L A X D A N D W A T K R 
March lO, i<)iG. 
THE WINGS OF VERDUN. 
By Hilaire Belloc. 
CORRECTION OF TWO ERRORS. 
BEFORE turning to the main subject of the day, I 
must apohigise for two errors which appeared 
in my work of last week relative to the German 
losses. Between them the minimum of German 
losses arrived at was far too low. • 
The first was an obvious but stupid clerical error, 
the omission of one item in the addition I was making. 
1 left out the category of Sick. The first item should 
have been ',,430,000 instead of just under three millions. 
The second error was an error in method, and there- 
fore of its nature more serious. It consisted in adding 
the whole of the " floating balance " of sick and wounded 
to the other losses. 
To do this is to overlook an overlap. For of those 
who have fallen sick or who have been wounded and 
who remain in hospital, on a particular date, a certain 
(and vcrv large) jiroportion reappear in the permanently 
disabled from sickness or wounds. 
This error of mine reduces the value of the floating 
liospital balance by pretty well half. The true figures 
give one a minimum not of three and a quarter millions, 
but of just over three and a half millions (3,650,000) up 
to December 31st, ic)i5. 
I owe this ajjology to my readers for the first clerical 
slip in a very large number of such additions carried on 
for manv monthij, but I think 1 ought to add that the 
combined result of this clerical error and error in a detail 
of method do not gravely affect a right judgment upon the 
present situation, because the minimum arrived at is 
certainly below tlie truth. Tiie truth is certainly nearer 
four millions. 
For the benefit of those wlio may still doubt such 
figures let me give a few simple illustrations showing how 
normal they are for the rate of wastage of the present 
war. 
(1) If the German Empire was losing at a rate not 
greater than the average of the British forces actually in 
the field since the first ILxpeditionary Force left these 
shores, its total wastage would be somewhat over four 
millions. 
(2) - Such a loss (4 millions) means that in the course 
of 1 7 mcmths the Germans have lost about as many men 
as thev permanently keep in the field. Now we know 
that among the Allies in the same period the wastage 
of each army is very much the same as the average 
total force maintained in the field. We find this to 
be roughly true of all the armies engaged in this 
war, though of course there are certain not very high 
difte;ences, in favour of the Italians for instance (for the 
time thev have been fighting), somewhat in favour of 
the French, rather against the Austrians and the Russians. 
The proportion is largel\- affected by whether the fighting 
has been on lines or of movement and the proportion 
between the two. 
(3) Such a rate of loss (4 millions) for the German 
Army means a total real wastage of less than 6 per cent, 
a month. Of course the figure of 15 per cent, a month 
given in Parliament for the British Infantry is nonsense. 
But there is nothing unreasonable about 6 per cent, a 
month, and it is perfectly consonant with the experience 
of every belligerent during this great campaign. 
{.\) No one has recourse to abnormal methods of 
recruitment in a conscript country until exhaustion is 
approaching. Why should he ? Now even the incor- 
poration of men in their 20th year {i.e., in the year when 
they attain their 20th birthday) is abnormal, in the sense 
that it is unknown to peace training. But the men in 
their 20th year arc what is called " the class 1916." We 
know how heavily Fraijce has sufifered, and we know 
that she has trained her Class 1916. We know that 
Germany also has called out and trained this same Class. 
But tht; significant point is that Germany has already 
used large pari 0/ it in the fighling. France has not. 
.Altogether there is no reason to doubt that the 
German Empire is suffering wastage at much the same 
rate as the other belli.-erents, rather less than some, 
rather more than others. If this be so the total dead- 
loss of its armies cannot, by the end of December, have 
been far short of four million. To believe that it is as 
low as three million, fur instance, is to believe that 
Germany has cautiously kept to lines, spared attack, in 
attack used open order as much as possible, cut losses 
whenever an action became doubtful : We know that a;, a 
matter of fact the exact opposite has been the case in 
each of these points. 
The only alternative is to b-iievc that the Germans 
work miracles, .'\gainst the religious mood which accepts 
such an attitude towards them there is no arguin g. 
THE BATTLES ROUND VERDUN. 
riie third week of the great German assault upon the 
Verdun lines was occupied in the main with very heavy 
attacks upon the two wings of the shallow crescent now- 
formed by those lines. Upon the south-eastern wing the 
enemy made during the whole of that time the most 
determined efforts to capture the heights oxerlooking 
the ravine of Vaux : upon the western wing he made the 
most determined efforts to master the Goose Crest with 
its culminating point of the Mort d'Homme. both by 
direct assault and by a turning movement directed against 
Bethincourt. 
There were also short but very \igorous expensixc 
and futile efforts directed against the right centre from in 
front of Louvemont to Douaumont, but the main effort 
was upon the two wings. 
In either case the attacks were distinguished by f)nc 
general feature : Very large forces were launched at 
intervals of about two days. In other words, there were 
upon each wing three main assaults in the course of the 
week, the intervals occupied by bombardment and the 
last assault the most powerful. In each case the attack 
achieved a slight final progress after an intermediate 
check, and in each case up to the Monday night, the 13th, 
the assault had failed in its main object at a cost quite 
out of proportion to the little belts of territory acquired. 
With this cost I shall deal in a moment, but I wuild 
first set down in detail the main attacks upon the two 
wings, which we may call respectively " Vaux " on the 
south-east or French righl, and the " Goos:? Crest" 
upon the west or French lejl. 
(I). Vaux. 
The village of Vaux (as who should say in English 
" Dale ") before it was ruined in this battle, iay on either 
side of one street in the depth of a ravine which has to 
the north of it the plateau of Douaumont and to the 
south of it a plateau bearing the abandoned fort called- 
after the village itself, the Fort of Vaux. The edge of 
the northern plateau, 'that of Douaumont, is rather the 
higher, standing some 300 feet above the village. The 
southern one is about 20 feet lower. Both are crowned 
at the summit with woods. That on the north, the Wood 
oi Hardaumont ; that on the south, the Wood of Chcnois. 
Just north of the village of Vaux, upon the slopes of the 
escarpment, are a couple of redoubts, abandoned when 
the permanent defence of Verdun was given up for a field 
defence in 19x4, but still affording shelter for defence. 
The reader should particularly notice these works 
(which are called " The Works of Hardaumont " from 
the wood on whose edge they lie), because some nns- 
understanding has arisen with regard to them. Though 
King in the neighbourhood of Vaux they have nothing 
to do with the l-'ort of Vaux which was, when armed, 
a closed fort on the edge of the escarpment to the south 
of the village and formed an outwork of the Verdun ring. 
Upon Saturday the 4th of March, and with increasing 
violence throughout Sunday, 5th, an intensi\-e bombard- 
luent was (l(>livered against the edge of the Northern 
plateau and Hardaumont wood. It seemed the prelude 
to an attack, but on the Monday no attack was delivered. 
It was upon Tuesday the 7th that the first considerable 
effort in this scries was made. The redoubt north ol 
