L A .\ T^ A N 1) W A T E R 
March 9, 1916. 
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take grcartcr'rfsks. 'Of the' Geihian loan, a' Bulgarftin 
tx-Ministor said at the time that it was certain that 
Ciermany would never gnve Bulgaria money during' a 
war without liaving adequate guarantees from Bulgaria 
as to her decision. This would seem to iiave been the 
common-sense view, but the Allied diplomats at Solia were 
not disturbed. When in doubt they used to walk out 
to gaze u]xm the huge monument of the Tsar Liberator 
and be reassured as to Bulgaria's gratitude to Russia. 
They did not realise the pregnant fact that when a people 
feel the need of erecting monuments to prove that they 
are grateful, the gratitude is nuich less living. Tiie Tsar's 
moinnnent at Sotia is not a sign of gratitude, it is it's 
tombstone. 
In Bucarest everyone was aghast and dumbfoundered 
at the doings in Sofia. Intercourse was free between 
the two countries for passengers, although the Bulgarians 
ga\e as little facility for the passage of Roumanian goods 
as did Roumania for Bulgarian war stores. Roumanians 
returning from Solia reported the Bulgarian capital as 
" more German than Berlin." there was open talk of war 
against Serbia. Bulgarians in Bucarest talked naixely 
of " taking Macedonia by force and remaining friends 
with Russia and neutral." The evidence that the Allies 
were ready to sacrihce Serbia con\'inced the Bulgarians 
that there was no real objection to a Bulgarian occupation 
of Macedonia. German officers, easily recognisable in 
their civilian clothes, passed through every da\', German 
under-officers also. For months before the Bulgarian 
mobilisation German instructors were training Bulgarian 
troo])s while the general staff at Sotia was being trans- 
formed into a German war machine, (ierman aeroplanes 
alighted in Bulgaria and were allowed to go on their 
way to Constantinople, others remained in Bulgaria. 
It must be said that in Bucarest the German agents and 
officers passing through were never at any pains to con- 
ceal their certainty of Bulgaria's entry on their side. 
Active Preparation. 
During this time of active and almost open German 
preparation, several Allied missions, more or less official, 
visited Sofia and were charmingly entertained by King 
Ferdinand. They all emerged from the fatal atmosphere 
of the Sofia diplomatic circle saturated with a conviction 
that Bulgaria was surely pro-Ally — and they were intelli- 
gent persons, having some of them pretensions of know- 
ledge of near-eastern affairs ! And so the fool's paradise 
continued even up to the end. It if probable that even 
after the Russian ultimatum had been delivered, the 
Allied diplomats hoped for a Btdgarian acceptance. 
The i^ussian Minister in Bucarest only a few days 
before the outbreak of war asserted that Bulgaria's 
mobilisation was solely directed against Turkey. To the 
lay mind of course it seems curious that even the fact of 
(iermany through her ally. Turkey, ceding territory to 
Bulgaria during wartime should have failed to convince 
the Allies that Bulgaria was " sealed " to the Central 
Powers. It is perhaps not surprising that Russia should 
have been reluctant to believe in Bulgarian betrayal, but 
that was no reason why the other Allies should follow 
blindly in the same way. Common prudence would have 
suggested some sort of insurance against mistake, some 
military preparation which would ha\e enabled the Allies 
to strengthen their position in the Balkans and gain 
weight at Sofia, while avoiding the awful error of remain- 
ing at the mercy of a belief in Bulgaria's friendship. 
It is only just to Bulgaria to say that it is doubtful 
whether she ever made any jiromiscs. 
Thus Bulgaria was able to mobilise, to concentrate 
leisvnely and strike when her Central .Allies had made 
good their promises of crossing the Danube. In Bucarest 
and Nish it was well known where the Bulgarian troops 
were concentrating, but not even jjreventive measures 
were allowed to Serbia because " we are negotiating at 
Sofia and hoi)C to arrive at fa\>ourable results." It was 
delightful for the Bulgarians, whose fear was that the 
Serbian armj' would occupy Sofia before they could 
concentrate for adequate defence — they certainly never 
hoped to be allowed time to concentrate for successful 
offence. Thanks to the Allied obsession, however, even 
this was not denied them. 
