February 17, I9i6. LAND AND WATER. 
ROUMANIA'S DECISION. 
By Alfred Stead. 
, filf;'. Alfred Stead, who ivas in Bucarest joy nine months last year, fighting the German propaganda, and 
■previously -in Athens, was formerly Roumanian Consid-General in London for five years. Hts connection 
with the Balkan States dates back to 1903, and during this period he has at one time or another been 
brought into contact with the leading personalities of that troubled region. Last October on leaving Bucarest 
he was attached to the Serbian Army, was with it from the fighting on the Danube to its retreat through 
Montenegro, and after witnessing the capture of Mount Lovchen returned to England by way of Skutari and San 
Giovanni di Medtia. There is no living Englishman more conversant with Balkan problems than Mr. Alfred Stead.] 
IN all the welter of the world-war it has been reserved 
to Roumania to remain aloof, openly bound 
neither to one camp nor the other, master of the 
national destinies. The sphinx of Europe has not 
yet spoken, but when the Ministers of the Allies 
or of the Central Powers quit Bucarest, a decision most 
momentous to the peoples at war will have been taken. 
To-day the enigma of Roumanian policy is puzzling 
the majority of the statesmen and generalissimos. For 
it lies with the Dauubian monarchy, with its si.K hundred 
thousand or more fresh troops, to play a decisive part in 
the determining phases of the war. But which way will 
the cat jump ? That is the question of the moment. 
The Government at Bucarest has shown masterly quali- 
ties of keeping its own counsel, and it is doubtful whether 
the majority of the Roumanian nation are any wiser as 
to the real position of their country in the international 
grov pings than are the people of London, Paris or Berlin. 
It isija singular triumph for M. Bratiano, the Roumanian 
Premier, who stands out almost alone as an astute 
statesman at a time when diplomacy and statesmanship 
are at a very low level. Holding in his hands all the 
strings, practically Minister of War and Minister for 
Foreign \ffairs as well as Prime Minister, this compara- 
tively young man has succeeded in pursuing an eminently 
national policy. This, despite the blandishments or the 
threats, the offers or the menaces of the belligerents. 
In Roumania the power is in the hands of the 
Monarch and of the Government more perhaps than 
in any other constitutional country blessed or cursed 
with a parliamentary system. The mass of public 
opinion, scarcely formed and incoherent, plays no part 
in the government's decisions, the Opposition and the 
leaders of the parties not in power have very little weight. 
They are those who talk more freely than members of 
the government, and thus impress a semblance of their 
importance upon the outside world ignorant that much of 
their speeches and utterances have rather a local than an 
international object in view. 
The King. 
Thus, to-day, in seeking to divine what Roumania is 
going to do, it is necessary to plumb the depths of the 
minds of King Ferdinand and M. Bratiano, not to 
listen too eagerly to the speeches of the Opposition or be 
affected unduly by the leanings of the majority of the 
thinking population. The mass of the population does 
not interest itself in the war or its details unless we except 
a certain universal idea that the time has come to " liber- 
ate " the Roumanians in the Dual Empire. But the 
Roumanian nation is not swept off its feet by any idea 
of a greater Roumania or a reunion of all the Roumanian 
peoples. 
While undoubtedly the Koumanian people would 
wish to see Roumania greater and the acquisition of 
Transylvania and Bessarabia, they have as foundation of 
their idea the natural desire to retain the Roumania of 
to-day. They do not wish to share the fate of the two 
other small States which have had the privilege of joining 
in the war. The earlier fate of Belgium and the recent 
destruction of Serbia do not tempt Roumania to go and 
do likewise. This sane national attitude in Roumania 
has aided largely in the achievement of successful non- 
intervention. And this, although the country is fringed 
with warring peoples and possesses a longer frontier 
facing war than any other nation. 
King Ferdinand, a Hohenzollern of the elder branch, 
whose aunt was the mother of the heroic King of the 
Belgians, has been much too frequently regarded as a 
certain German element in Roumania. The King of 
Roumania to-day is a Roumanian so\'ercign, desirous of 
furthering the welfare of his subjects and promoting the 
future of his country. He is a Roumanian first and last, 
just as his beautiful Queen, the daughter of our Duke 
of Edinburgh is Roumanian, although English and 
Russian by blood. The Throne will decide on national, 
not on family lines. 
M. Bratiano bears an historic name, and his actions 
and 'decisions must inevitably be affected bj' the traditions 
of his father, who guided Roumania througli the stormy 
times of the Russo-Turkish war, and saw both the \ictory 
of the Roumanian army at Plevna and the treacherous 
filching by Russia of the Roumanian Province of Bessa- 
rabia — tearing up the " scrap of paper " by which tiie 
Tsar had guaranteed Roumanian integrity. Keeping 
his own counsel, refusing to answer questions in Parlia- 
ment, or outside, M. Bratiano has to-day the destinies of 
Roumania in liis keeping. His very success in maintain- 
ing a policy of aloofness so far, strengthens his hands. 
Learning from the Past. 
If it is impossible to gain any real idea of what M. 
Bratiano thinks or decides, it is possible to gather some 
very valuable indications from the attitude of Roumania 
during the past months of war. It must not be forgotten, 
that before the autumn of 1914 Roumania was a party to 
the Triple Alliance, her participation depending upon 
Italian inteivention. The country had Ijeen financed 
and developed economically by (German capital and 
German energy. Owing to an artificially developed 
prejudice in England and France against the country 
because of supposed persecution of the Jews, the purse- 
strings of London and Paris were not untied for Bucarest. 
It was only after the British Navy began to look to 
the Roumanian oilfields for fuel that it was realised that 
Roumania offered excellent fields for investment and 
development. But the antidote to German influence 
was only beginning to be applied. 
The few months before the outbreak of war were 
occupied by very real and partially successful efforts on 
the part of the Triple Entente to detach Roumania from 
the Central Powers. The great personal friendship of 
the late King Charles for the Emperor of Austria made 
it difticult to secure anything more than a probability of 
neutrality. But in view of the former certainty of 
Roumanian action on the side of Germany, this was a 
great gain. As will be shown, the neutrality of Rou- 
mania has been a very precious aid to the Allies. It has 
been the unforgivable sin in the eyes of Vienna and 
Berlin. As a Roumanian politician said, plaintively : 
" The only people who are sure that we are with the 
Allies are the Germans, the Allies do not seem to believe 
it." And yet Roumania has given proof on proof of 
her goodwill towards the Allies — and this at great risk and 
peril to herself. 
A National Policy. 
The moment the idea of a national policy forms the 
foundation of Roumanian diplomacy, it is evident that a 
premature decision on one side or the other must force 
intervention. And while a large State can look forward 
with equanimity, if not with satisfaction, to a war lasting 
months and years, a small State has seriously to considci 
her staying powers. And therefore it has seemed well for 
Roumania to reserve her forces until proportionstely 
they represent a greater value and can hope to hasten the 
end of the war within a measurable period. 
The Koumanian policy is an eminently sane one ; it 
i? not quixotic, it is not suicidal. But in order to be able 
to avoid an earlier entry, it has been necessary to devise 
means and methods of procrastination —to create a buffer 
zone of uncertainty in the minds of possible adversaries. 
