LAND AND WATER 
February 24, 1016. 
delaying the approach to 5. while 4 and 6 are only of 
use as (lankinR 5 and prcvcntint; its bcinp turned. 
Now it is: imjHirtant at this stage of the description 
to grasp the fact that the ridge upon which 4, 5, and 6 are 
placed does not dominate and control the Tafta hill just 
above the pass. The idea of building fort 5 with its 
Hanking and supporting works was not to stand up 
against a force which might already have captured the 
great principal fort i on Tafta. The idea was rather to 
prevent fort i from being turned. 
The German engineers appear to have argued thus : 
" Tafta is too strong to be rushed and can stand against 
anything the Russians have by way of a siege train. It 
is true that the munitionment and th(? main strength of 
the army must come along the road. But still, some 
slight deviation from the road is possible ; and unless 
we guard the flanks of the principal work on Tafta, the 
enemy can turn it round by the north. So we will create 
a new set of works to prevent this." To this decision the 
position owes the group 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. 9, which I have 
callod the second gro\ip. But Tafta once taken the 
second group loses its value at once and the northern side 
pf the pass is clear. 
On the southern side of the pass just eastward of the 
summit, is the spur or ridge called " The Mountain of 
Ahmed," the Ahmed Dagh. Its highest point at 
10 is crowned with a closed work. AH roimd its edges 
arc a series of open batteries which command the road 
las it rises up towards the pass) and the plain of Passine 
10 the East; while an isolated work upon the lower 
hill towards the plain (marked 11, on sketch II) server, as 
a support to retard anv attack upon the Ahmed Dagh. 
]-inally this set of fortifications (which may be called 
tlie third group) contains upon a summit at the extreme 
west the battery of Lala hill, which guards the flank of 
the principal work 10, but does not comniand the road 
in any way. No. 10 and batteries all round the edge of 
the Ahmed Dagh are useless if Tafta be once taken, for 
Tafta commands the road more thoroughly than 10 docs 
and the open batteries on the northenr edge of the Ahmed 
Dagh just south of the road could not stand against 
whoever was the master of Tafta. 
The fourth group is to the Ahmed Dagh or third 
group what the second group is to Tafta, the first. It 
is a system designed to prevent the Ahmed Dagh from 
being turned by the south just as the group 4, 3, 6, 7, 
8, 9, is a systeni designed to prevent Tafta being turned 
by the north. 
This fourth group consists in a closed work, No. 12 
on sketch II, with two batteries, above and below it, at 
11 and 14. The-^e stand on the edge of another spur or 
ridge ovcrlookin,^ the plain. Finalh', this fourth group also 
has its support, two large batteries, standing on two twin 
summits to the south and called (from the names of villages 
near them) the battery of Ekhlikhan and the battery of 
Tchatarli. The object served by these last two works is 
threefold ; they prevent any force from using the track 
which here goes over the hills to rejoin the main road 
beyond the summit of the pass, and so turn the Ahmed 
Dagh position. Thej' sweep all the approaches to 12, 
I"; and 14. And they prevent any body of the enemy 
from using the very steep dead grounil at A on the 
northern side of a deep ravine which here would give an 
opportunity, were its approaches undefended, for a 
comparatively small force to turn the whole of the fortifi- 
cations by the south. 
It will be seen from the above that the whole system 
is based upon Tafta : It has been constructed with the 
idea that no one would attempt to take Tafta directly 
but the Russians would try to reduce the main position 
gradually by the two flanks, northern and southern. 
But the Russians, aided by circumstances of which 
we know nothing, struck directly for the main position 
and carried Tafta before most of the other works were 
reduced. The struggle Ix-gan upon the afternoon of 
Friday the nth. By the 14th, two works at least had 
already been caixied at the point of the bayonet. The 
afternoon of Tuesday tlie 15th, so far as one can gather 
from the telegrams as yet to hand (in Paris up to 3 o'clock 
of Monday the 21st) tlie whole position uas mastered 
and the road over the simimit of the pass was held by our 
Allies, who were then marching directly upon Erzeroum 
beyond. Those units (portions of three army corps) 
which were garrisoning the city evacuated it. leaving 
behind them, however, a great mass of material and 
stores, all the heavy guns in the forts, and a very large 
number of lield pieces as well. 
A little before midday on Wednesday, the i6th, 
the Russian cavalry rocfe into the city and was 
soon joined by the separate columns which had been 
coming up tlvough the passes A and C (on sketch I) 
through the hills to the north and the south. All next 
day, Thursday, and Friday afterwards, were occupied 
in pursuing the rapid and partly disorderlj' retreat of the 
Turks. What was left of one division, the 34th, was 
captured wholesale, and by the evening of the day 240 
field pieces were in Russian hands. The Turkish troops 
were already' scattered into three separate fragments, one 
retreating north-west towards Trebizond, the other due 
westwards by the road Erzinguian, and a third south- 
ward along the road to Diarbekir. Which was the largest 
of these fragments or whether any one of them can be 
said to constitute the main body we afe not told. 
V^ Kavs 
1 
Tci (ci;ista 
0^^^ N^ Mosul , 
Q ... » ;;, « k Jqo ii30<yJruiad Mouatdinoas ///// 
It was inevitable that a success so rapid and so 
unexpected, and one of so much political consequence, 
should give rise to a great mass of speculation with regard 
to its strategical results. These speculations are premature. 
We do not know the concjition of the roads nor what num- 
ber of men the Russians can spare for what will now be 
their lengthening communications far away from their rai.' 
head beyond the frontier. We do not even know how 
far they command the Black Sea, though we may guess 
that their command has been suHkicntly complete to 
prevent reinforcements and munitions from reaching 
Trebizond ; since the fall of Erzeroum was most pro- 
bably due to the interruption of this line of communica- 
tion. They may find it necessary to march north and 
hold Trebizond before they do anything else. If they 
are not compelled to use a large force thus, their most 
obvious course will clearly be to try and strike at the 
Bagdad railway, and the most convenient point for that 
would be Diarbekir — 140 miles from Erzeroum : they 
are already at Mousch with their southern or left wing. 
Any considerable Russian force at Diarbekir would 
menace the existence of all Turkish forces in Mesopotamia, 
but the march is a difiicult one through a mass of des- 
perately confused and high mountain ridges of the 
Armenian Taurus. The only certain thing we can say is 
this upon the strategical situation created by the fall 
of Erzeroum : that it will compel a Turkish concentration 
towards Armenia. It may relieve the pressure upon the 
small British forces in Mesopotamia, it must almost 
certainly postpone to another season the difficult and 
now perhaps impossible scheme for invading Egypt. 
This latter, once it is fully appreciated, will release 
for the general purposes of the Allies, much the greater 
part of the forces concentrated for the defence of the 
Suez Canal. And it is perhaps the renewed availability 
of this force for action elsewhere which is the chief 
consequence of the fall of the capital of Turkish Armenia. 
H. Bi:i.LOC. 
10 
