J, A X 1 ) A N L) w A r 1-: R 
March 2, iQi6- 
THE BATTLE OF VERDUN. 
By Hilaire Belloc. 
THE enemy lias laumlied, with the (icrnian por- 
tion of his forces, that fn"Pat offensive in the 
West which was expected and upon which will 
turn the future of the war. 
It is already generally known as the battle of Verdun. 
All opinion has by this time clearly seized the vast 
import of the affair. 
Whether the enemy's action be premature or not, 
whether he. has struck too soon and must pay the price 
for having struck too soon, wo cannot tell until the issue 
is decided. Nor shall we know until the ofhcial history 
of the war can be written (if then) whether he was at 
liberty to strike later, e\en had he so willed. 
Let us not forget at the outset what may be lost sight 
of in the intense anxiety of the moment and in the dramatic 
interest of a battle at last joined, that Ihc whole thing is 
yd que more proof — if proof ivere needed — of hoiv numbers 
tire now ihc determining factor of the u'holc campaign. 
In a sense, this has always been true. In a sense it 
is true of all war. But it is particularly true now ; and 
that truth will be the better emphasised if I take the 
opportunity of recalling to the i^eadcr wliat wa.; pubhi.hed 
in Land and Watkr with regard to the impending attack 
not longer ago than February lotli, under the title " The 
Chances of a (ierman Offensive." 
What I put forward in these columns upon tlic loth 
February was as follows : — 
1. That the enemy's whole strategic plan was already 
governed by the exhaustion of his useful reserve. As 
against this exhaustion the Allied superiority in numbers 
was getting more and more striking. 
2. In such a numerical situation the enemy was in 
need of a very immediate offensive. To quote the words 
written " Anyone standing in the shoes of the enemy's 
Higher Command at this momenE must be contemplating 
somewhere a vigorous offensi\e upon a large scale.". 
. .3. Such an offensive would have an immediate 
]wlitical object. If it could do more, well and good for 
the enemy ; but e\en if there was only tlie capture of some 
thousands of prisoners and some scores of guns the enemy 
would hope to produce an effect both at home and 
among neutrals. His ultimate object would, of course 
be much more the breaking of a front. 
4.. This coming great offensive would almost certainly 
be delivered upon the Western Line. 
5. It would probably be delivered upon two selected 
sectors in conformity with the successful strategy of the 
enemy last summer in the East. 
All this the enemy has done. 
The plan is fully developed after ten days of action, 
save for the last point which only the future can show 
to be well or ill founded. I-'or we cannot yet tell whether 
the enemy, as is still expected, will proceed to strike at 
vet another point in order to create a great salient between 
the two, or whether he will confine himself to developing 
the present action solely upon the sector already engaged. 
The German and French Objects in this Battle. 
The essential fact to remember is that it is the 
balance arrived at by the end of a struggle which 
alrtne decides its value. This is true in all war. It is 
true of the most dramatic and conclusive decisions, such 
as Sedan, in which one side is, in a military sense, des- 
trov'ed in a few hours, at no grievous expense to the other 
sidfe. It is equally true of the longest, dullest, and most 
inconclusive of military operations, sUch as, for instance, 
the last campaign of Marlborough. 
We have in the case of the Battle for Verdun 
particular examples of this truth. 
There are three points which are the objects of the 
enemy. 
His main object, of course is to break the 
French front. He proposes to deliver a blow so 
violent or so prolonged that at some moment during 
its delivery the French resistance shall crumble 
and the whole of that part of the line go to 
pieces. In that case he obtains a decision. .\t the very 
best, for }iim, he might conceive the possibility of getting 
right through, separating the French armies, linding him- 
self able to act upon the flank of either part, and in general 
determining the campaign in his favour, so far as the 
Western held is concerned. If he can achieve this, 
enormous losses (spread over a fortnight of the most 
violent lighting) and the expenditure of the greater part 
of his accumulated munitions, are well worth his while; 
he migiit have 300,000 men hit. and yet achieve his 
object. For in the end. not hundreds of thousands, but 
millions, of his opponents would be out of action, and the 
decision in his favour arrived at. 
Scrond in importance is something very different. 
His desire to break the French front he must have known 
to be an enterprise very doubtful of achievement. Failing 
this he might yet obtain results of high political value to 
him at the moment, ^hc capture of very numerous 
prisoners, guns, stores and other trophies would impress 
neutral opinion at a moment when it is essential that he 
should prevent one army at least, and perhaps two, from 
appearing in the near future in the field against him. He 
, would impress the insxifhcicntly censored and insufficiently 
disciplined Press (and tlie financial powers behind it) in 
the \\'est. He would affect the parliamentary form of 
(iovernment, which is so thoroughly imadapted to war. 
At the loss of many men he would have prevented the 
appearance of more fresh men against him, and could hope 
to shake the moral of his foe, at least on the civilian side. 
Even if he did not obtain a great measure of positive 
success; e\'en if he were not able to point to numerous 
guns captured, great masses of munitions fallen to him 
as booty, and thousands of unwounded prisoners, he 
could still have a singular effect upon that same opinion of 
neutral, disaffected, and independent or treasonable 
elements of the Alliance, by the mere name of Verdun. 
It is a point with which the soldiers in command ai'e least 
concerned, for in the military sense it is meaningless. 
But it is still a p. int of political valu3 and the enemy 
knows it well. 
Supposing at the end of such a business he could only 
point — at the expense of a quarter of a m.illion men — 
to a few thousand prisoners, and a normal number 
of pieces remaining in his hands as the result of an 
advance over live or six miles of country, but could 
say that his troops had entered even so much as the 
eastern ruins of Verdun, beyond the Meuse river, the 
name " A'erdun " would still do its work. Men continue to 
think of this geographical area — this single circle of a 
few miles in 500 miles of line — as though it were a fortress 
of the old days of fortresses. It has become in the 
minds of miUions during the last few days the test of 
success to discover whether the enemy does or does not 
attain even the ruined houses in the suburbs. 
Still greater would be the effect, of course, if the 
whole French line were to fall back behind Verdun and 
that area as a whole to be occupied by the enemy. That 
the line should fall back intact, that its new position 
should be stronger than the old, that the French losses 
should be not a third of the (iermans, that those German 
losses should be such that their offensive power should be 
crippled in the West for months to come —all that would 
be set against the accomplishment and counted little. 
The merC' attainment of the area called Verdun 
on the map— no matter at what price —would have the 
political effect I have described. 
These three points, therefore, the first alone a military 
consideration, are in the enemy's mind. 
Unlike what is the fase with simpler situations, the 
corresponding French object is not a mere negation of 
these German objects. You cannot in this instance 
simply contrast the two opponents and state the success 
of the one in tenns of the failure of the other. 
The main French object in the whole matter is the 
infliction of such military losses on the enemy, in com- 
parison to those suffered by themselves, that this great 
