I. A N i^ A N 1^ \y A T E R 
March 16, iQif). 
because the Uintl round it lent itself tofortitication ; tlu re- 
lore it would be strong even when such fortihcation 
became no more than field works. For, of course. Verdun 
as a " fortress " no longer exists. It was no more than a 
jmrticular i)art of the 500 miles of French line (li^rat ter- 
ised by great local strenfith. a considerable accumulation of 
supply, and the junction of communications, as also by 
the fact that it was the nucle\is of a prominent salient. 
Well, consider all these points and see how the lapse 
of time affects them, quite apart from its effect upon 
(ierman losses. 
P'or the breaking of a front, rapidity, the concen- 
trated value of your blow, is everything. The Dunajetz 
was a proof of this, and the partial success of the Allied 
offensive in September. The Allied offensive in Septem- 
ber did not break the German front, but it smashed up the 
first line (which was held in full strength), and all the 
effective work was done in a few hours after the close of 
the bombardment. 
The (ierman attack upon Verdun liar., through the 
effect of time, utterly lost this character. I am trying to 
break through my enemy's wall with a battering-ram. I 
give a violent blow, open a breach in it, but Imd a second 
wall behind. Against this second wall the impetus of 
my battering ram is such that it gives that second wall a 
bad dent, but cann<it break it. My battering ram is of 
such a nature that in the act of acliieving its first success, 
and of striking against the second wall, in every impact, 
it loses a certain large percentage not only of its momen- 
tum, but of its actual stuff. 
That is a metaphor fairly describing what happened 
in the .Mlied offensive in September so far as a mere blow 
was concerned. In the supreme factor of numerical 
effect, of course, it was far more. For the wall and 
battering ram are both made out of armed men, and the 
bricks thrown down were far more numerous than the 
material lost to the ram. 
But now, suppose that in attempting to break down 
vty wall in his turn the enemy believes me to have built 
it upon his own plan of two main curtains standing one 
close behind the other, wherea;., as a fact, it consists of 
four or five much thinner curtains standing one behind 
the other and at last, behind all these, the main wall. 
My enemy delivers his blow, but finds that he has to 
deliver it four successive times, wasting his instrument 
heavily each time, and, long before he has reached my 
main wall, destroying all the effect of rapidity in his blow. 
That is a fair metaphor for what happened between 
February 2 1st and February 26th East of the Meuse, in 
front of Verdun. 
In this point, therefore, the effect of lime alone, quite 
apart from losses, is apparent, and the fact that the battle 
has gone on for now close upon three weeks, is a fact 
heavily in favour of the defence. 
Now for the second point : The desire, if one could not 
break a front, at least to cut off large bodies of one's 
opponents. 
The essential of such a plan is surprise, and surprise 
again can only be stated in terms of rapidity. The 
essence of surprise is to catch your enemy before be has 
had time to understand what you were at or, if he has 
already done that, before he has had lime to take full 
dispositions against it. 
1 believe that the big attack up the ravine against the 
position of Douaumont was something in the nature of a 
surprise, and had it succeeded it is conceivable or even 
probable that the main body of the defence lying between 
Douaumont and the Meuse would have been wholly or 
partly cut off. Failing, as it did, to do more than reach 
the edge of the plateau, this prime factor of time in an 
effort of surprise, rapidly diminished. It was already 
almost worthless when the French counter offensive was 
launched within three hours. It had <lisappeared within 
three days. The passage of ten more days has dissipated 
it altogether. 
But it is upon the thinl point, the moral or political 
effect at which the enemy aimed, that this effect of time 
is most noticeable. 
What may properly be called the " T,egend of 
Verdun " — the theory of a great " fortress," imperilled 
and about to " fall " — was prettj' strong on February 
iQth, when the first shots of the bombardment began. 
