LAND A N D W A T !• R . 
Marcli 0. IQI^"). 
Tho Britisli figures .qivo then about 2.6 men 
wmiudod to one man killed or dead. (1). 
' The separate (Colonial statistics give us a proportion 
not very different. 
\Mien we turn to other statistics, portions of which 
1 may aihide to, but the details of which are not public 
property, we have a rather hij^her multiple. To one man 
dead 3.35 wounded in one large category ; in another 
large, category, to one man dead, 3.4. 
If we ask ourselves why there is this difference 
between the lower British and Colonial multiple and tiie 
rather higher multiple in continental cases, the answer 
is that the maximum, or nearly the maximum number of 
troops in the field were being used from shortly afti-r the 
beginning upon the Continent, while in the case of the 
British and Colonial contingents the army iii the field 
has immensely increased from the beginning of the war 
onwards. / 
What has been the effect of this ? 
To answer that question we must appreciate the fact 
that the proportionate mortality is nuich higher in 
trench warfare than in " open " or " moving " warfare. 
At the beginning of the war you had such ratios at 
6. 7 and even 8 men wounded to one killed. It was only 
after the fixed trench warfare began that the ratio fell 
to 4 and 3. 
It is clear that in a field force fighting, not on immobile 
lines but with movement throughout August, September 
and much of October 1914 — three full months — and after 
that continuing uiiincreased for fourteen months mainly 
occupied in trench warfare, the number of wounded to the 
number of dead will be higher than it will be in the case 
of a force which was small while open lighting with 
movement was going on and got larger and larger after 
the higher mortality of trench warfare had begun. 
We should have, therefore, roughly, for our Conti- 
nental average something over 3, although the Britisli 
and Colonial average gave us something under ;. 
In the particular case of the Cierman Army we ha\e 
further to note that the whole of the liastern held has 
been characterised by a very much larger proportion 
of fighting with mo\ement to trench fighting than has 
been the case with the Allies in the Western field. 
If it be true of Continental troops in the Western 
field that, counting the open fighting and the trench 
fighting together, the multiple is somewhat over- 3, then 
it will be true of the (Icrman aniiy as a whole that the 
multiple will be still greater, because, though their lines 
be largely immobile upon the Western field, yet upon the 
ICastcrn fiekr (where first and last more than a third of 
their forces have been engaged), there has been continual 
movement. 
The general conclusion is, then, that the number of 
wounded is to the number of dead in the case of the 
( Icrman service appreciably more than three to one. 
The Cierman lists are here of hardly any use to us. 
They give us the impossibly low multiple of 1.7 to 1.8 
men wounded for each man dead — which is nonsense. 
If we take the number of dead, then, in the Cicrman 
service and multiply it by 3, we ha^•e a figure for the 
wounded in the same ser\-ice which is quite certainly a 
minimum. 
We may write down that minimum, then, at three 
viiUion. 
But when we have thus established a minimum 
gross total of wounded our task has only begun. For we 
nave next to decide what proportion of these icounded 
have iiithin the eoursc of 17 moiilhs, returned to the fii^httw^ 
line. 
\\'e here approach much the most difficult part of the 
subject, that upon which our terms are least capable of 
definition and that upon which exact statistics are most 
difficult to establish. 
11) The proportion of wounded to killed is ol nurse int)r}v.< usly 
liiSher when you take the case of a particular action, especially an 
action in which there is a grc.ir deal of nioveiuent, and in wliich nun 
appear in the open. I'or in.stance. at Loos it was 4.5. In the French 
offensive in Champagne it was 4.7. In such a great offensive as that 
which the Germans are now undertaking on the Verdun section it is 
])erhaps as high as 4 for the moment, in spite of the dense forma- 
tion in which the enemy atlacks. 
But this verv hijjh rate would be a most mi^Icadin); one to adopt 
at the present moment and ns applied to the whole year, because after 
the lapse of manv monih.< yiu get a greater addition to the dead 
whr ultiniateh' die from .sick'<?ss and wounds and also Ijccause, as is 
said in the^text, the proportion of wounded to dead in the trench warfare 
is luuch lower than in open ni ovcmcnt. 
