L A NM) AND \\' A T E R . 
March 9, 1916. 
along which a similar narrow column of attack advanced 
successfully against Kix Station a week ago and was 
repelled. Closely following this road runs the railway, 
and I have marked it upon the above sketch map with 
the number 2. 
The third road is a small country road, but hard and 
with a good surface, which runs eastward as far as 
Moran\ille and then turns southwards making for 
Chatillon, only on the reaching and taking of which 
village can the assault of the heigiits with their crowning 
batteries begin. 
This road I have marked " j " upon tiie sketch. 
It presents a characteristic making it very difticuit for 
use in attack, which is that on reaching Moranville a 
column following it -is presented in flank, and at the 
short range of only j,4(M) yards, to batteries behind, and 
obser\ing from the little lum]) of clay in tiie I'lain 
called " Hill 255."' The approach to Moranville itself 
is hidden from the observers by a little depression, but 
the road going southward out of Moran\ille towards 
Chatillon follows a slight cle\'ation above the brook called 
Voche, and is murderously exposed, not onl\- to the field 
guns just under the escarpment, but to the batteries on 
the escarpment itself, and is under full observation from 
the summit of the hills. That is why the Germans the 
other day made so determined an attempt to capture 
this obser\ation point and shelter for field batteries 
called Hill 235. As we know, they failed, and probably 
if we knew the details we should lind that they failed from 
the state of the ground once the high road was left bv 
the troops deploying northward against Hill 255. 
But after this Moran\ille-Chatillon road, which is 
so inconvenient for their purpose, there is nothing they 
can use until you get to the great national road from 
Paris to Metz, more than five miles away. This road I 
have marked 4 upon the sketch. 
It in its turn was the a\-enue of approach for a dense 
and narrow column (supported by troops in a wood to 
the north of the place) which did succeed in carrying 
ManheuUes village ten days ago, but could not quite 
reach the west end of those ruins. 
It will be seen, therefore, that while we might reason 
from our knowledge of the country that the enemy could 
only use the few roads for his advance, and would there- 
fore be compelled to advance in narrow columns, we also 
find from experience that he has so attacked and has been 
confined to that attack and has been unable to deploy in 
the horrible mud of the W'ocuvre. 
There is a further point to be considered in this 
connecl.'on. Not only is the Wocuvre the impossible 
soil I have described, but precisely because the enemy is 
entirely confined in it to artificial causeways the 
junctions of those catiseways are very vulnerable points in 
his communications. Etain, Warcq, the cross roads of 
Aulnois (which get their name from a farm in the neigh- 
bourhood) Henneville, and the little bit of road just 
south of Fromezey with its branches leading north and 
south, Abaucourt and Moranville itself are under the 
long range guns concealed in the woods upon the heights 
of the Meuse. The very longest range involved, that of 
E*tain and Warcq, is only 11,000 yards. The other ooints 
are at lesser ranges averaging =5,000 to 8,000. Further, 
the roads of approach over the Woeuvre are, in nearly all 
their length, observable from the sunnnits, lying below 
one as upon a natural map. All these things combined 
make attack in strength from the \\'oeuvre at this time 
of year exceedingly difficult, and break the parallel with 
the Battle of the (irand Couronnc which developed south- 
ward indeed when the first Northern attacks had failed, 
but from much harder soil and in the height of the 
summer. 
Certain General Considerations. 
While the great battle thus stands still undecided, 
it may be well lo recapitulate certain general considera- 
tions, most of them I fear already familiar to the reader, 
but necessary to be borne constantly in mind, if we are 
to understand the objects and methods of the opposing 
forces. 
(i) The French deliberately refuse to make a main 
point of their foremost positions. Their whole theory 
in tactics as in strategy reposes upon the reser\ed mass 
of manoeuvre. 
(2) Consequently we must alwaj-s expect advanced 
positions at the beginning of an action of delay, that is, 
when they are on the defensive, to be successi\-ely 
abandoned, and this is not done without a loss of prisoners 
and guns. 
(j) The enemy is probably calculating in the main 
upon a superiority of munitionment for the moment. 
Hence his lavish expenditure for already more than a 
fortnight. The lulls in the battle have nothing to do 
with bringing up of guns, which occupy much the same 
positions they did on February 25th, the fourth day of 
the battle and the end of the retirement of covering 
troops. They have to do with the replenishment of 
shell, especiaily heavy shell. 
(4) Even now after more than a fortnight of battle 
the French have not moved their general reserve. 
(5) Failing the breaking of the French defensi\-e 
front as a whole, the only criterion of success or failure 
is in the purely military sense, the comparative expendi- 
ture in men. The whole French effort is aimed at making 
this expenditure immensely greater upon the enemy's 
side. 
(6) But from the enemy's point of view there is an 
obvious immediate political, as well as an ultimate 
military object to be obtained. He will therefore cer- 
tainly be prepared to sacrifice a very much larger number 
of men than he has already sacrificed if by that ex-penditurc 
he can put a few soldiers into the ruined suburbs of Verdun 
town, as he has put a few soldiers into the ruined suburbn 
of Soissons town. Meanwhile he is hoping to deplete the 
French reserve of shell. 
Certain Details. 
The scandalous scaremongering about the Fokker 
machine is now dead, but the following points may be ol 
service. 
The Fokker is simply a French Morane machine. 
It existed as a Morane machine in (iermany long before 
the war. The German copy of the Morane machine wa? 
not a rough copy but an exact copy down to the smallest 
details and down to measurements of a millimetre foi 
nearly all its parts. There is some difference in the 
angle and cur\ature of the wings. There is the replace- 
ment everywhere of wood by metal, save in the battens 
of the wings. It is slightly more complicated in itv 
apparatus of alightiitg (though preserving the character- 
istic " M ") and there is a little difference in the rudder. 
While upon this subject we may note the correction 
of a false German Communique which I think has not 
been noted in this country. This communique appeared 
on the 28th of January aiid stated that starting from 
the 1st of October, 1913, the Germans had lost up to that 
date (the 28th of January) 16 aeroplanes and the Allies 
63. The statement is simply a falsehood. The true 
figures for the period were 13 English losses and 17 
r>cnch, making a total of 30. The ascertained German 
losses in the sanie period were 11 on the English front 
and 20 cm the iMcnch front, making a total of 31. 
This somewhat belated information leads us to 
insist once more upon the utility — I should say the 
