LAND AND WATER 
February lO, 1916. 
in the montli of Aiif:;ust and Soptcmbor. But it would 
be a iE;rcat error to deduce from these figures that the on- 
slaught on our trade will be or can be kept to these com- 
parativelj' low figures. The toll \\hich was taken of 
the German submarines— a toll by the way, which still 
continues — limits the number of boats activelj' engaged 
against us. But it is not the only limiting element. 
There are fewer boats out,, not because there is a 
paucity of boats, but because there is a paucity of trained 
crews to man them. 
Of the German capacitj' to produce submarines, and 
subrnarines of a larger and more formidable tj-pc — more 
formidable because clesigned for a greater radius of action 
and carrying a heavier gun armament — there can be no 
doubt whatever. Indeed it is a capacity that has 
certainly shown a progressive increase since the war 
began. The inference is then that Germany probably 
possesses many more submarines than she can man, and 
that many of those that she can man are withdrawn from 
hostilities for training purposes. The situation that 
existed in the months of October, November, December 
and January, 1914, and 1915, has in all probability been 
recreated. A reasonable inference is that as soon as the 
new crews are ready a more violent and a more extensive 
onslaught on our trade will be made, and will be made in 
the light of the very costly experience which Germany 
lias already had of our counter efforts. It will therefore 
probably be made with* sea-going submarines, in the 0]>en 
sea, and as far as may be from the narrow waters which 
we have learnt to protect. I say that this is a reasonable 
inference because no other counter stroke to our blockade 
is conceivable. 
Should this prove to be the situation is it not inevit- 
able that cither America must stand by while Germany 
sinks indiscriminately, or that a broach between America 
and Germany must take place ? It might seem at first 
sight as if to force America into hostilities could only 
defeat Germany's ends by ensuring the blockade being 
made more stringent. The truth probably is that Ger- 
many knows that even without American assistance the 
blockade will be made stringent enough to do the work. 
The indications are, then, that there will either be an 
immediate breach between Washington and Berlin or 
that German}' will yield for the moment, knowing per- 
fcctlj' well that the exigencies of the situation will compel 
her to throw over the American code as soon as her 
submarines are ready for business. It is quite incon- 
ceivable that having stood out for a principle for nine 
months, that Mr. Wilson should waive that jirinciplc now. 
Finally, it would be a useless humiliation if he submitted. 
America cannot stand by in the new campaign, if it is one 
that disregards Mr. Wilson's code. And it must do so. 
The High Seas Raider. 
The raider that held up the Appam i,s supposed to be 
a new merchant ship, the Potif;a, that was building at 
Hamburg at the outbreak of war. If this supposition is 
correct, it is unlikely that her speed is greater than 14 or 
15 knots. Lieutenant Berg has been telling American 
reporters that she is so enormously fast that our work will 
be cut out if we try to catch her. If this is so, some very 
radical changes must have been made in her construction. 
People on the Appam describe her as displacing something 
more than 4,000 and certainly Jess than 6,000 tons. No 
ship of this displacement, built on the lines of a merchant- 
man, can possibly be driven at 25 knots. Captain Harri- 
son, it is true, said that her above water hull was shaped 
as a tramp, but that her lines under water were those of 
a yacht. But this hardly satisfies the conditions that 
Lieutenant Berg i^roclaims. lentil it is proved there 
is no rca.son for supposing that her speed is anything 
exceptional, and speed would be a material fact or in 
her power for mischief. . 
Her story up to her encounter with the Appam 
seems fairly clear —but the date of her escape is not given. 
She escaped through our patrol lines disguised as a tramp 
and flying false colours. There is nothing remarkable in 
this. Not every neutral ship leaving the North Sea has 
been stopped and searched as is every ship that enters it. 
This, at least, has probably been the rule ; but it can be 
the rule no longer. It will have to be a very clever raider 
that gets through now. Where has the Ponga gone ? 
