importance of 
their efforts. Bluntly, we must eliminate from our minds 
all the official Montenegrin communiques, issued in the 
various European capitals, noting only en passant that for 
some time these inspired documents have not been issued 
in London. Facts are stubborn things, but a skilful use 
of official communiques on a basis of an uncomprehending 
glamour may do much to give an idealised impression, 
and Montenegro resembles most of all the self-starting 
device on modern motor-cars, which only are in action 
until the main engine starts. It has been the r6le of 
Montenegro to be among the starters, generally even to steal 
a few lengths, but serious application to war is quite another 
matter. Not that anyone should seek to say that the 
Montenegrins are not a courageous people ; they can be 
that in excelsis and yet be of small value as a fighting ele- 
ment in the present great war. 
Not a Feat of Arms. 
Lying outside the regular beat of special newspaper 
correspondents Montenegro has enjoyed during this war 
the role of fixing for the outside world her own desired 
estimate of Montenegrin valour and fighting work. There 
has been no means of cstabHshing a perspective, indeed it 
is doubtful whether the newspapers would have cared for 
the truth, when the fiction was so much more picturesque. 
But now the time has come for a detached and objective 
summing up of the Montenegrin situation, so that the 
Allies can gain some adequate idea of the value of the most 
recent success of the Central Powers. It may be said at 
once that, from a military standpoint, the loss of Montene- 
gro as it was utilised, has no importance whatever. From 
the moral effect standpoint the importance is small in the 
circles where the truth is known, however much it may 
have been boomed in an endeavour to enthuse the public 
in Vienna or Berhn. At the Ballplatz and Friedrichstrasse 
they know well that the conquest of Montenegro is primarily 
a commercial financial operation and not a brilliant feat 
of arms. 
From the Allies' point of view the only military value 
ot Montenegro was that within the frontiers of that country' 
were situated the dominating artillery positions overlooking 
the Bocche di Cattaro. But since in the eighteen months 
of the war no real effort had been made to utilise these 
positions, no heavy modern guns placed on them to render 
the Bocche impossible for the Austrian fleet, the present 
loss of the Lovchen positions makes no real difference to 
us. It makes the Austrian position surer and enables the 
bulk of the Austrian fleet to remain in this magnificent 
natural harbour ; it also makes the task of conquering the 
Bocche a much more possible one. Such attack, if it ever 
comes, must necessarily be preceded by the recapture of 
the Lovchen positions above Cattaro. And the Austrians 
are not likely to leave these positions without adequate 
means of defence. 
The reason why the Allies, and especially Italy, did 
nothing to send heavy guns to Lovchen is a m.ystery, 
since the advantages are so obvious. The only excuse 
given is that had such an attempt been made, the 
Austrians would have occupied Lovchen before the guns 
could have reached there. There is one thing certain, 
and that is, that had Montenegro been an ally of Germany 
and the Bocche in our hands with our men-of-war sheltering 
in it, there would have been heav}' guns on all the positions 
above Cattaro. I was present at the first attack made by 
the Austrians on the northern extremity of the Lovchen 
ridge, which was the first indication of the coming of the 
end of Montenegro. 
A Bird's Eye View. 
I stood at the farthest Montenegrin outpost and saw the 
whole Bocche, with its forts and warships at anchor spread 
out below me, as from an aeroplane. The Ccttigne-Cattafc 
road, close to whicJi are the gun positions, is over nine 
hundred yards above the sea-level, the highest Austrian 
fort is not much over seven hundred. It was a curious 
feeling, looking down on the forts and seeing their guns 
firing at the Montenegrin positions while the traops around 
me could have thrown pebbles into the chimneys of the 
barracks of the Austrian garrisons. And there were no guns 
worth looking at. The French, in bitter jest, did send some 
120 mm. long guns of old pattern firing black po A-der, which 
were blown out of action by the twelve-inch gims of the 
Austrian warships anchored in the Bocche. For it was not 
only possible to see the forts, but the smallest detail of the 
daily life of the ships' crews on the warships was as an open 
book to the spectator on Lovchen. And with it all nothing 
was done — until the Austrians decided to remove what 
must ever have been a terrible menace, and occupied 
Lovchen. 
They first built roads towards the northernmost point 
which was also the highest and dominating one — zigzag 
miHtary roads constructed with infinite patience and labour 
— and the defenders looked on while the Allies continued to 
ignore the good existing roads of Montenegro, up which 
guns could have been dragged to destroy both the Austrian 
road and its makers. When all was ready the Austrians 
poured a tremendous fire from all their heavy guns on this 
chosen point, Ratkova Gova, and captured it — the Mon- 
tenegrins lost five men killed and the whole of the Lovchen 
positions as well as Cettigne itself was at the mercy of the 
Austrians. With the taking of Ratkova Gova the military 
value of Montenegro to the Allies disappeared. The sub- 
sequent happenings, the signing and tearing up of armistice 
or capitulation, were af quite minor importanca. After 
Ratkova Gova was in the Austrian hands at least one 
Foreign Legation took steps to place its papers in security 
beyond the frontiers, a wise precaution, as things 
eventually turned out. 
The expected denouement could not' long be delayed, 
the only question was, what exact form would it take. 
The generally expected termination was a reversion to the 
former arrangement with Austria whereby Montenegro 
should make a semblance of warfare without, howe\'er, 
doing anything serious enough to necessitate large Austrian 
military concentration on the Montenegrin fronts. There 
were indications that negotiations were being carrL^d on to 
this end, not only in Montenegro, but in Vienna. 
Russia's Foresight. 
Russia had already regarded the situation as lost, and 
for some time previous had removed her active rep -esonta- 
tives from Cettigne. The country was overrun with Austrian 
agents, and in Cettigne well-known Austrians could be seen 
in the streets any day, quite unembarrassed. On one 
occasion I saw the former commander of the Austrian 
cniiser Qen/a busily employed selecting billets for coming 
staff-officers among the houses of Cettigne. Everything 
that was known in Cettigne was known in Cattaro ; through 
Budua there was easy and convenient contact. There was 
no question of spies, because these are persons supposed 
to work in secret, the Austrian agents in Cettigne worked 
openly, nor were they looked upon as enemies, save 
by the Servians from Dalmatia and Bosnia who had 
sought shelter and immunity from Austrian military 
ser\-ice in Montenegro. It was a curious state of affairs, 
perhaps more comprehensible when it is remembered that 
Montenegro's whole economic existence was bound up with 
Austria and with no other country. 
It must be said, however, that the mass of the Mon- 
tenegrin people are intensely patriotic, and in this differ 
strongly from those who governed them ; but the mass had 
little say in the decisions of Cettigne. Foimerlv Prince 
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