LAND AND WATER. 
February 17, 1916. 
The simplest method was to bargain as to territorial 
recompense, for ncutraUty or for active participation. 
This, not because it was vitally essential to be assured 
beforehand of the Transylvanian territory or the Bernat, 
but simply because by asking both sides, it was possible 
to make Berlin or Vienna, Paris or Petrograd believe 
that the decision had not yet been reached. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the Bucarcst Govern- 
ment would have been very seriously embarrassed if at 
any moment either group of Powers had suddenly acceded 
all her demands. As they did not, the equilibrium was 
maintained. M. Bratiano availed himself very cle\ erly 
of the various members of his government and of the 
Opposition, of the pro-allj' I\I. Costinescu, the Minister 
of Finance, of the pro-German M. Marghiloman, one of 
the Opposition leaders, &c. M. Bratiano's task was 
always to create an unclear situation, so that the Central 
Powers could never come down on him and say, " You 
are with the Allies." 
The Russian Factor. 
Roumania has to-day contact only with one of the 
Allies, and that the one least able to help and the least 
trusted at Bucarest. The loss of Bessarabia is more 
recent than the loss of Alsace Lorraine, and whereas 
Germany wai- the enemy of France, Russia had just been 
saved on the slope? of Plevna by the young Roumanian 
army. Also Roumania lies between Russia and Bulgaria, 
and the way to Constantinople. Two dominant forces 
exert influence in Roumania, mistrust and fear of Russia 
and dread of a Greater Bulgaria. And unfortunatelv 
the Allies have left much of their negotiations at Bucarest 
in the hands of the Russians, and the Roumanians have- 
seen Russia leading the Allies at Sofia bhndlj' to endeavour 
to create a greater Bulgaria at the expense of Serbia, 
which country had already made sacrifices and won \'ic- 
tories for the Allies. 
The Germans have been very active, they have been 
extraordinarily clever. The whole country, has been 
inundated for months by German agents and money, 
the newspapers have been bought, money has been 
lavishly spent. In Bucar(>st there were Germans en every 
hand, there were no workers for the Allies, especially 
none from England or France. It is true there were 
occasional special missions, who generally arri\-ed from 
Sofia and worsened the situation by explaining to the 
Roumanians that the Bulgarians wer'e with the Entente 
and that they were surer of Sofia than of Bucarcst. And 
in Roumania there vvas no doubt that Bulgaria was in 
alliance with Germany— the Roumanian Government in- 
formed theAllies of this months before the recent events. 
Oil and Agriculture. 
Roumania is a country depending upon agriculture 
and oil for revenue, and is in no position to manufacture 
munitions. Nor had she a large stock in hand. Tiie 
ammunition ordered and paid for in Germany before the 
war was not delivered, has never been delivered —a 
significant indication of how little sure Berlin is of 
Bucarest. But it was essential of Roumania, before em- 
barking on war, to have adequate supplies accumulated 
or assured. The Salonika line, even at its best, was a poor 
line to rely on, change of gauge arid transhipment made 
arrivals slow. From Russia munitions were not to be had. 
Also, when the Russians were forced back from Bukovina 
and Galicia the railway connection through Moldavia 
was imperilled. 
Roumania demanded guarantees from the Allies, 
and it depends not upon Bucarest, but upon the Allied 
Governments, if the Roumanian army enters into action. 
The whole attitude of Roumania has been unmistakably 
pro-Ally all along but the Roumanian Government i's 
not going to war without being sure that there are 
enough Allied troops to co-operate and to make success 
probable. To do otherwise would be foolish. 
If, on the other hand, the Balkan situation be not 
taken seriously, Roumania will remain neutral. Tliere is 
no question of bargaining, the situation is quite clear. 
The Germans and the Bulgarians arc alarmed at the 
prospect because Roumania is as a knife at their throat. 
