February 24, igi6. 
LAND AND WATER 
continue? to lose less and less as it went on. 
The second series of diagrams will make the meaning 
of the first clearer. In this series I show what may be 
called the stages of a race in which A, B and D engage. 
The 5-inch, the 12-inch and the 15-inch shells arc seen 
starting level. At 1,000 yards the 5-inch lias already 
fallen behind the 12-inch but it leads the 15-inch. At 6,000 
yards the 5-inch shell has fallen greatly behind, though the 
i2-inch still leads the 15-inch. At 9,000, the 5-inch has 
long been out of the race, and the 15-inch leads the 
12-inch by a short head. At 20,000 the 15-inch has 
beaten the 12-inch by four and one-tenth seconds ; the 
12-inch has beaten the 5-inch by nearly half a minute. 
Nothing can better illustrate the staying power of the 
heavier shell, for in this case remember, the starting speed 
of the 12-inch was something like 750 feet per second the 
greater. 
Now mark with regard to these diagrams of the race 
that the advantage which the 15-inch shell has over the 
12-inch is enormously less than that which the 12-inch 
has over the 5-inch. The advantage of the 17-inch over 
tiie 15-incli would be correspondingly reduced. In fact, 
for practical purposes, it may be said to have no advantage 
at all. And consequently, we are reduced to points 3 
and 4, namely, the greater visibility of the splash and the 
greater the smashing effect of the bigger shell, g 
Weight and Numbers. 
Now, when we get to these points we have a second 
matter to consider. And it is this : If you decide to 
adopt the bigger gun, it means that you can only carry a 
smaller number of them for any given displacement or 
expenditure. It is no answer to say that you can build 
bigger ships to carry the same number of bigger guns. 
For your total shipbuilding and gun-making effort you 
will still have a smaller number of guns. As a rough 
formula, the weight of guns with their mountings, ammu- 
nitions, etc., tompare as do the cubes of the calibres. On 
this principle, a 17-inch gun double turret would represent 
37 times the weight of an ii-inch turrent ; 2-8 times a 
12-inch turret ; twice the weight of a 13-5 turret, and be 
one and a half times as heavy again as a 15-inch turret. 
If Germany then has decided on the 17-inch gun for her 
new ships, her total shipbuilding and gun-making capacitv 
can be expended upon half as many more 15-inch gunned 
ships as 17-inch gunned ships. It seems to me that she 
could only decide upon a smaller number of ships with the 
more powerful gun if she were perfectly certain first, that 
the 17-inch gun is more likely to hit at a great range than 
the 15-inch ; secondly, that the decisive naval battle 
would be fought at a range at which this advantage of 
17-inch guns would have full play. For not otherwise 
would a Power already so inferior in numbers sacrifice 
the very great and undoubted advantage which numbers 
confer. 
Now as we have s(5en, it is improbable that the 17-mch 
gun would have any hitting superiority over the 15-inch. 
But it is quite undoubted that fifteen guns have a very 
great hitting advantage over ten guns. For at long 
range so many uncertainties nuist necessarily be present ' 
— uncertainties of range, of aim, etc., that the probability 
of making hits increases out of proportion to the increase 
of the number of guns. A broadside of eight guns would 
have a great deal more than double the chance of hitting 
than a broadside of four. Nor would the splashes of six 
17-inch guns, be more visible than those of eight 15-inch. 
Those that choose the 17-inch gun therefore, would choose 
solely on the ground that a single shot would have a 
better hope of sinking or disabling, and would probably 
not so choose unless they were extraordinarily confident 
of bringing a greatly improved standard of marksmanship 
into use. A further consideration must be added. Off 
Heligoland we fought at 6,000 yards — we could see no 
further. Is it wise to build for long range only ? At 
short range numbers are everything. So much for 
general theory. 
As to the practical question as to whether as a fact 
the Germans have decided upon the 17-inch gun and are 
actually re-arming their old ships witli it, and have done 
both as a result of war experience, I have to confess a 
considerable scepticism. War experience, as we have seen, 
would not have been available till April last. Is it 
conceivable that Germany would have decided upon a 
revolutionary na\'al policy at so late a date in the war ? 
She would hardly delay making up the lost ground. 
No battleship has ever yet been built in a shorter time 
than two years from the completion of the design, The 
Dreadnought was actually constructed in eighteen months 
from the lajing down of the first plate, but in this case, 
four of the five turrets were taken from ships previously 
ordered, so that the element which takes longest in the 
production of a battleship, viz. 
were already provided. 
the guns and turrets, 
1% 
IS 
Jleioooj^ds. 
soo/t. 
J^e 9000j^ds 
f: 
15' 
Jit 20000i^ards 
SOSecozids 
4-1 Sees 
1 
As for tlie re-arming of old ships, it is no doubt 
physically possible that Germany's five 'ii-inch gunned 
Dreadnoughts could be converted from carrying 
six turrets of these pieces into ships carrying two single 
17-inch guns and two ii-inch turrets. But it would 
mean the virtual re-construction of the entire ship, and it 
would probably take longer to change over these five 
ships than to get ten 17-inch guns afloat in two new ships. 
The 12-inch Dreadnoughts could ,iot be converted to 
17-inch ships, without a similar reconstruction. 
Finally, two reflections are in place. It is no use 
our making ourselves unhappy on the question of the 
surprises in naval construction that Germany has in 
store for us. Nothing we can do now in the way of deter- 
mining on new ships can bear fruit in completed shi]:is for 
at least twenty months. If Germany actually got ahead 
of us between last January and last May, as Mr. Hurd 
seems to think, it is too late for the present Board to 
remedy the mistakes of Mr. Churchill and his colleagues. 
We must trust — as it seems to me we can trust — with 
absolute confidence to the very great margin of strength 
which we possessed in August, 10x4, and to the great 
additions to that strength which the purchase of foreign 
ships and the completion of those already in hand, have 
enabled us to make. Half-a-dozen ships carrying 17-inrh 
guns could make no material difterence to naval'strengtli. 
We ought to have added between twelve and eighteen 
15-inch gunned ships before a single German ship with 
the large guns is afloat. Akthur Pollen. 
That virtue brings its own reward and evil its own 
punishment is the keynote of Unrest, Mr. Warwick Deeping's 
new novel (Cassell and Co.. 6s.). A temperamental lit, of 
i-estlessness led Martin Frenshani to run away from his wife 
\yith a bold, black-eyed American woman, of whom he soon 
tires. For his wife, in the meantime, there rem»«ns the 
problem of how to comport herself and gloss over liis absence 
so as to deceive friends until he shall return to her, as she 
confidently expects he will. • The book is a study in cun- 
trasts, in high fights and strong shadows --tlR re "arcf vury 
few haU-tones iu it. But its inti-rest is sustainta. 
