February 24, 1916. 
L .\ X D A X D \Y .\ T E R . 
LAND & WATER 
Empire House, Kingsway, London, W.G. 
Telephone: H'3LBORN 2S28. 
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1916. 
THE AMERICAN CRISIS. 
A WASHINGTON telegram quotes Mr. Lansing 
to the effect that Germany's policy regai'ding 
submarines makes the situation between that 
' country and America as grave as it was when the 
case of the Liisitania was recent. But this surely must be 
an under-statement. The issue between the two Govern- 
ments then was not merely that Americans had been 
killed, and killed without justification. It was that they 
had been killed in spite of the clearest kind of warning 
that America would hold Germany to account if, in the 
sinking of merchantmen which Germany had threatened, 
any American citizens should suffer. The injury therefore 
was not an injury only to the victims. It was an outrage 
on the sovereign dignity of the State which, by its warning 
had pledged itself to protect — or avenge — them. And 
if this was the situation in May and June of last year, 
how does the case stand as between two countries in 
February of this ? Has Germany done anything to 
assuage the wounded pride of the great Republic of the 
West ? Regrets and apologies she has always been willing 
to offer. That she had no wish or intention to murder 
Americans she has always been ready to profess, though 
the profession must sound strangely to those who saw the 
advertisements published by the German Embassy 
cautioning Americans against taking ship in the doomed 
liner. She has been prepared to compound her felony 
by proffering blood-money to the widowed, orphaned 
and bereaved. But from the first Mr. Wilson has made it 
clear that such things would not be enough. Expressions 
of regret, he said, might suffice in ordinary cases, but where 
life had been taken by an illegal and inhuman act, unpre- 
cedented in the history of modern war, where over a thousand 
men, women, and children had been sent without challenge 
or warning to their deaths, nothing short of a disavowal 
could suffice. Twice — in May and June — was this point 
insisted on. In July the President sounded a sterner note. 
Even disavowal and reparation could not wash out a 
rjpctition of the offence. If murder was risked a second 
time, such an act, said Mr. Wilson, must be " looked upon 
as deliberately unfriendly." If Germany persisted, then 
she would be steering straight for war. And as the cases 
of the Arabic, Persia and Ancona show, Germany has 
persisted. When, therefore, Mr. Lansing is reported as 
saying that the situation is as grave now as it was in IMay 
last year, it can only mean that a breach seems very near 
indeedr 
For obviously, the diplomatic position is greatly 
aggravated. And it is not aggravated only by many 
repetitions of acts previously defined as " dehberately 
unfriendly." It is almost a greater aggravation that the 
Kaiser's personal representative in the American capital, 
has been profuse in promises, glibly made in his august 
master's name, that Germany would not only sink no un- 
warned liners, but no ships at all, without securing the 
safety of their passengers and crew. That this promise 
was definitely made after the sinking of the Arabic cannot 
be questioned. But it was a promise that Berlin never 
has confirmed. And now it seems evident that Berlin 
never will confirm it Nor can it he doubted that each 
and all of Count Bernstorff's promises have been made in 
the full knowledge that they would not rccci\-e the (lucs- 
tionable honour of the Emperor's endorsement. How, 
then, has the situation been kept open so long ? It can be 
partly explained by Count Bernstorff's singularly fascinat- 
ing personality — more, possibly, by his unscrupulous 
dexterity as a diplomat. But the master cause of Mr. 
Wilson's long-suffering has been his countrymen's aversion ^ 
innate and deeply felt, for any participation in any Euro- 
pean quarrels. To avoid such entanglements might 
almost be called a death-bed bequest of the Father of his 
Country. To become a party to such entanglements • is 
complicated to-day by the very recent descent of so many 
iVmericans from the peoples now at war. No Govern- 
ment could be blamed for hesitating over a decision that 
would seem to many of its citizens to involve them in a 
parricidal strife. If we add to this, as our columns show 
to-day, that the Germans have played upon this string 
by a not too skilful, but singularly effective press cam- 
paign, we shall realise that to Mr. Wilson and his associates 
have been hai^d put to to find an honourable excuse for 
peace. But National honour is a thing more sacred than 
traditions, a bond more forceful than any sentiment of 
ancestry. And America, once forced into a national 
decision, will not be threatened by any divided sentiment. 
However good a German the hyphenated may wish to 
be, when tlie country of his adoption speaks as a nation, 
it will be his chief anxiety to be a good American. 
What then will the upshot be ? Our Naval Corre- 
spondent, Mr. Pollen, has maintained in these columns 
from the first publication of the first Lusitania Note, 
that there could be but one issue to the controvers^^ 
America may not wish to become a belligerent. But 
she will not be left with the option of remaining neutral. 
The breach with Berlin is inevitable because Germany's 
persistence in high seas murder is inevitable. Twenty 
months of hostilities have opened the eyes of the War 
Lord and what is of more moment, the eyes of his people, 
to the realitj'' of sea power, and its appalling consequences 
to the sea impotent. It is a reality that cannot be 
evaded or concealed by keeping the High Seas Fleet in 
harbour and so saving it from destruction in battle. The 
purposes of sea power are manifold, but they can all be 
achieved without battle and they can be achieved simul- 
taneously. To seize the command of the sea, to use the 
sea for the transport of armies, to destroy the trade of the 
enemy, to protect our own trade from the enemy's attack, 
to organise the overseas supply of those who possess the 
command, these are things that were not done in succes- 
sion, but all at once. For the most, the forces that 
secured the one secured the other, and by the same action. 
As Mr. Pollen points out to-day, we threw away perhaps 
the greatest of our wasted opportunities in not including 
with all these assertions of sea sovereignty the most 
effective of them all — namely, an instant strict blockade. 
To have done this while the blood of Belgium still ran 
red, while the civilised world still quivered with anger 
and pity, would doubtless have made it possible for us to 
announce such applications of the doctrine of the con- 
tinuous voyage as would have made the economic isola- 
tion of Germany complete. 
At first sight it seems sheer madness that Germany 
by quarrelling with America now should jeopardise the 
receipt of such American supplies as still reach her 
through the neutrals. That she takes this risk is an 
index of her graver internal difficulties. Something 
worse than the actual sufferings of the people must 
threaten the people's leaders. If the overseas supplies 
of the Germans have been grievously straitened, those 
of the Allies are already ample, and in war material are 
growing daily. It is not merely that these things mean a 
steadily growing military strength of the other. They 
are intolerable because it is becoming apparent to the 
people that their leaders have misled them — misled 
them in saying that Germany's future was upon the sea, 
misled them into a war which their failure on the sea must 
turn into a crushing defeat. The war party, if it cannot 
save Germany, must at least try to save itself. It must 
then strike at these continual manifestations of Great 
Britain's sea strength with any weapons and any means 
that offer. To men in so desperate a position as this it 
is mere wapouring to talk of moral right and %vrong. 
Hmuanity, justice, legal precedents — these things are all 
uf less account even than the scraps of paper Germany 
has so consistently ignored. 
