LAND AND W A T E R 
February 3, 1916. 
Nicolas ruled autocratically, hampered largely by an 
entourage of relations nnd parasites. The idea of a con- 
stitution rerommended ilsell to him as a means of freeing 
liimself from his relatives, and lie adoj^ted it. At first, 
Itovvever, it threatened to lie a most dangerons enemy to 
t he antorrary, and a coiif> d' Hat was needed to bring matters 
to the condition in which they found themselves at the 
beginning of tlie recent wars. 
King Nicolas had secured autocratic power with 
constitutional lack of responsi*bility. The governing few, 
having lirmly grasped the opportunity of enriching them- 
selves, showed a callous disregard to the welfare of the 
.Montenegrin people, almost unprecedented in any country. 
Thus the patriotic, imdoubtedly courageous mass was 
helpless in the iiands of the self-seeking few — the governing 
regime, as a Montenegrin deputy said in the Parliament 
a few weeks ago, was imworthy of the traditions of the 
coimtry and had betraytd the people. Even the chari- 
table funds raised in England and elsewhere were diverted 
from the people into the pockets of the ("iO\'ernment. The 
Palace and the Ministers seemod perfectly ready to allow 
the people to star\e and the army to go without bread, so 
long as there was a chance of filling their pockets. Thi-s 
being the case it would have been perfectly idle to 
exix-ct a fierce pushing of the war on ^the part of the 
Montenegrin (iovcrnmcnt. 
Always seeking to arrive at the headship of the whole 
Serbian race, King Nicolas rejoiced in the disaster which 
had o\ercome the Serbians and sought rather to exaggerate 
the dehade than to momn it. The open ])leasure shown 
at the Palace was hard to bear by the Serbian officers 
forming the General Staff of the Montenegrin army. The 
feeling that Russia had chosen Serbia as her favourite 
protege, helped on the cause of Austria in Montenegro 
enormously. Nor must it be forgotten that there was a 
\ery general belief in Montenegro that the Central Powers 
had already won, and as one very highly-placed personage 
said, " Why does England go on with the war — Germany 
has won alread3^" 
Austria the Real Power. 
To the Palace and the Government Austria is a real 
power, while even Russia is only an unknown one. Few 
Montenegrins have been in England, and the power of a 
dominating fleet is unknown to them. In the matter of 
fleets, all they know is that the Austrian submarines were 
able to sally out of Cattaro when they wished and sink 
Montenegrin transports. Then there came Austrian 
aeroplanes over Cettigne and all the towns, while the whole 
of the Montenegrin coast was mined and blocked by the 
Austrian Navy. It is a small wonder, therefore, that in the 
Governing circles of Montenegro there was a very strong 
desire to " keep in " with Austria. 
Despite the Italian marriage, relations with Rome 
were far from good, and it was openly said that Italy was 
not able to do anything against Austria. Austrian influ- 
ence was very strong in all departments ; it paralysed any 
national action. A notable success was when the Montene- 
grin Go\'emment was " persuaded " not to construct the 
road through the mountains to Ipek, although this was an 
essential undertaking to secure contact with the Serbian 
armies. The absence of this road meant later the loss of 
all the Serbian artillery and train and of many soldiers. 
And this is only one instance. The Italian wireless station 
on Lovchen, which reported the movements of the Austrian 
vessels in the Bocche, had its telephone wire to Cettigne 
cut several t'mes a week, and notably when any vessels 
were leaving the harbour. All movements of transports 
arriving for Montenegro were known immediately in 
Cattaro, with obvious results. Indeed it would seem as if 
much of the cargo in some of the ships was destined for the 
Austrians, not for the Montenegrins. There were instances 
■^i vessels being captured by Austrian submarines off the 
Boyana River, conducted to the Bocche di Cattaro nnd 
then sent back again after the Austrian goods had been 
discharged. The whole atmosphere at Cettigne was one 
of unreality, and all those who were working for the Allies 
were convinced that they were flogging a dead horse, and 
that the Ciovenmient was simply seeking to get a.=; much as 
possible out of the Allies without ha\'ing any intention 
of being loyal. 