I'nfortunately this, the least certain factor in our 
calculation is, at the same time, among the most im- 
portant. Vox it is clear that if we grossly overestimate 
or under-cstimate the number of wounded who ultimately 
return to acti\-c ser\ice, we shall falsify our conclusions 
alto(.;ether. An .'Vrmv's iwrmanent loss at any moment 
tloes not consist in the number of men who have been liit 
or sick up to that moment. It consists in the number f)f 
men who are at that moment oft the strength from all 
causes whatsoever. And this last figure is obviously 
in a large degree affected by th(> ]>roportion of returns, 
^'ou cannot bring the dead to life. Vou cannot, as a 
rule, release your prisoners. The first two categories of 
our four categories are therefore absolute. 
But you can so cure many of your wounded men 
as to rencler them as useful as tliey were before. 
What is the proportion of men out of all tho-c 
wounded who thus return to full active service? 
The difficulty of answering this cpiestion resides in 
the fact that over and above the number who really 
" return," that is, who are fit at last for the same strain as 
they left before they were wounded, there is a certain 
margin (and it is a large one) wliich can conceivably be 
used in capacities of \'arying usefulness, or at the worst 
can be kept inde'initely on the books of an army in the 
hope that sooner or later they may be put to some kind 
of use. . 
Out of a thousand men hit, 350, let us say, will be 
found,back again within such a space as a year in exactly 
the same capacity as they left before they were wounderi. 
But over and above these there will be a number difiicult 
to establish (it may be 200. or e\en 250, or it may be as 
low as 150), who are not fit for the duties they left and 
will not again be capable of full active serxnce. but can be 
put on to less onerous duties (clerical, sanitary, prison 
and frontier guard, communication work of certain kinds) 
thus releasing men fitter than themselves to take their 
places under the full strain of active service. 
A-fter the lapse of a very considerable period such 
as 17 months (and that is the period of war we are con- 
sidering up to the end of ic)i5) very great numbers of those 
wounded in the earlier part of a war will have been 
returned to the army from the hospitals as "cured." 
But in the same long period there has come in with regard 
to the use of the imperfectly cured and with regard to the 
use of those who, though as much cured as they ever will 
be, are permanently the worse for their wound, another 
factor in calculation which it is of the utmost importance 
to seize. 
During a certain short period alter the outbreak of 
hostilities, the iniperfeelly cured, the men who thouoh still 
capable of some service will never be the same again, can 
be absorbed by various forms of auxiliary work. 'J hey 
can be used for the different services I have mentioned 
la small proportion of the lighter work upon communications, 
hospital work, clerical work, etc.). and in this capacity ihev 
replace filter men than themselves, but this " ab'iorption " 
of inefficicnis is soon exhausted. After thai, if you retain 
them in your service as fart of your " paper army, 
you either have to create fobs for them b:hind Ihc fight- 
ing line, which jobs are pcrfecllv useless and merclv 
serve to swell your force on paper, or you 7nust frankly 
admit them to hs of no service to you bx'ause they cannot 
go into Ihc firing line and there is nothing for them 
to do elsewhere. Later, some of them come into use with 
the expanding necessities of the various auxiliary branches 
as the war proceeds (the medical for instance). But these do 
not check iiic decline of .the real fighting strength for there 
are no more fit men for them to replace. 
Now the number • required for medical help, for 
guarding prisoners, neiJtral frontier guards, policing 
occupied cities, etci, it4 not very great. The work of 
communications i<;.i in 'a veiy large degree, work which 
must be conducted hy able bodied men. There is onl\- 
a limited projwrtion of work which you can hand over 
to the less efiicient. 
In general, over and above quite a small fraction of 
\our " returns," the oixly returns that count arc the returns 
'jit for full active service:'' What arc the gross returns in 
such warfare as this, and what the net residuum of really 
fit ? 
As to the gross returnt ^vc have a good working rule of 
