J. WD AND WATER 
March 9, 1916. 
^ittle from the political clissonsjons, t^ic Press clamour, 
and the pcrsunai iutrif^ues. which^for fco long woakcnecl 
the hand of 1-incoln. Again, \vu arc happily not lighting 
against genius of the lirst order, for there is no (lennan 
soldier who can rank with Lee and Jackson. \\e are 
engaged with a far more formidable'powcr than the Soutli, 
but if we allow the possession of the great Confederate 
leaders to weigh against the lack of trained men and 
supplies, we may say that the North was the amateur 
and the South the professional ; just as to-day Britain is 
the amateur who begins by having the business to learn, 
and (iermanv is the professional who has studied the 
game for a generation. Like the North, we and our 
Allies ha\e the greater potential strength in men and 
wealth, but all Cicrmany's strength has been at her dis- 
posal from the outset, and we have had to make of ours a 
practical reality. Our jiroblem is the same — to beleaguer 
the enemy and then to breach the walls of his fortress. 
But we began, like the North, by ha\ing no consistent 
strategic plan, by having no real staff work at head- 
quarters, and by various divergent operations which 
clissipatcd our strength. JJke the North we ha\'e had to 
mobilise our man-power to an undreamed-of extent, and 
we have had to train it. We have also had to hnd the men 
who could use our strength, l^'ortunately they need not 
be geniuses. Genius is like the wind that bloweth 
where it listeth, and no man knoweth the way of it. We 
cannot connt on the advent of a genius — tholigh a Lee 
or a Napoleon would no doubt cliange the whole aspect 
of the struggle — but we have the right to look for leaders 
who can recognise where our assets lie, and use them with 
an undivided purpose. 
Our strategic objective is the same as that of the 
North, and our strategic plan is the same. We have 
succeeded, as the North succeeded, in blockading the 
enemv. But that is not enough, (irant had to figlit liis 
-wav through the enemy's defences and break him in a 
held battle, and that took two stubborn years. We have 
the same task. We cannot beat Germany by blockading 
her, though all that helps ; the finishing touch must come 
from a field victorj'. \\'e have no use for a complex 
an(^ showy strategy any more than (irant had. Our 
strategy must be simple, but it must be pursued with a 
single-hearted purpose and unwavering resolution. We 
have to mobilise every ounce of potential strength and 
so concentrate it as to over\vhelm the enemy. That was 
what Grant did, and only by doing that can we win the 
victory that Grant won. 
Other Parallels : Trench Warfare. 
There is another series of lessons to be learned from 
the American Civil War —technical lessons in the handling 
of troops. This is perhaps scarcely the place to enlarge 
on such a subject ; but one or two points may be noted. 
The first is the use of entrenchments. The great 
war of 1870 showed comparati\ely little spade work, 
at any rate in the earlier stages. But if you take such a 
campaign as Grant's in the Wilderness of Virginia in 
May 1864, vou will find that it developed very fast into a 
war of entrenchments. Both sides sheltered behind 
parapets of earth and felled timber, and the result was the 
kind of stalemate which we have seen for the past year. 
Grant, it will be remembered, turned the first position by 
a very audacious flank march, and Lee took up a second 
line, the line of Petersburg. This line was admirably 
chosen, for I^ee has never been surpassed in his eye for 
country. There (irant wore him down and ultimately 
drove him from his position. If we seek for parallels to 
the kind of frontal attacks on entrenchments which we 
have seen lately in the West there are plenty in the Wilder- 
ness campaign. The series of encounters which we call 
the Battle of Spottsylvania was such an attack. Mark 
what happened there. < irant found out a weak point in 
the Confederate line, and on May loth attacked witii three 
divisions after a long artillery preparation. The twelve 
battahons in the centre, like the Highland Brigade the 
other day at Loos, swept everything before them. They 
carried the first position, took 20 guns and i,aoo prisoners, 
and then swept on and carried the second position. But 
Lee deliverecl his counter-stroke, caught the Federals 
when their impetus was exhausted, and drove them back 
to. their original line. 
