rubrimry lo, 1916. 
LAND AND WATER. 
LAND & WATER 
Empire House, Kingsway, London, W.G. 
Telephone : HJLBORN 2828. 
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1916. 
OUR AIR SERVICE 
THE current talk about forming a " Ministry of the 
Air" requires careful consideration, for public 
opinion has undoubtedly been moved to some 
anxiety and to some questioning in the matter 
of aerial defence in general, quite apart from articles in 
the daily newspapers. There has, indeed, been- no 
general demand for a creation of a " Ministry of the Air." 
It is not a solution upon which the public mind has turned, 
or, for that matter, \\'hich most men would be able to 
define. But that portion of the Press which has mentioned 
the subject is, in raising a debate upon the matter at all, 
expressing public opinion insomuch at least as lliat 
opinion is now rather doubtful and disturbed about tlie 
whole matter. 
Now the first thing that strikes one in this connection 
is that uncertainty and debate of this sort is precisely what 
the enemy would have desired. That is not in itself a 
sutheient reason for avoiding the subject. It is a sound 
rule ia wdr, at least where definite mihtary plans are 
concerned, to do other than that which your enemy wishes 
you to do. But it does not follow that in so vague 
a matter as a general debate upon aerial defence the 
abandonment of it merely because the enemy desired 
to create anxiety and confusion would be wise. There 
must be an eleuient of debate in the affair and conclusions, 
to stand firmly, must repose upon reason. 
But it is precisely when we apply the rules of reason 
to the case that the value of the suggested policy become 
more and more doubtful. The more rigidly we examine 
the pros and cons the less does the prospect of any such 
change as the creation of this new poUtical department 
reinsure one. The fundamental principle in this matter, 
as in any other matter subsidiary to the war, whether it 
be the policy of reprisals or economic policy, or this one 
of aerial defence, is simply this : How far does such and 
such a suggested policy or change conduce to victory ? 
The function of aircraft in the attainment of a victory 
is novel — but it is entirely military. Soldiers only — 
especially now after many months of this modern war — 
can decide how aircraft should be used, in what numbers 
and with what object. Even among soldiers it is only 
one particular expert branch which can be consulted in 
this highly technical matter. It is exceedingly important 
to remember this. 
In every science there are general principles appre- 
ciable to the layman, though even these he will grasp less 
' thoroughly and certainly or much more imperfectly 
than the man whose trade it is to follow that science. 
But the further you get into any science the more you dis- 
cover departments which require thoroughly detailed and 
expert knowledge for the barest comprehension of them. 
And this is true of the science of war. Any civilian, for 
instance, may see the importance of numbers and insist 
upon a policy which produces numbers, but no civilian 
worth considering would give ad\'ice upon the disposition 
of a macliine gun shelter or the probable margin ot error 
upon a windy day for such and such a piece firing at such 
and such a range. No civilian would give his opinion 
upon the handling of cavalry in particular circumstances. 
And in the Service itself no one would presume to give his 
advice outside the arm in which he had been trained ; 
at least, where that advice regarded highly technical 
matters. 
Now if there is one department of which this is 
peculiarly true it is the new fourth arm. The men 
actually fiying, and especially those commanding the 
flying of others at the front, are alone competent to decide 
not only the use but the number and type of weapons 
required. The creation of a civilian department (which 
at the best could only repeat what was told it by the 
soldiers, but at the worst might and very probably would ■ 
interfere ^vith the soldiers) serves no apparently useful 
purpose at that best and quite clearly serves a very bad 
jjurpose at the worst. But there is much more than this. 
If the particular service in question were a failure, if the 
soldiers connected with it had blundered in any conspicuous 
fashion, there would be an argument, though it would 
hardly be a valid one, for the replacing of the expert by 
the amateur. If there had been any timidity in general 
policy there might be an argument for the presence of a 
strong will, though that will were possessed by civilians, 
to govern the weaker wills of more expert men. 
In the particular case of the British Air Service it is 
notorious that these conditions are exactly reversed. 
The British Air Service has been the most conspicuous 
success of the whole war. It has led the Allies in almost 
every new departure. It showed its supremacy at the 
very outbreak of hostihtics. It has brilliantly maintained 
that supremacy through all these months. It has ex- 
hibited in every part of it a unity of direction and a 
rapidity of development which are nothing short of a 
triumph for the British Service among all the beUigerent 
powers. To interfere with iuid to change an achievement 
of that kind at such a moment could not possibly be other 
than a blunder.. Nor does that exhaust the case. Even 
supposing that we were dealing not with a triumphantly 
successful thing but with a thing which had badly failed, 
and even supposing that one could amend that failure 
by the admixture in its direction of vigorous though 
amateur ability, that might be an argument for choosing 
some man conspicuous for his qualities in this particular 
field and appointing him to .the direction of it. But there 
is no question even of that. 
,Ve all know in practice that the creation of the 
proposed " Ministry of the Air " merely means a post for a 
politician, and there is no one at this time of day still eager 
to create more, posts for civilian politicians wherein at the 
expense of an enormous salary some one selected from a 
very small set of men, in no way trained to the business, 
should be deputed to over-ride the decisions of soldiers. 
To anyone who really grasps the enormity of this cam- 
paign and the quahty of the issues dependent upon it 
there is something grotesque in the suggestion that one 
of its most vital factors, which happens to be also one 
of its most successful factors in favour of our side, should 
suddenly suffer disturbance and rearrangement for no 
better object than to provide yet another salary and to 
lend a chance for experiments to yet another incom- 
petent, because untrained and inexperienced, layman. 
Everything connected with this war by land, save 
the direction of its general political ends, is clearly a 
matter for soldiers and for soldiers alone. But as much 
at least as the most technical of its branches, as much as 
the artillery or the staff work, more perhaps than any 
other, this is true of the military air craft. It is not 
likely that the blunder will be committed. Were it 
committed it would be unpardonable. 
