March g, 1916. 
LAND AND \\' A T E R 
LAND & WATER 
Empire House, Kingsway, London, W.C. 
Telephone : HOLBORN 2828. 
THURSDAY^, MARCH 9, 1916. 
THE TWO OBJECTIVES. 
A LTOGETHER apart from its purely military 
/^L siiE;niricance, the struggle still going on around 
/■ — ^ Verdun possesses a very special interest as 
■^ -*- illustrating the marked difference of motive 
which now dictates the military policy of the contending 
powers. These motives will in all probability become 
more and more divergent as the war proceeds ; and it 
will be well, if wo are to take a just view of the future 
progress of the war, to take this opportunity of 
examining them. 
For about a fortnight the German forces have been 
engaged in a prolonged and very violent attack against 
that section of the French line which may be called the 
salient of Verdun. The attack has been deUvered with 
great determination and at an extravagant cost in lives. 
So far it has met with no solid success. The French have 
met it \vith forces kept deliberately inferior in number to 
those of their opponents, and at an expense of life smaller, 
out of all proportion, than that which they have been able 
to exact. They have fallen back deliberately and at a 
moment chosen by themselves from their original ad- 
vanced positions, thus yielding certain ground ; but the 
attempt to dislodge them from the line of heights which 
forms their present main defensive position has so far 
failed. That is what, up to the moment of writing, has 
actually happened ; but it may be well to go further and 
ask what the German command was really attempting 
and why it was attempting it. 
Of course, if the encny could have succeeded in 
breaking through the French line and rolling it up, north 
and south, such a result would be well worth the utmost 
sacrifice of men that he could commatid ; for it would 
be a decision and would for the moment, at least, put an 
end to all danger to his security from the west. Most 
probably he thought that he could do this. But even 
if he could only have hoped to have found himself in 
a position to compel the French to abandon the salient 
of Verdun, and to fall back upon some other line behind 
that city, a result which he valued would have been 
attained. 
Now, it is cjuite certain that that objective would not, 
from the purely military point of view, be worth the 
sacrifice of much-needed men which the enemy has 
already made and which he must continue to make for 
some time to come if he is to pursue; his end. If it occurred 
— which now seems far from probable — it would not be a 
decision, it would not put the Allied armies out of action 
or relieve the enemy from apprehension as to the safety 
of his \\'ostern front. The importance of Verdun as a 
fortress has virtually ceased to exist, and all that the 
Germans would have gained would have been so many 
more square miles of almost useless standing ground. The 
inference is that the objective] of the enemy is not [only 
military, but also moral or, as one might say, political. 
In pure strategy the capture of Verdun— or of the 
ground upon which the forts of Verdim had once stood — 
would be no great thing ; but the Germans evidently 
think that it might have far reaching and important 
political results. Not only would it reassure civilian 
opinion in Germany itself, but it might prevent certain 
neutral nations from coming in on our side, while pro- 
ducing in others an im]M-ession that the Germanic powers 
were still moving from victory to victory, ri^ully it 
might affect in the same fashion civilian opinion in the 
Allied countries, and especially in this country, and so 
make it possible for Germany to conclude a peace on 
terms more favourable than she can otherwise hope to 
obtain. 
It would be easy to tind in the enemy's own dispatches 
conlirmation of this view of his present objective. Mr. 
Belloc gives a striking example elsewhere in this paper. 
The temporary cajjture of an important part of the 
plateau of Douaumont was, so far as it went, a genuine 
military success, and might well have been claipied as 
such. The capture of the jort of Douaumont was merely 
the capture of an empty shell. Nevertheless the 
Germans claimed the capture, not of the plateau but of 
the " fortress." That means that they were appealing 
not to military, but to civihan judgment. 
On the other hand, it is the principle of the f rench 
commanders to take note of military considerations alone. 
They will yield ground wherever they choose, an4 allow 
the Germans to claim " victories " wherever they choose 
provided they can make each advance sufficiently expen- 
sive to the enemy. They will meet each assault with 
the minimum number of men inflicting the maximum 
amount of loss. They will be careful to keep in being as 
large an untouched reserve as possible against the time 
when in their judgment a decisive blow against the 
enemy may most hopefully be struck. 
Now these two policies, which appear in such 
marked contrast throughout recent operations, really 
depend upon the same consideration, which from hence- 
forward must necessarily pro\-e the dominant factor 
in the war. It is a consideration which has from the first 
been continually einphasised in these columns. It is 
now admitted, even by those who were at most pains to 
deny or belittle it. It is the approaching exhaustion 
of the German reserves. 
A foolish suggestion has been put forward in some 
quarters that this approaching exhaustion is di.sproved 
by the gigantic effort which the Germans are now piaking. 
This, of course, is the exact reverse of the trutji. The 
effort does not disprove the fact referred to ; but the fact 
explains the purpose of the effort. No one ever sug- 
gested that the enemy was already seriously crippled by 
the lack of effectives. What has been maintained, and 
what is now admittedly true, is that he must ev'entually 
iind himself so crippled — and that at no very distant 
date — because he possesses no reserves sufficient to keep 
his army at full strength by replacing losses. Therefore 
he cannot afford to w^ait. Before that time arrives when 
his reserves fail him, he must cither obtain a decision, of 
which he probably now despairs, or alternatively must 
produce so considerable an effect on opinion in Allied 
and neutral countries as may enable him to make peace 
on terms which shall at least leave his military power in 
being. He has no choice save to make some move 
which may give him the chance of producing such an 
effect. If he awaits the event he virtually accepts defeat. 
The ^ame considerations which make it necessary 
for the Germans to force an immediate issue if they can, 
dictate the wise policy of the Allies in refusing, so far as 
possible, such an issue, until the enemy is further weak- 
ened, and the exhaustion of his reserve begins to tell. This 
is the settled policy of the soldiers, both French and 
British, and it is an eminently sound one. 
But the enemy's attack is primarily on civihan opinion, 
and it should be our business to see to it that that attack 
is ineffective. The soldiers, who alone are qualified to 
judge in such matters, have the whole business in their 
hands, as they ought to have. Th«y are determined upon 
the military annihilation of Prus.sia as the only end worthy 
of the sacrifices of this war. Tlicy believe that they can 
achieve it. It should be our affair to see that they are 
not embarrassed or diverted from their task by ajiy such 
civilian clamour as the enemy ardently desires to see 
raised in this country and elsewhere. They will strike 
when they arc ready, and what we can all do is to await the 
event with reasoned and therefore increasing confidence. 