It was clearly apparent in the Press of neutral countries, 
and to some extent our own during the ne.\t few days. 
though it waned rapidly under the vigorous efforts of 
those writers who were concerned to emphasise the mili- 
tary truth for the public. It was shamelessly persisted 
in throughout the (ierman Press, until it became ludicrous.. 
ICven as late as last Tuesday, March 7th, German corres- 
pondents sp:'cially sent to the F"ront, were talking of the 
" groat French fortress " and " last fortress of the Allies." 
Hut long bi'fore that date the legend, even in remote 
neutral countries, antl even with tiie least robust of Allied 
civilians, was dead. There is perhaps no one left to-day 
outside (iermany who accepts that legend, and not many 
in Germany. It is to the honour, by the way, of the prin- 
cipal students of the war in that country that they did 
not lend themselves to the oflicial absurdity -but that 
is by the way. The point is that the moral and political* 
effect which would certainly have been produced in the 
last days of February had German soldiers reached the 
ruins of the suburbs of Verdun beyond the river, even at 
lo.i^es threefold th:-ir opponents, can now never be 
achieved. Should the area of Verdun be occupied after 
a month's effort and an enemy los?; of 300,000 men, even 
the least instructed opinion has had time to estimate thai 
result in comparative losses, which iire everything, and 
not in area, which is nothing. . H. B:u.[.oc. 
\Ouin^ to pressure on our space Mr. Bdloc's 
analysis of the A ustro-Hungarian losses is clef erred until 
next u'eek.\ 
THE LATE MR. JANE. 
Mr. Fred T. Jane, who died quite suddenly last week, 
had every student of naval affairs throughout the world 
his debtor. His annual "Fighting Ships " has long since 
been indispensable to all whosi interest in Navies was 
more than superficial. Its compilation from year to 
year gave Mr. Jane a knowledge of constructional and 
statistical detail altogether unique. But he was much 
more than a naval statistician. He was an omnivorous 
reader, and as his published books show, had a wide and 
curious knowledge of ancient as well as of modern s-a 
practice. 
For many years Mr. Jane had lived near Portsmouth, 
and iew men can have had a wider acquaintance amongst 
naval officers. His enthusiasm for the Navy was im- 
bounded, and it had been his habit to put his pen and his 
speech at the service of every movement either for 
strengthening the fleet: or bettering the fortunes of its 
personnel. His death leaves a gap no one can fill ; he 
will be mourned by more than those who could claim 
the privilege of his friendship. And they were many. 
Mr. Frederic Coleman, the author of From Mons to Ypres 
with French (Sampson Low and Co., 6s. net) has seen certainly 
as niuch, and probably more, of the actual fighting of the 
British Army as any civilian, having been on dutv with his 
car with the cavalry headquarters staff for the whole of the 
period of which his hook tells. The record that he gives is 
■' live " throughout ; there are hosts of good storids of the 
indomitable spirit of the men on the great retreat, in the 
battle of the Marne, and in the later days leading up to the 
great fighting about Yjjres. Altogether, this is one of the 
most mterosting books on the war that has yet been published. 
There is no evidence in the pages of The Trof>ici. by 
C. H. Ivnock (Grant Richards, i()s. net), to show that the 
auth()r has visited all the lands that he describes ; more 
especially when dealing with India and the Hast, the greater 
part of the work is such as might have been derived from 
f^uidc-books and geographical manuals— but his book is 
not to be passed over for that cause, for most people have 
neither the time nor the inclination to amass such a quantity 
of literature as would be necessary for all the information 
contained in tliis single volume. 
The Peruvian tableland, Chile, and the Andean plateau 
Renerally. receive the most detailed and intimate attention 
of any localities, as if here the author were on ground with 
which h;> is thoroughly familiar. I'or the rest, the reader 
may find descriptions of climate, geographical peculiarities, 
racial chara'-teristics, "if-ommercial enterprise and travel 
facilities, in all the tropical regions of the f,'lobe. For this 
object, evitlently the book has been compileJ, nn<l the oliiert 
i-i well achieved 
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