February lo, 1916. 
LAND AND WA T E R 
SAVE THE SERBIAN ARMY. 
By Alfred Stead. 
[We have made many mistakes in the Balkans — there is 
danger of yet another. There is one -paramount and 
pressing duty before the Allies to-day. It is to lose no 
more time but at once reorganise the Serbian army 
and add a hundred thousand men to the Allied armies 
The writer, Mr. All red Stead, has only recently 
returned from the Balkans.] 
SERBIA has suffered more cruelly and more 
uselessly in this war than any of theAllicd Powers. 
And to-day the Allies have a great duty to 
fulfil towards the remnants of the Serbian 
nation and army, a duty which must be fulfilled at once. 
Delay is impossible, unthinkable. We have already 
sacrificed the Serbian people through delay, and cannot 
now sit down and watch the final destruction of the few 
thousands of fighting men who, undaunted by hardships 
and undiscouraged by abandonment, only ask to be 
allowed to fight again. For that is all that the Serbian 
army asks to-day to. be allowed to reorganise itself 
and re-equip so that in a few short months, a Serbian 
force may co-operate with the British, French and 
Italian troops in the Balkans. Let us therefore bend 
every effort on making the Serbian army an active 
fighting force again as soon as possible. 
The Allied policy in the Balkans has centred around 
one principal crroi-, which nothing seemed capable of 
driving out of the heads of those in power in London, 
Petrograd or Paris. The belief in Bulgarian friendliness 
to the Allied cause was able to resist all the onslaughts of 
facts — proof of a treaty between Bulgaria and Germany 
before the war, a Bulgarian loan from Germany during 
the war, Turkish cession of territory to Bulgaria, all 
these were unavailing. It vvas, therefore, no wonder that 
the warnings from Bucarcst and the apprehensions of 
Nish went unheeded. 
Reasoned Advice. 
We choose to ignore the reasoned advice of the Ser- 
bian Government, treating the Serbian aUies as if they 
were prejudiced, narrow-minded self-seekers — quite over- 
looking the fact that the earher months of the war had 
given the Allies ample proof of the value of Serbian 
aid to the common cause. The Serbian armies had been 
able totally to disorganise the Austrian military machine, 
but the Serbian Government was not worth listening to 
when it came to be a question of Bulgaria. And so 
inevitably the allied policy towards Serbia became 
warped, and instead of regarding the Serbians as loyal 
allies, it became almost a habit to look upon them as 
pig-headed and undisciplined fellows standing in the way 
of an arrangement with Bulgaria. 
On the Serbian side, every day brought a growing 
belief in the certainty of a Bulgarian attack, and an 
increasing disinclination to embark in any action until 
the Bulgarian question had been disposed of. Led by 
the nose by the astute sovereign of Bulgaria, the Allies 
bullied Serbia, forced her to agree to relinquishing much 
of her territory to satisfy Bulgarian demands, and all 
this without any real certainty of winning Bulgaria. 
Had the Serbians not been very loyal such an allied 
pohcy might well have had I'he effect hoped for in Vienna 
and Berlin, that is to say, Serbia disgusted, and rightly, 
would have been driven into a separate peace and an 
advantageous arrangement with the Central Powers. 
But Serbia has always been too loyal to allied policy and 
alhed advice ; it would have been better for her and for 
her Allies had she disregarded much of the advice and 
gone her own way deciding her own course of action. 
In one thing only did Serbia go counter to the allied 
desires, and that was in the occupation of the strategic 
points of Albania and the support of Essad Pasha. And 
to this alone the Serbian army owed its sole refuge in 
disaster and was able to pass through the Albanian tribes 
with a minimum of loss. 
The obvious project of an attack by Allied and 
Serbian troops towards Budapest in the early part of 
last year was not proceeded with. This attack would 
have pierced the Achilles heel of the Central Powers, 
would have brought in the Roumanians and enabled 
the Russians to pass the Carpathians — it^ would also 
have brought P>ulgaria to reason anl the Turks to 
their knees. But there were no men to be found to send 
to Serbia. It was only later when the Dardanelles ex- 
pedition was decided on that men were found for the 
Near East. Having lost the chance of an offensive 
there still remained the possibility of a successful de- 
fensive. The German-Austrian offensive was long in 
preparing ; adequate information as to numbers and 
weight of artillery gathering on the Northern banks of the 
Danube and Save was forthcoming in ample time. At the 
same time, the Serbians had accurate information as to the. 
decision of Bulgaria to attack, even before the order of 
mobilisation. 
The Main Object. 
From the point of view of the Allies, the main object 
to be secured was to prevent a contact between the 
Central Powers and Bulgaria. They took the view that 
the Bulgarians would not attack "the Serbians if the 
Austrians and Germans did not cross the Danube and 
Sive. Therefore, they said, " Mass all your men in the 
North," and we will protect the railway "line to Salonika. 
The Serbians, seeing the greater peril from the East, 
wished to strike a decisive blow there before the northern 
forces could cross the rivers. They accordingly concen- 
trated their forces principally against Bulgaria, and at the 
moment when Bulgaria ordered mobilisation were in a posi- 
tion to throw some 120,000 men, concentrated near Pirot, 
straight at Sofia, only defended by 20,000 Bulgarians. 
In a week the Bulgarian capital would have been in 
Serbian hands, and if the German attack developed the 
whole Serbian force would have been available to en- 
counter them. The Serbian plan was the axiomatic 
military one of deahng with your enemies separately. 
But the Allies put their foot down on this idea, motiving 
their refusal by the negotiations still proceeding in Sofia. 
It was the unforgivable mistake. The Serbians 
loyally obeyed orders, unfortunately. The Serbian 
armies sat still near the frontiers until the whole of the 
enemy forces were ready, the Germans, the Austrians, 
and the Bulgarians, and then were attacked at thirtcjn 
different points. When the Serbians were denied the 
right to attack the Bulgarians, Serbia was lost. 
Orders were given to retire slowly, saving the army 
intact as much as possible. Thus there were few serioiis 
engagements and the armies made their way southwards 
and westwards in good order, expecting always to find the 
pressure being relieved by the advance of allied troops 
from the south. But as no help came, and as the 
hydraulic pressure of enemy troops became ever greater 
on the right-angled front, the Serbian anny, denied the 
right to sweep back the invaders as it had done in the last 
Austrian invasion, was condemned to continuous retreat, 
culminating in disappearance as an offensive force. 
That the Serbian army, as it was at the beginning of 
the offensive in October, 1915, could have been expected 
to defend its long line against the heavy artillery of the 
Central Powers and the heavy infantry superiority of the. 
Bulgarians was quite impossible. The wonder is not thai 
the Serbian army did not do better, but that it did so well. 
Dominant Guns. 
The Germans and Austrians passed the Danube and 
the Save, thanks to their heavy guns, which pounded the 
Serbians out of their positions without any chance of 
retaliation. Belgrade was practically denuded of troops, 
but the positions behind cost the Germans some regiments 
when it came to infantry fighting. But the guns always 
dominated the situation and the Serbians were forced to 
retire continuously. In the north there was little serious 
fighting after the first two weeks, but against the Bul- 
garians there was plenty of fighting and successful. The 
Serbians were more than able to hold their own against 
the Bulgarians, although they consider the Bulgarian 
infantryman as superior to Qither the German or the 
Austrian. But success against the Bulgarians did not 
suffice, since it was always necessary to retreat westward 