The tortoise has put out its head and its neck is at 
the mercy of Roumania. Had the iMench not literally 
forced us to remain in Salonika, all jiope of Roumanian 
intervention would have gone. To-day the danger is 
rather that the Central Powers, seeing themselves con- 
fronted with the almo^'t certainty of Roumania joining 
the Allies, will force the pace. But it is doubtfid whether 
they feel ready to bring into play a fresh body of six 
hundred thousand men, well equipped and trained, 
occupying an ide.iUy dangi;rou> position. Unless the 
Allies make some supreme blunder — and who can 
guarantee that they will not after the experience of 
Sofia— the Roumanian situation is very satisfactory. 
Nor must it be forgotten that Roumania has already 
done much for the Allies during the past months. The 
only country which has found neutrality to .spell economic 
and financial ruin, Roumania would have every right to 
regard the recent purchase of wheat for ten millions as a 
mere drop in the bucket. For two years there h.as been a 
practical cessation of export of cereals, the bulk of two 
years' crop are lying in the country, much at the frontier 
railway stations. The whole wealth of Roumania is in 
cereals and petroleum, and botli those are in a terribly 
bad way. At the time when the .\ilies had the idea of 
starving out (iermany, I^oumani:i by refu^-ing to allow her 
railway truck: to pass the frontier, practically stopped 
the export of grain. 
It is of course an arguable point that perhaps Germany 
would have suffered more had Roumania sold her grain 
for gold, the drain of gold being more disastrous to Germany 
than the disadvantage to the Allies of allowing some four 
weeks' food supply to go out of Roumania —incidentally, 
Roumania would have then had a strong financial position. 
Be that as it may, the bulk of the grain stayed in the 
country, and as all the financial institutions are founded 
on agricultural wealth, the financial situation became 
bad. The few sales at high prices of an odd lot of grain 
to Germany, in exchange for coal or other commodity, 
had no real influence. The prohibition of the cx])ort 
of petrol and some other products of j>etroleum crippled 
the oil industry. In the first six months of i()i4 131,204 
tons of petrol were exported, in the corresponding period 
of 1015 only S,092 tons. The petroleum industry is at a 
standstill, the production has fallen, all the tanks are 
full, prices are practically non-existent. Germany and 
Austria have not grain or petrol from Roumania, but 
Roumania is ruined. 
Proofs of Friendliness. 
But there is still more proof of Roinnaniau friendli- 
ness. Until the occupation of Serbia gave the Central 
Powers contact with Bulgaria and Turkey, Roumania 
consistently stopped the passage of war stores to Con- 
stantinople and Sofia. Whole trains were held up at the 
frontier, while truck-loads clandestinely introduced were 
seized at Bucarest. Every manner of device was resorted 
to in the hopes of securing the passage of vital parts of 
shells, etc., but the vigilance of the searchers let httle 
past. But it was necessary to do this stopping work 
very circumspectly because iihc long frontier with Austria 
and Hungary rendered reprisals easy. But Roumania 
loyally stopped the bulk of the munitions. On the other 
hand she took a large view of tlie uso of the Danube for 
the passage of stores between Russia and Serbia. 
With the practical ruin of her resources Roumiaan 
has been faced with the dislocation and expenditure of 
maintaining the bi\lk of her army mobilised. She has 
seldom had less than 300,000 men ander arms, with a 
result that her army is in a state of extraordinary effi- 
ciency to-day. The line of the Carpathians is in an 
admirable state of defence, many of the heavy guns from 
the Bessarabian frontier having been transferred. The 
enemy cannot surprise Roumania, an attack must dispose 
of at least half a million men — nor can heavy guns be 
used in the mountains. The southern frontier is the 
more dangerous, a crossing of the Danube covered by 
heavy artillery having been jiroved to be quite feasible 
but with an allied army at Salonica, Italian troops in 
Albania and Russians at Czernovits to cross the Danube 
would be a hazardous adventure. 
Roumania dreads a Greater Bulgaria, she believe.? 
the Allies will win because lingland is determined to win 
— let us lose no time in being worthy of the confidence 
placed in us and if necessary let us remove any fear that 
Roumania may be shut in after the war by Russia at 
Constantinople, by offering her a way out to tlie .Egean 
through the territory which was once Bulgaria and no\> 
is eastern Germany. The Roumanians wait on us — 
the moment has come for the great stroke of the war. 
