LAND AND WATER. 
March 23, 1916. 
thirds on the west and one-third upon the east. Roughly 
speaking this estimate gives us a minimum of three and 
three-quarter million and possibly as many as four 
million men. 
As to the second point, whether the true net wastage 
of an average infantry battalion can be at the rate of 15 
per cent, per month. This would mean that in a little 
over half a year our full strength had disappeared 
and that the rate of loss of our army in the lield so far 
as the infantry was concerned, was such tiiat the average 
field army would have to be renewed three times over 
between the outbreak of the war and the present day. 
Such figures applied to the Germans, for instance, would 
mean a total dead loss of not less than ten and a half 
millions and nearer twelve, which is obviously nonsense. 
It is quite possible, as I have admitted, that particular 
battalions, if you count all forms of wastage whatsoever, 
however temporary, if you include men being on leave 
and the rest of it, might show as high a wastage as 15 
per cent, in a particular set of months. The average rate 
of dead loss, that is of net total loss for the whole army, 
seems to be round about 6 per cent, per month. That, 
of course, is including the units which are not for the 
moment in the fighting as well as those which arc, and I 
sliould imagine that the average wastage for the units 
actively used was nearer nine per cent. 
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN LOSSES 
The second most important member of the original 
aggressive Alliance launched against Europe is the Dual 
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. 
We must make some appreciation of its losses up 
to the 31st of December, IQ15, if we are to arrive 
at any estimate of the detailed losses. But this esti- 
mate will be necessarily less general and therefore less 
conclusive than was the case with the (ierman Empire. 
There is a much larger margin of error. No one can 
accept so low a real figure as 3! millions for German dead 
loss. Few would accept — reasonable as it is — a figure 
over 4 million. That is a margin ' of error from the 
average either way of not quite 7 per cent. 
In the case of Austria-Hungary the margin of error 
is much larger, it is over i^ per cent. There are three 
reasons why this should be the case. 
First— and much the most important point.- Z//^' 
Dual Monarchy publishes no regular lists of .killed and 
uoundcd* There are not even private lists published in 
any useful number, such as the (ierman authorities 
' foolishly allowed to be published for so long. There have 
reached this country and other portions of the alliance 
occasional calculations based upon particular hospitals, 
but they are not sufficiently widespread to give a true 
axerage. 
The second reason the Austro-Hungarian losses are 
more difficult to calculate than the German is that the 
number of effectives in the field under the .\ustro-Huii- 
garian Colours, including the au.xiliary services, is more 
difficult to calculate. In the earlier part of the war 
my estimates of Austro-Hungarian losses were exagger- 
ated because the only mode of calculation available to 
me was a rough rule of thumb based upon the propor- 
tion between the Austro-Hungarian population and the 
German. But the Austrian army in the field is not of 
so high a proportion to the German as is the total popula- 
tion. The population is nearly 80 per cent of the German. 
But the army maintained in the field, as only became 
clear when fairly full evidence was available, is in :a 
smaller proportion than this to the German army main- 
tained in the field. Now it is largely upon the army 
maintained in the field and upon the rate of loss in 
particular units of it as observed by its opponents that 
total losses must be gauged when lists (which, however 
incomplete, are an admirable basis of calculation.*) 
are unobtainable ; the only other tests being the in- 
formation of spies as to (a) average numbers of drafts 
per month (b) admissions to hospital. 
Under this same heading we must remark that not 
only is the Austro-Hungarian army in the field smaller 
than the total population might seem to warrant, but 
also it is not quite certain that all possible elements even 
of that population are available for recruitment. Four 
per cent, of it, for instance, are in the annexed provinces 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. More than 16 per cent, of 
it is in Cialicia. It is probable that in the former category, 
and certain that in the latter, very large numbers of the 
later recruitment were not available, .\gain, there has 
been a verv heavy emigration from .Austria-Hungary, 
• The very interesting and informing Hungarian correspondent of 
the Morning Post mentions Usts. I take it they are not pubUc ones ? 
I'or none such are to my knowledge available. 
• .\s an example of how a falsified and incomplete list may bo 
of the greatest value a<«a foundation for an exact estimate. I will 
refer my readers to the note, three weeks ago, on the German Prisoners 
in I'ren'ch camps. Specific instances gave an error in tlie olTicial lists 
of 70 per cent. The lists, though thus proved false, were the foundation 
of an exact calculation. 
especially during the last twenty years, the losses in 
recruitment from which, though not to be exactly esti- 
mated are appreciable.* 
The third reason which makes it difficult to estimate 
the Austro-Hungarian losses is the nature of the fighting 
in which the Austro-Hungarian armies have been engaged. 
Save in the earliest months (jf the war, when the 
Russian and Serbian armies were engaged with Austro- 
Hungarian forces alone, that clu'ck upon calculation 
which consists in noting from prisoners and captured 
documents, from the occasional counting of bodies in 
front of the line, or, in the ca^e of an advance, of men 
left killed and wounded in the territory occupied, was not 
available. During the greater part of the seventeen months 
we are considering, German units were mixed up with 
AuLitrian against the Russians or against the Serbians, 
and there was some confusion consequent upon the check- 
ing. While upon the Italian front Austrian forces did 
not come into play until more than half the period had 
elapsed, and no one considerable Austrian offensive has 
taken place there. 
To these three main sources of difficulty we must 
add the peculiar form of recruitment which makes it 
more difticult in the case of the Austro-Hungarian forces 
to establish exactly the units in front of one than it is 
in the case of the German. Separate units upon different 
fronts often bear the same number. 
Having appreciated the difficulties we may yet turn 
to the evidence a\ailable. such a^; it is, and that, as in 
the case of all the other armies consists in several different 
forms of estimate independent one of the other, and check- 
ing one with the other. 
The first of these forms is the analogy with the known 
losses of other great groups in the War. 
The second is the proportionate losses noted in a 
large number of units by our Allies who are fighting the 
Austro-Hungarian troops and the averaging from these 
of total losses, together with the known number of 
Austrian prisoners taken by our Allies. 
The third form of estimate is drawn from what wc 
know of the classes the .\ustro-Hungarians ha\-e been 
compelled to call up, which is an index of their exhaustion. 
On the analogy of the other forces engaged in the 
great War we should arrive for the seventeen months at 
something approaching the average of the armies main- 
tained in the field. Germany with a field army (and 
auxiliaries) of rather less than four millions has lost from 
over three-and-a-half to less than four millions of men. 
And the German proiwrtion applies, as might be expected, 
with but slight differences to the other armies at work. 
The German authorities, in a statement made to. 
and used bv, their propagandists in neutral countries 
(particularly in Holland) have told us that their Ally's 
effectives are little more than half their own. They have 
put them at 56 per cent. 
Now it is obviously to the advantage of the German 
authorities when attempting to impress neutral opinion 
to make themselves out particularly efficient in mobilisa- 
tion as in everything else. Let us, however, accept this 
minimum German estimate and say that Austria-Hungary 
has maintained in the field, counting all auxilliary 
services, an army of no more than 2,400,000 men, 
making that number her standard and filling gaps as 
best she might. 
Tiien, on the analogy o f the other armies, we might 
• (Jne official estimate on llic Conlinent gives joo.oou lor tl;is 
figure. 
8 