" The truth was not in them," is the only way to 
describe the tactics of the Montenegrin Government. This 
was esjwcially so at the time of their occupation of Skutari. 
Austria's most popular move was when she gave her 
sanction to a Montenegrin occupation of this Albanian 
town, even during war time. It was obviously better for 
Austria to have her ]iuj>pet there than to see either Italy or 
an independent .Albania at Skutari. But the Montenegrins 
were crazy to have Skutari, and so went there " to receive 
the keys of the tfiwn from Austrian notaries,"' as a Monte- 
negrin deputy put it. It was the dominating jjassion, this 
cult of Skutari. A most serious Montenegrin Professor, a 
leading opponent of the King and the governing clique, 
told me quite calmly that he would break his word of honour 
or lie if by so doing he would secure Skutari to Montenegro. 
And Austria gained ground by ac(]uiescing, by pushing 
Montenegro into Skutari ;the .Allies o])posing and refusing 
to recognise the occupation, lost, ground considerably. 
It was commonly said that King Nicolas was quite ready to 
barter the Lovchen positions for Skutari — indeed, to Mon- 
tenegro the Lo\ chen positions were of small value, however 
formidable they might ha\e been to a great Power. 
Serbia's Steadying Influence. 
The steadying influence on the Government was the 
army and the Serbian General Staff. The Serbians took 
on their shoulders much of the cost and burden of feeding 
the army and undoubtedly a great majority of the troops 
were more ready to follow their Serbian oflicers in the 
defence of their country than desirous of acquiescence in 
surrender, if ordered by their King. But it must not 
be rated too high. The Montenegrin army, its methods 
of fighting are not those of modern warfare. The highest 
number of soldiers was about .40,000 ; but there were few 
moments when even a quarter of these were at the front 
or firing line. 
Cettigne was thronged with men of military age, and 
so were nearly all the towais. But there was not any real 
need for the army to be busy. The Austrians did anything 
but press them, even after the defeat and retreat of the 
Serbian armies. The numbers of Montenegrin killed and 
wounded are insignificant and bea, no comparison to the 
reports circulated by the official communiques abroad. To 
tell the truth the Montenegrin army has done propor- 
tionately less fighting in this war than any other. The 
combats reported and exaggerated ha\'e been largely 
affairs of patrols — recently even orders had been sent to 
the troops not to fight. It was only the efforts of some 
Serbian Montenegrin patriots who exhorted the soldiers 
that some attacks were made and engagements occurred. 
The army had ammunition, but was short of food ; it had, 
however, no reason for despair now rather than formerly. 
The population of Montenegro was tired of the war 
because there was a very great shortage of food. In 
many respects the country resembled a besieged city- 
there was only one means of sending in food, and that 
was by San Giovanni de Medua and the Borjana River. 
The proximity of Cattaro and the openness of the Medua 
anchorage made the supply of food very precarious. 
In normal times it is only tlie Montenegrin towns which 
are dependent upon outside food. The country people 
raise and store enough for their own needs. Thanks, 
however, to the passage of the Serbian army, which 
enabled the Montenegrins to realise fabulous sums for 
their stores and tempted them to deplete their stocks of 
food — and also owing to the quartering of local regiments 
near the villages, the normal self-sufficiency of the country 
side had disappeared and the whole people was short of 
food. They are still short of food to-day, and this is 
undoubtedly one of the great problems which the Austrians 
will have to deal with at once. 
Food for the People. 
The difficultj^ of finding fo#»d for the people wa? 
complicated by the venality of the governing regime, 
by the lack of distributing machinery — while the Monte- 
negrin grain-ships at Medua were much more frequently 
lost than those coming for the Serbian army. The 
attitude of the Government to the question of famine 
reminded one of an episode in one of Voltaire's plays where 
the prophet comes to announce to King David that he 
has sinned and . must be punished but can choose his 
punishment. The first suggestion is three days' pestilence. 
The second, three weeks' discomfiture at the head of his 
troops. David rejects both as being personally danger- 
ous, but accepts the suggestion of three months' famine 