Grant's attack failed for one reason only —he had no 
reserves at hand. Two days later, early on the morning 
of May I2th, he made another desperate assault on a salient 
in Li,'e':i front, (^nce again the first posiition was carried ; 
once again the NortlK-rners were brought up against the 
second position and routed by Lee's counter-stroke. 
The same thing happened in many other battles of the 
American Civil War— at (lettysburg, for example, where 
the superb charge of Pickett's Virginians failed for lack of 
supports. When a frontal attack succeeded, as at 
Chickamauga and at Chattanooga, it was because behind 
the spear-head there was a spear-shaft. 
Have we not seen the same thing ? At Neuve 
Chapelle, at Festubcrt, at Loos, we delivered frontal 
attacks which succeeded brilliantly in the first effort. 
But there were no fresh troops behind them to give the 
finishing stroke, and the impetus slackened just when the 
vital point was reached. The lesson of the American 
Civil War is that, when owing to the nature of the adver- 
sary's ])osition, no man(eu\-re battle is possible and the 
only thing to do is to attack in front, that attack can<mly 
succeed if there are ample reserves —fresh troops who can 
carry on the impetus of the first assault. It was fortunate 
that the (iermans had ho Lee at their head to deal his 
deadly counter-stroke, for, if they had, Neuve Chapelle 
and Loos might have been for us not partial successes, 
but unrelieved calamities. 
Cavalry. 
A second point is the use of cavalry. The Civil War 
will repay thi close study of all cavalry officers. It pro- 
duced some really great cavalry loaders, like Job Stuart 
on the one side and Sheridan on the other. In shock 
tactics the American cavalry would probably have ranked 
below the cavalry of a first-class European Power. But 
they may be said to have discovered the mounted rifleman 
— men who could fight on foot or on horseback as occasion 
demanded, men full of initiative and self-reliance, who 
could lorm an impenetrable screen, or raid enemy com- 
munications, or urge a pursuit, or make a reconnaissance, 
or play their part in a set battle with equal competence. 
Happily in Britain we have learned this lesson. I think 
•we may fairly claim that our cavalry are the handiest 
in the world. In pure ca\alry work they showed great 
brilliance in the retreat from Mons, and at the first and 
second battles of Ypres they were as steadfast in trench- 
fighting as the best infantry. There is no parallel to 
such jjerformances on the (icrman side. Last September, 
when von Hindenburg made his desperate effort to cut off 
the Russian army in the Vilna salient, he flung 40,000 
troopers under von Lauenstein round the Russian right 
flank. They turned that flank completely, but thev 
could not hold their ground. They had no infantry with 
them, and the horsemen were routed by the Russian 
counter-attack. It was fortunate for Russia that the 
(icrman ca\alry were not true mounted infantrymen. 
Had they been trained on the British ]Aan. it is not un- 
likely that \on Hindcnburg's bold stroke would luwe 
succeded. 
These topics are suggested 10 an\one who cares to 
pursue the parallel. But that parallel is most instructi\ e 
in connection with the greater n^atters on which the 
success of the North depended. In almost all respects 
their problem was our own. (iiven greater wealth and 
more men, how could these best be used to crush the enem\' ? 
Like us, the North had to levy armies beyond its wildest 
dreams. It had to simimon the whole of its available 
man-power, and it had to use for this purpose the legal 
imperati\e. It had to learn how to train its le\'ies, so 
that the initiative of the volunteer should be preserved 
under the discipline of the corporate unit. It had to 
use its navy to hem in the enemy, and to starve and cripple 
that enemy. It had to find men to lead its armies who 
could get the full value out of its greater man-power 
and better equipmept. It had to find the right strategical 
plan and stick to it, discarding all divergent operations 
and brilliant side-shows. And when all this had been 
done it had to fight hard for success ; to deliver hammer- 
blow after hammer-blow till the armed strength of the 
South crumbled to pieces in the field. Potential strength 
was not enough ; it had to be made actual. Actual 
strength was not enough ; it had to be used. Nothing 
less than a complete and whole-hearted national effort 
availed. 
But when that effort was made, there was victory. 
