LAND AND WATER 
February lo, 1916. 
to .ivoid tho Gorman descent upon llip nnlv road open for 
retirement. " 
A Curious Fact. 
One of the most curious features of the campaifjn 
was that the Serbian troops were pven specific dates 
until which positions Iiad to be lieid. as if there was some 
liopc of relief coming. In every case the positions were 
held longer than required, but nothing happened. 
Gradually, inevitably, the Germans secured contact witli 
the Bulgarians ; they freed the Danube ; they captured 
Nish and possessed the direct line to Sofia, but they were 
never able to capture the army. The Russian retreat was 
child's play compared to the Serbian ; the Russians had a 
straight line of defence and gradually retired. The Ser- 
bians had aright-angled lineandhad always to be looking 
over their shoulders, sometimes only finishing a successful 
attack eastward to sec the shells bursting in the hills 
to the north of their line of retreat. Also, as the forces 
fell back, all the principal depots of food had to be 
destroyed and there was a shortage of everything. The 
services of distribution also became dislocated, it being 
impossible to reorganise supply when the army was never 
for more than a few days in one place. 
The Bulgarian coup in occupying Vranje and thus 
cutting the line south, was a terrible blow, since it pre- 
vented intercommunication between the forces in Old 
Serbia and the weak Macedonian forces and the Allies. 
Vcr>' soon the army was on short rations, and as the 
retreat went on food became more and more scarce. 
The fact that the mountainous nature of the country left 
only available a few- valleys and passes for the escape of 
the armies made the question of transport far more 
difiicult. But notwithstanding all this much of the army 
made the retreat in very good order and without dis- 
organisation. When it is remembered that there was 
never, too much discipline in the Serbian anny ; it was 
wonderful to see how orderly was the retreat. It was 
always a retreat never a rout. 
This was especially the case up to Prishtina. It was 
in. tliis town that definite news came that there was no 
hope of any real offensive on the part of the Allies in 
the south and the army had to resign itself to further 
and still more hopeless retreat towards Albania. Up till 
then the army was still an offensive force, afterwards it 
became only a defensive one. But, despite the fact 
that there were practically no roads, some of the heavy 
siege guns were dragged as far as Ipek. 
Serbian Psychology. 
The psychology of the Serbian soldier must be 
taken into account. The Serbians are a people who have 
never emigrated, and to leave Serbia is a terrible thing 
to the peasant. He is thus a wonderful defensive soldier, 
out of much less value as an offensive element outside his 
country. The effect on the army after it had left the old 
boundaries of Serbia was very marked ; the homing 
instinct began to become irresistible and desertions took 
place much more frequently. Also there was much less 
vim in the army. The further the retreat took them the 
more the feehng of all being lost grew. The Serbian 
soldier also does not understand retreating without 
fighting, giving up without a blow of large portions of 
his beloved country. All this sapped the moral of the 
troops still more even than did starvation and privation. 
" Why go to Montenegro to die of starvation like 
women and children?" was frequently asked. It was 
held to be much better to stay and die fighting. " But, 
of course, if there is a chance of starting again, let us go 
to Montenegro or Albania." When before the frowning 
walls of the Montenegrin and Albanian inountains it 
was necessary to destroy all the artillery, automobiles 
and much of the baggage train, the army passed a terrible 
moment. To cross the moimtains looked like bidding a 
long farewell to their homes and going out into the im- 
known, where they would no longer each be an inde- 
pendent landowner, but dependent upon the bounty of 
others. 
But the desire to start again conquered, and gradually 
but surely more and more men arrived in Skutari. They 
::ame lumgry and wearied, many without guns, without 
good shoes, with uniforms in rags hanging loosely on 
them, but they came. Even the Serbian officials were 
astonished that there were so many. But at Skutari the 
Serbians had further .proof that the Allies had not yet 
reached the point of pFo\'ision-or antiripntorv preparation. 
It had heeu evident for a considerable t'ime that the 
Serbian army must arrive in Montenegro and Albania, 
and that it would arrive starving. It would have seemed 
natural that the Allies should have taken prompt steps 
to accumiilate food along the line of retreat in Montenegro 
and in the towns of Albania before th<^ arrival of the 
troops. B\it this was not done and the starving soldiers 
had to wait nearly two \\eeks before any real store of food 
arrived. 
It was an incomprehensible additional cnielty. 
After all its sufferings and sacrifices, the Serbian nation 
found itself forced into the position of a suppliant for 
alms. As one Serbian minister put it, " Tears came into 
my eyes when I wrote the telegrams imploring aid whicli 
we had to send." It was an unworthy recompense for 
all the Serbian effort, and yet the Serbians desire only to 
go on co-operating with us. But to be a member of one 
of the great Allies of Serbia in Skutari was to be ashamed, 
very ashamed. 
It ^\•as physically impossible for the worn troops 
arnvmg in Skutari to ]M-ocecd over mud tracks to Durazzo, 
without rest or food. If they had found the expected 
stores there, they could have set out at least two weeks 
earlier. Little or nothing had been done to improve the 
roads south, and save for a swing bridge over the Matia 
river nothing material had been accomplished in the 
month's pause which the Bulgarians and Austrians kindly 
gave, in the way of facilitating the salving of the Serbian 
armj-. 
The Original Plan. 
The original idea of the Serbian Government was 
that the army should go to South Albania to reorganise, 
protected by the Italians and the Greeks. This'dcsire 
was based on the necessity to keep the Serbians on the 
mainland. South Albania was barred to them by the 
Italians who fixed the Skumbi river as the southernmost 
limit, and then Albania became impossible, since there 
was no guarantee for security. And troops which have 
been retreating for weeks need a feeline of security to 
reorganise. 
There has been a terrible spectacle of divided coimsel 
since the Serbian armies arrived in Albania. The Allies 
could not decide who should do what. Consequently, the 
unfortunate soldiers died of starvation or ran the risk of 
capture by the enemy while their friends argued who 
should take each department in hand. There was no one 
power ready to take responsibility and command. And 
yet only that can save the situation. Otherwise the 
Austrians from the north and the Bulgars from the east 
will force the Serbians to do what they never dreamed 
of doing even during the most terrible moments of the 
retreat — that is, to capitulate. 
The Serbians believe that the Allies will win, and 
their faith in this is largely because we are amongst her 
allies. Let England be worthy of this confidence and 
lose no time in putting the whole of her effort into saving 
the Serbian army and placing it safe from outside in- 
fluences, where it can re-organise itself in the shortest 
possible time. All that is needed is a little decision and 
real desire to help. Surely we have enough on our 
consciences in respect of Serbia without wishing to put the 
crown on our shame and while promising that the Serbian 
nation's future is as our own, callously allow the Serbian 
army to be lost and wasted. 
It is no use to say the French will do this or the 
Italians will not do that. The question before us to-day 
is, " What arc we going to do for Serbia," and on our 
answer will depend the possibility of turning defeat in 
the Balkans into the first step towards decisive victory. 
Tlie reply to the request from the Postmaster-General 
for books and magazines for the troops has been good but 
not good enough. Two Inmdred and fifty thousand hooks 
and periodicals are needed every week, and one Inindred 
and forty thousand arc forthcoming. The shortage therefore 
is over a hinidrcd thousand. The process is so simple and 
many people get such large accumulations of literature that 
it is amazing the response has not been better. All anybody 
need do is to collect their superfluous books anrl magazines 
and hand them witJiont packing, payment, or address, over 
tlie counter of the nearest post office! 