There is still no news of her. No new captures have been 
announced. There is no news r-f sliips being overdue* 
For the moment then no new captures.can be presumed. 
We can, of course, onty conjecture as to her whereabouts. 
Her two obvious choices are as follows : If she is look- 
ing only for a place of safe concealment, the innumerable 
inlets round Cape Horn offer the best prospect. It was 
here that the Dresden sheltered so long. It is possibly 
here that the Macedonia, once in von Spec's fleet, may still 
be hiding. But this would give her safety only. 
But the best combination of refuge and raiding oppor- 
tunity is undoubtedly to be found on the old hunting 
grounds of the Karlsruhe. The north coast of Soutli 
America, with its many inlets, the West Indian Islands, 
with their innumerable coves and anchorages and 
the trade route that passes Pernambuco to fall upon 
— this is unquestionably the ideal field. The Karlsruhe, 
it will be remembered, captured 16 ships in ten weeks 
in this neighbourhood. But the Karlsruhe could show 
a clean pair of heels to almost everything we had in the 
Atlantic, and the Ponca, as we suppose, has no such 
advantage. 
If she has, we have cruiser resources to-da^' which 
we did not possess in August, 1914. At that time, we 
had under construction ih fast cruisers — eight Arcthusas 
and eight Calliopes — all sixteen must long since have gone 
into commission, and others as fast have no doubt suc- 
ceeded them on the slips, \\ith the Indian Ocean, the 
Pacific and the North and South Atlantic otherwise 
free from enemy surface shijos, the demands on the 
services of our cruisers is limited to (a) the scouting and 
screening work demanded by the (irand Fleet and the 
warships in the Mediterranean, and (b) the enforcement 
of the blockade of (iermany. Things are thus very 
chffercnt from what they were in the first six months of 
the war. It is obvious then that the cniiser force 
available for running down this or any other raider, is 
not only enormously greater in numbers, but may with 
perfect safety be made very different in quality from that 
which could be employed against the cruisers and anned 
merchantmen sent out against our commerce when war 
began. Note first then that the career of any raider is 
neither likely to be long nor destructive while it lasts. 
But it is also worth remarking that if the Germans have 
inaugurated this raiding adventure in the hope of distract- 
ing counsel or weakening the cruiser force in the North 
Sea, her expectations are likely to be disappointed. Our 
available cruiser strength is, for once in our history, 
greater than our immediate needs call for. Had Germany 
expected war with Great Britain, had she put a sufficiency 
of armed ships upon the trade routes before war began, 
the story would have been very different. It will be very 
different if fast ocean-going submarines come out in the 
spring. But for the moment the situation is satisfactory. 
German Plans. 
As I remarked last week, the most obvious comment 
on this incident is that it surprises us only because the 
inertia of the German Fleet during the last eighteen 
months has been so extraordinary. Just as our sub- 
marines, both in the Baltic and in the Sea of Marmora, 
have completely eclipsed the doings of the German sub- 
marines, so would the naval resources of Gennany, had 
they been in the hands of British officers, have done some- 
thing either in the North Sea or in the Baltic in this long 
interval of time. There are those who would have us 
believe that the coyness of the (ierman Fleet masks 
subtle and deep laid plans for our confusion. We should 
be foolish indeed if we supposed that because (iermany 
was taking no overt action against us, she was not prepar- 
ing — and as sedulously as she could — some action in the 
future. But the particular form of action with wlvich 
we arc threatened does not seem well authenticated by 
evidence, nor intrinsically very probable, nor, if true, 
very formidable. About Germany's shipbuilding resources 
there is after all no mystery. As she did not expect war 
with England, it is unlikely that before the middle oi 
1914 she had made any vast naval preparati'-- " that 
were secret. That she has done all the shipbi di • in 
her power since August, 1914, we can take for ^ ...ited. 
But when all allowances are made, it is imlikely that be- 
yond the Kronprinz, Lutzow and the Salami's she can 
have added more than a single ship so far, or can add more 
than four ships before the end of the current year. What 
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