I'hv Bulgarian refusal to accejit tlic Russian ultima- 
luin came as a thunderbolt to the diplomats at Sofia '. 
■' The visit of the British and French ministers to the Palace, 
the remaining of the R\issian minister, all after the break- 
ing off of relations between the Allies and Bulgaria, were 
final proof of the reluctance to believe the obvious, to 
admit that Bulgaria had played them false. The Blur 
book on the events in Turkey before the war is melaucliol) 
reading with its pathetic reiteration that " the peace 
party are gaining ground," even while the " Gocbcit and 
Hrcslau " and the German detachments were llaimting 
the victory of the German triumph over the peace party. 
It is unimaginable that there will ever be a Blue book on 
the Bulgarian negotiations— it would be sub-edited away. 
Removing Ferdinand. 
And so Bulgaria went to war and Serbia was sacrificed! 
The simplest nu'thod of proving the Russian contention 
that the Bulgarian ])eople were at heart with Russia and 
that it was only tlu' King who was .\ustrian would have 
been to remove Ferdinand— a sacrifice of one life to sa\'e 
thousands. Then, and then only, would it liave been 
possible for the Bulgarian people to show that their 
sentiments were other than those of their ruler. This 
is no longer possible. The a^isassination of Ferdinand 
would not release the Bulgarians from the German swa\'. 
The argument of the jjro-Ru-sian inclinations of the 
Bulgarians with its corollary that the Bulgarian troops 
would not fight against Russians is no sound one. 
Besides, the Bulgarians are told nothing, know nothing 
save that which their rulers choose to tell them. A 
Bulgarian Colonel, captured near Pirot. did not know 
of tile Russian manifesto nor that Russia had declared 
war. He said quite sincerely : " Why should Russia 
mind if we take Macedonia ? " If a Colonel did not know 
of Russia's action what is to be expected of the rank and 
file ? They are simply food for cannon and will fight 
against the Russians if ordered to. 
That they will surrender is also i>robable because 
they will be tired of the war and, having Macedonia, they 
will think there is nothing more to be gained. The 
Bulgarians have a touching belief that in the final settle- 
ment, Russia will allow tliem to keep their spoils. To 
honest men it is a terrible, an unconceivable idea, but it 
exists in Bulgaria and is not unknown in Russia. How 
it is to be reconciled with our obligations to Serbia and 
our interests in Roumania it is difficult to conceive. In 
the fairness of things and for future peace in the Balkans, 
Bulgaria should disapjicar. Better tlie Turk than tin; 
Bulgar. The clearer it is made that the Bulgarian 
obsession no longer has wei.glit with the Allies the more 
possible is it to hope for Roumanian co-operation. If 
Roumania were to believe tluit there exists a policy of 
resuscitating Bulgaria without or with Ferdinand, of 
taking the Bulgarians again to the Allied bosom, it is 
certain that the six hundred thousand Roumanians will 
not participate in the coming Balkan campaign. 
Cost of Mistakes. 
\\'e have surely paid dearly enough for our mistaken 
belief in Bulgaria, we have made Serbia pay more dearly 
and it should be inconceivable that we should still be 
ready to be gulled. It is all very well for the Bulgarians 
to dream of being forgiven — their German taskmasters 
will not allow them to act independently during hostilities. 
Afterwards will come the tug-of-war, but if the true facts 
of the double dealing of Ferdinand (and the Bulgarians arc 
as guilty as he, since for 30 years they condoned his 
doings) come to be known, not even the mo: t ardent 
devotee at the shrine of Bulgaria as pictured by the 
Balkan Committee will dare to ad\ocate mercv. 
The allied ■ pact guai'anteeing the restoration and 
future integrity of Belgiiim should have its counteri)art 
in a combined dtH:laration on the part of this country, 
France, Russia aiid Italy, that Serbia will be re-created as 
before the war, wliate\ermay happen as to the Serbians 
of Austria or Hungary. Such a declaration would clear 
the Balkan air eiiormously. 
The question' is clear and vital, the Allies must choo.sc 
between a second-hand Bulgarian army and a fresh 
Roumanian one. They cannot entertain any idea of 
welcoming l>ulgaria. into the Allied fold and hoix- to win 
Roumanian to-o^K'ration. And to-ilay the decisi\e 
word in the Balkans is with R(jumania. 
lO 
