March 9, 1916. 
LAND AND W A T E R 
THE BULGARIAN OBSESSION. 
Bv Alfred Stead. 
Bl'LGARIA lias betrayed the Allies once, there 
is a danger that Bulgaria will cause the Allies 
to betray their word again. To understand 
the present situation in the Balkans, and to 
foresee the future. course of events, it is necessary to look 
a little closely into the Bulgarian question. Here we 
lind the cause of much that would otherwise be inexplic- 
able. It is necessary that we should understand this 
question, because it is far from having finished its sinister 
influence. The fact that the Bulgarian Monarch and 
his people are now fighting against us, or that they have 
devastated Serbia and shot down Enghshmen, does not 
preclude their endeavouring to run with the hare and hunt 
with the hounds. It is still necessary to warn against 
the efforts of those Englishmen, who, desirous of adver- 
tisement in Bulgaria and at home, become useful tools 
in Bulgarian liands. The Bulgarian seed has been well 
sown, one crop has' been reaped in Gallipoli, another in 
Serbia, the third is ripening north of Salonika. 
The obsession of the Allies for Bulgaria, the childlike 
belief in Bulgarian friendship would be touching were 
it not criminal. It has already brought the whole 
Near Eastern policy of the Allies into chaos. Serbia has 
been sacrificed, Roumanian aid has been made more diffi- 
cult to secure, while Turkey has been granted a new lease 
of resisting power. The Bulgarian obsession is also 
responsible for the Dardanelles campaign. And yet to 
those on the spot, to any honest man with a knowledge 
of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Monarch it was certain 
that Bulgaria must go against the Allies. And the only 
change in the situation to-day is that the Germans have 
Ferdinand in their hand as surely as he had the Bulgarians. 
Remarkable Astuteness. 
The Bulgarians have shown remarkable astuteness in 
])reparing the public opinion in this country and in 
France and Russia, making them believe that they 
knew Bulgaria, but that was no reason why English- 
men and Frenchmen of ability should have allowed 
themselves to become Bulgarian catspaws. They may 
be left to their consciences. The future must, however, 
be guarded against. 
In Bulgaria there was, from the beginning, and is 
now only one element to be considered, and that the 
Bulgarian King, Ferdinand of Coburg, who had gradually 
gathered into his hands all the national life-cords. There 
was nobody else who counted, no minister or individual. 
He was supremely absolute, and his people knew it well. 
The successive Bulgarian ministers were so many puppets 
and had as much fay in their actions as the dolls in a 
marionette show. It was not only that they were afraid 
of their foreign ruler, whose ability to think quicker than 
they earned an unloving respect, but Ferdinand had 
taken every precaution to ensure their obedience. 
It would be difticult to find a prominent Bulgarian 
politician who could not be forced to confess that 
Ferdinand possesses documents or proofs destructive of 
his career and imperilling his life. And the posses- 
sion of these proofs of unsavoury transactions, financial 
))rincipally, but occasionally worse, made it easy for the 
King of Bulgaria to call his ministers to heel. Daneff, 
Radoslavoff, Gueshoff, Ghenadieff, none of these had any 
real say in the making of war or the determining of policy. 
Tiiey were more impotent than thii Peace Party in Con- 
stantinople before Turkey made vvar on Russia. They 
could grow rich while in office, to live in uneasy aiflucnce 
afterwards, but they have never been other than political 
eunuchs. The Bulgarian people, a Tartar race, with their 
nomadic instincts not yet Eradicated, had inherited 
from the Turkish domination an atmosphere of petty 
mistrust of each other, which riiade tlie handling of 
them by Ferdinand and his tools an easy matter. 
Nor must it be overlooked that for thirty years 
they have acquiesced in Ferdinand's sway — in a land 
where assassination is more easy of accomplishment than 
is the mobbing of a minister here. 
And as to Ferdinand's views in the present war there 
could never be any doubt. He was inevitably and whole- 
heartedly with the Central Powers, both by inclination 
and calculation. Nor is the reason far to seek. Not only 
was he always more than fialf Austrian in his ideas, due 
largely to his upbringing at Vienna, but it was evident that 
he could only realise his ambitions by alliance with Berlin. 
Principle of Nationality. 
The Allies had enunciated the principle of nationali- 
ties as the fundamental basis of the war, and the success 
of this principle meant ruin to all Ferdinand's ambitions. 
A man of tremendous ambiti(ms, inherited and developed, 
he could never be content with a minor role. Vain and 
arrogant, his ambition has always been to be the greatest 
of Near Eastern sovereigns. The principle of nationalities 
dooms him to be the least important. The inclusion in 
Serbia of the Serbians in the Dual Monarchy and in 
Roumania of the Roumanians of Transylvania inevitably 
makes these two states larger than Bulgaria, even with 
all Macedonia. 
It is impossible, hurriedly, to create Bulgarians ; 
the most that is possible is to argue that all Macedonians 
were Bulgarians. But this still left a Greater Bulgaria 
overshadowed by her neighbours, nor was there any possi- 
bility of Bulgaria coming into contact with Europe. Often 
and openly used Ferdinand to deplore the fact that he 
had to spend his life "a missionary of European civilisa- 
tion " amongst a barbarous race without any contact 
with Europe. It was therefore hopeless from the start 
for the Allies to offer Ferdinand Macedonia or part of 
Thrace ; it could not meet the needs of his ambition. 
On the other hand the Central Powers were able to 
offer him aggrandisement of territory on the ruins of 
Serbia and through the despoilment of Roumania. They 
were prodigal of promises — so prodigally gilded was the 
pill of future Bulgarian vassalage to Germany that 
Ferdinand was ready and willing to swallow it. There 
would be no Serbia, Roumania also would be much less 
enlarged — and promises were held out that in the later 
future Roumania might also disappear. There was, 
therefore, every chance of the greatest of his dreams being 
realised, and on the ruins of former Serbia a greater 
Bulgarian Tsardom march with a Germanised Austria. 
So obvious were the advantages to Ferdinand of 
alHance with the Central Powers that he, never hesitated. 
He was quite willing to risk his people in the attempt to 
realise his ambitions — especially so since he would far 
rather have the Bulgarian nation slaughtered than con- 
tinue to rule it as the least important of Balkan rulers. 
But it was necessary to gain time, to endeavour to obtain 
arms and ammunition, both lamentably short at the 
commencement of the war. The sturdy resistance of 
Roumania to the passage of war stores hindered greatlv 
the moment of Bulgaria's action. The Austrian and 
German forces were far away and for months Bulgaria was 
at the mercy of the Allies. An ultimatum with twenty- 
four hours for decision would have settled the Bulgarian 
question any time up to last autumn. 
Futile Negotiations. 
Nothing was done. Negotiations were commencea, 
carried on and recommenced. The astute Ferdinand 
was as much in his element as ever was Abdul Hamid, 
when maintaining an ec]uilibriimi of discord amongst the 
Great Powers. More than a match for the best diplomats 
and statesmen, his task with the diplomats at Sofia was 
easy, because they were certainly not of the first class. 
Utilising to the full the traditionary belief in Bulgarian 
gratitude to Russia, the King was able to con\ince the 
allied representatives that he was more than desirous 
to come in with them. Carefully coached by his future 
allies he tried on the game of disgusting Serbia by de- 
manding that the Allies should take from their small, but 
victorious ally, the fruits of the two Balkan wars. Serbia, 
violating her constitution, submitted to her own despoil- 
ment, and remained loyal to her Allies. 
Secingto what lengths the Allied obsession would go, 
and having an additional proof in their acquiescence in 
the Bulgarian loan in Berlin, the Bulgarians began to 
